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MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1557

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SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFRICA DISCUSSED IN FRENCH SOURCE

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Nov 80 pp 41-52

[Article by Henri Paris: "Recent Soviet Actions in Africa"]

[Text] At the close of the 1950's Soviet influence in Africa was limited to Egypt alone. In 1980 nearly half of the continent is involved. Besides their embassies in 18 states there are 80,000 citizens of CEMA and Warsaw Pact countries stationed there. These personnel include civilians and military of Soviet, Cuban, East German, Czech, Hungarian, and even North Korean citizenship. Much more, 50 percent of these are military personnel organized into major combat units acting as such. The military presence of the East thus proves to be one of the principal forces in Africa, vastly stronger than that of the French, for instance.

An examination of this presence strives to determine the methods of the actions of the socialist states in this part of the world, as it has recently appeared. After recalling the constants of Soviet strategy one will be able to identify the methods of its application.

1. The Constants of Soviet Strategy

Soviet strategy in the Third World and more specifically in Africa is characterized by its very strict coherence and its permanence. It is guided by principles defined by the "peaceful coexistence" originated by Joseph Stalin in 1952 and which Leonid Brezhnev recalled at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU]. These principles, numbering four, continue to be absolutely immutable. In the first place the Soviets shun war as a solution of the inexpiable conflict opposing social systems. They accept noninterference in domestic affiars but the latter is exercised only within the framework of "socialist solidarity" which continues to be primary. The assertion of the implacable character of conflict flows from a second point: The maintenance of the ideological war. Third, deduced from the concept of "socialist solidarity" comes the support "for the proletariat struggling against capitalism." In the last place support "for national liberation struggles against colonialism and neocolonialism" is asserted. The latter point, incidentally, does no more than reiterate at full length resolutions of the Beku congress of 1920. It specifies that such support is available to all those who, even if they are not Marxist-Leninists, struggle against colonialist capitalists. Involved is a formula known since antiquity: The enemies of our enemies are our friends.

"Peaceful coexistence" involves elements opposed to each other such as the first, which rejects war, and subsequent ones which enunciate principles of struggle whose effects are grouped by Westerners under the term indirect strategy. The Soviets must however maintain the coherence of the concept and reduce the antagonisms within it. In Marxist language one would say "to reduce internal contradictions."

It follows that Soviet strategy is marked by opportunism and prudence. The Soviet Union cannot violate any article of this "peaceful coexistance" and notably the first point. To avoid having a conflict degenerate into an open and generalized struggle which could only be convulsive, the Warsaw Pact takes good care never to place any of its troops in a situation which could confront them with forces of the Western camp. "Striving to get pickings" has been the rule with the watchword "two steps forward and one step backward and even more if necessary with a readiness to resume the offensive later and elsewhere." A setback such as that which the Soviets experienced in Egypt was taken completely in stride and has never modified their strategic approach. Remarkable perseverance in action thus emerges. Egypt was evacuated in the interest of new Soviet ensconcement in Somalia, which was evacuated in turn for Ethiopia. Idi Amin Dada, who can certainly not be taken as a pure socialist, was abandoned in the interest of his Tanzanian enemies. Support was given Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi who is not a Marxist-Leninist either and could even be charged with religious obscurantism by the orthodox communists. At present the Soviets are increasing their studies of Islam and find in it a large number of positive points which run in the direction of socialism, but they stress at the same time that this does not mean that they are abandoning a single iota of their own materialistic and atheistic viewpoint.

Concurrently, the parity institutionalized by the SALT agreements, as Henry Kissinger would say, reduces the margin of maneuver of American action. Consequently, the East sees its own initiative growing.

The master scheme presiding over the establishment of socialism thus remains constant and still obeys the same criteria identified by Marxism-Leninism. It is valid for any state, whether Western or African. What is involved is to apply the law of historical materialism which holds that any society must pass successively through the stages of feudalism, bourgeoisie, and imperialism to achieve a dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism. Specifically, it is first necessary to bring about the organization of a communist party, a creation which will be all the easier to achieve as the ensconcement of Eastern countries will be strong and the country will be the prey of social antagonisms. In a second stage the communist party becomes the single party and eliminates domestic oppositions. The country then falls of itself into the socialist orbit, which is completed by the conclusion of a mutual military assistance treaty of the type that binds the Soviet Union to its allies of the [Warsaw] Pact. That country then becomes won over to socialism. This final stage has not been reached in any African country however. Ethiopia came closest to it in 1979 in the intermediate stage with the establishment of a committee charged with the formation of the single party.

2. Soviet Strategy in Action

The implementation of Soviet strategy involves two types of means, civilian and military. It is however necessary to determine that action proper has witnessed a series of setbacks for the Soviets, which may appear paradoxical when one views the overall result.

The Civilian Field

Conditioning any penetration, the first manifestation of the Soviet presence is diplomatic or similar representation that can assume very significant dimensions. By this means Soviet influence begins to be exercised by assuming an institutional structure thanks to a series of cooperation and assistance agreements.

Cultural cooperation has been exercised through the organization of universities of the Third World in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary. Agreements were signed in 1979 with the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Togo. Their purpose is to train elites in the Marxist-Leninist mold. This cultural cooperation seems to have failed, however. The agreement with the Central African Republic became pointless with the fall of [former Emperor] Bokassa. Its most tangible manifestation and the most recent one is in Somalia where more than 10 years of cooperation failed to prevent Somali irredentism from turning against the USSR as soon as the latter espoused the Ethiopian cause even though that cause was marked by the seal of socialism. Ethiopia itself offers a contrary example, for the socialist elites who have assumed power in the country were not trained in Moscow. The value of cultural investment cannot however be totally denied for, even when it does not inculcate loyalty to the Soviet Union, "the first country of the workers," it helps to establish ways of thinking. This concern has led the Soviets to develop all the means of communication, especially radio broadcasts. More recently, in 1979, the USSR concluded an agreement with Algeria and Iraq for the broadcasting of television programs by bringing them into the "Inter-Sputnik" network.

Commercial agreements favor Soviet penetration but must rather be considered as business pure and simple prompted by the necessity to improve the Soviet economy. That is the case of the agreements signed with the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea [Conakry] for bauxite. It is also the case of phosphates which have been the subject of Soviet-Moroccan agreements. This trade between the East and Africa is small if it is compared to African trade with the West.

Agreements on engineering services and the export of technology are more significant, even if they are not free from strictly commercial concerns. Accordingly, in addition to a commercial agreement, an accord was signed with Nigeria in 1979 for the establishment of a series of technical institutes, but in parallel manner that country has sought a reduction in the number of [Soviet] technical cooperation personnel. In the same field the Soviets anticipate building electric power stations for Guinea-Bissau and hydroelectric facilities in Tunisia.

The Soviets have considerable interest in maritime matters. One finds there commercial concerns which are however very largely linked to military goals. It is thus possible to note an agreement for the improvement of ports in the Cape Verde Islands, a maritime agreement with Madagascar accompanied by a plan for the upgrading of road and railroad communication facilities, as well as an agreement on posts and telecommunications. There is also an agreement with Mauritania for the supply of a research center including a system for surveillance of the ocean depths.

It should be stressed that the realization of these major projects gives a risky aspect to the prospects of political alignment. The example of Egypt with the Aswan [High] Dam built by the Soviets is ample evidence of the latter. In the past 2 years

the Soviets have thus witnessed a series of setbacks. Cape Verde refused to grant a naval base to them. Mauritania and Equatorial Guinea are reluctant to renew their fishing agreements. Tunisia suspended visiting rights for Soviet submarines in the port of Menzel-Bourguiba. Djibouti has made calling rights for Soviet trawlers subject to preliminary clearance. Benin has reduced the number of [Soviet] military cooperation personnel.

The overall survey of this civilian cooperation makes it possible to draw two partial conclusions. It is seen first that the Soviet Union has stepped up its effort and has involved its East German, Hungarian, and Czech allies who hold a minor but growing role in this endeavor. Overall, however, as regards the civilian field, Soviet influence continues to be below that of the Westerners while it involves some 40,000 personnel.

The Military Field

In the military field the East has seen spectacular successes, less in military assistance, incidentally, than in direct action which is essentially the doing of the Cubans.

Military assistance consists especially in the sale and supply of equipment. The principle consists in making arms available in such a way that their maintenance, logistical and technical support, and instruction in their use continue to depend on the Soviets and their allies. The African states often willingly acquire Soviet armaments which are sturdy and very suitable even if they are not the most modern in the USSR's arsenal.

Transfers of arms are made to states which have accepted socialism, formally at least: Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Tanzania. The arms are accompanied by extremely advantageous terms when they are not outright gifts. Military assistance then is paired with sizable civilian assistance, which is the case for Angola, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Mozambique. For other states deliveries are made on an entirely cash basis, but according to interesting methods, too, which are far from excluding political concerns. The example of Libya, the principal buyer of Soviet arms in Africa, is cogent on this score. Even though Qadhdhafi has established a kind of Arab socialism addressed to a more or less nomadic tribal society of some 2 million Libyans, he cannot be considered a Marxist-Leninist. However, he illustrates in remarkable manner the type of opponent to capitalism which the Baku congress and the final ariticle of peaceful coexistence anticipate supporting because he leads a positive struggle in favor of the interests of socialism. "President Qadhdhafi's anti-imperialist position is important and positive," Fidel Castro said in 1977. Qadhdhafi assumes this stance because he is opposed to Egypt and because, in the Arab world and Africa, he wishes to play a role greater than the size of his country would warrant. Qadhdhafi has the financial means to do so thanks to the oil he sells to the United States, something for which the Soviets take care not to reproach him. However, Qadhdhafi is short of human resources. He is a destabilizing element, an ideal ally, all the more so as Egypt has become Qadhdhafi's enemy.

All Libyan actions lead to destabilization, to an exacerbation of conflicts, and even to their initiation. There can emerge from it at best a socialist solution and, at worst, a weakening of regimes opposed to socialism. Libyan support of the

POLISARIO through the intermediary of all the tribes of the southern Saharan region linked to those of southern Libya cannot help weakening Mauritania and Morocco and bringing about a decline in the credibility of their political regimes. The Libyan thrust in the direction of Chad must increase that country's instability and the withdrawal from Chad by the French without the Soviets being directly or indirectly involved in it is at first sight considered a positive point for the East. If the French had not evacuated Chad they would have risked finding themselves involved in an endless struggle, something which would also have been an extremely positive point for Moscow. One thus finds the Marxist-Leninist classification of just and unjust wars depending on whether they favor or not the cause of socialism, and the same circumstances are found in Libya's actions vis-a-vis Tunisia whose regime is not favorable to the cause of socialism. As Boris Ponomarev noted in a recent article in PRAVDA, the Soviet strategy does not create conflicts but it exploits the situation. In a less marked manner, Algeria responds to the same dimension and the same is true of Mali. This is the best argument to oppose to Chinese influence which cannot compete with the USSR in this field, as proven by the examples of Mozambique and Tanzania.

Outside of this political aspect the Soviet sales and transfers of arms lead to another destabilizing phenomenon. The arms race obliges the underprivileged states to go into debt, which reduces their investment potentials by a corresponding amount and hinders their economic development. In all fairness, responsibility for this state of affairs is shared by the Westerners. Finally, military assistance prompts the African states to send military trainees to the East. The benefits for these trainees are clearer than for civilian trainees. The military elites, outside of cultural and linguistic influence, acquire techniques and tactical modes of reasoning which very naturally lead them to consider the Soviet Army as their source of inspiration and as a model which they think appropriate to emulate. Thus, even in a non-socialist state, the army framed by officers tends to become an army of the socialist type which differs greatly from Western armies by virtue of its structures and methods of action.

Direct military action has given its most decisive successes to the East. This is due essentially to the effort of the 40,000 Cubans, and one is tempted to believe that the USSR and its European allies thus reap the fruits of the economic support that they did not spare from Cuba.

A more thorough examination however leads one to temper the judgement that can be made regarding the Cuban intervention, not as far as the results are concerned but rather the voluntarist Soviet aspect.

From 1920 to 1955 the Soviets were interested only intermittently in Africa. At that time African communist parties benefited only from weak support restricted primarily to rhetoric. In 1945 Stalin had claimed Libya on account of its status as a [former] Italian colony, but without really insisting. The conference bringing the Third World together in Bandung in 1955, from which the USSR was excluded, abruptly awakened the Soviets and made them see that the USSR, which claimed to head the international revolution, was going to be on the sidelines of a revolutionary movement. Africa did not for all that become the principal subject of its concerns. The impetus came from Cuba.

The Cubans became interested in Africa within the framework of the nonalignment and anticolonialism emanating from Bandung. As early as 1955 Castro wished to have a leader ship role in that international movement. The training in Cuba of the initial African guerrilla fighters began in 1961. Soviet-Cuban relations, extremely tense between 1962 and 1968, did not for all that prevent Ernesto Che Guevara from effecting a full-fledged African tour in 1966 whose result was the dispatch of [Cuban] personnel not only to Africa against the Portuguese but also to Arab countries such as South Yemen. The real turning dates back to 1966, with the tricontinental conference held in Havana and whose leader was Castro. Cuba was then poised between two strategic orientations as a function of its Latin-African roots: To take the revolution either to South America or to Africa. The death of Mehdi Ben Barka, secretary of the tricontinental conference, replaced by a South American, appeared to tilt the balance for a moment in the direction of Latin America. The turnaround was to occur only later and Cuba was to stress its "African character" dear to the origins of its people who are in part descended from imported black slaves. On 22 December 1975, at the close of the First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, Castro declared: "African blood flows freely in our veins. Our people have always accomplished their internationalist duties."

In the meantime, in 1968, Havana and Moscow were reconciled. The Soviets took charge of instructing the Cuban Army. The first action of the latter, whose code name was Operation Carlotta, took place in Angola in 1975-76 following the departure of the Portuguese and aimed at insuring the assumption of power by Agostinho Neto's MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] against his two rivals, also heads of national liberation movements, who were to be supported by the Chinese, the Westerners, and the South Africans. The Cuban forces clashed directly with South African troops but halted at the borders of Namibia. Cuba also intervened throughout the rest of the former Portuguese colonial empire which became decolonized abruptly--Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Mozambique--but did not meet as much opposition as in Angola.

After the initial success of the Cubans the conflict in Angola was transformed into a guerrilla war confronting the former national liberation movements in an inextricable mixture of ideological, ethnic, and tribal hatreds. In 1980 the conflict is continuing, with some 20,000 Cubans fighting on the side of the MPLA. The Cubans' adversaries, without outside support, are doomed to annihilation in the long run.

Operation Carlotta was planned by Cuba and massively supported by the Soviet Union. At the time Moscow felt that, traumatized by its defeat in Vietnam, the United States would not intervene. The risk of direct confrontation with the West was thus small. Moscow's prudence is illustrated by the fact that the intervention took place only following the departure of the Portuguese and that there was no invasion of Namibia. In 1976 a veritable conference took place at the border between the Cubans and South Africans to determine the methods of a cease-fire. The first article of peaceful coexistence was thus followed.

Cuba and the Soviet Union were not slow in seeking to collect the dividends of their success. In 1977 Castro made a triumphal tour in the black and Moslem capitals of Africa and the Middle East, which paralleled that of Nikolay Podgorniy. Moscow's prudence, however, continued to oppose the audacity of Havana, which made itself the champion of exporting the revolution. Seen from Havana, Cuba's affiliation with the

Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet alliance made it possible for it to evidence a revolutionary elam which is impossible in Latin American, as attested by the Guevara's failure and the toppling of [Salvador Allende's] Chile. The alliance was concretized by Cuba's full-fledged membership in CEMA in 1972 but, despite its wishes, Cuba was unable to join the Warsaw Pact. Very likely, the countries of Eastern Europe did not wish to find themselves under the obligation to support with force an intemperate initiative of Castro.

It is Fidel Castro who was to persuade the Soviets of the interest involved in the intervention in Ethiopia. The analysis from a Marxist viewpoint of the Ethiopian situation, with the toppling of the empire and the existence of clergy who were not always enlightened, indicates indeed that it has many similarities with that of imperial Russia. There was enough in it to strike the imagination of ideologies such as Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev. In 1977, the second large-scale action of the Cubans, the "Baragua Protest" Operation, achieved complete success in Ogaden and led to their perceiving yesterday's ally--Somalia--as today's enemy. As in Angola the open war was transformed into guerrilla warfare, especially in Eritrea and even in Ogaden where the fighting resumed. The initial goal was to form a confederation of states of the northeastern Horn of Africa, but the war and the Somali opposition caused that plan to fail. The Ethiopian leader Haile-Mariam Mengistu proved to be more difficult to handle than Agostinho Neto because, while Mengistu adhered to socialism, he did not forget his nationalism. Castro leaned toward a solution allowing very broad local autonomy. Brezhnev inclined more toward centralization and Mengistu even more so. It is not impossible that the East moderated the scope of its operations in order to maintain an important military presence making Mengistu easier to handle and, in 1980, the latter had to agree to initiate the formation of a single party. As in Angola the opponents, if they do not receive outside support, are doomed to final defeat in the long run. A new and recent fact is that several thousand East German military personnel joined the Soviets and the Cubans.

A constant feature of the policy must, however, again be stressed, namely respect for the first article of peaceful coexistence. A soldier of the East is not to confront a Western soldier, for such a face-off threatens to degenerate into general war. This constant was adhered to in Ethiopia and, in May 1978 in Shaba Province [Zaire] when, at the time of Operation Colombe unquestionably staged by the Cubans and the East, the French clashed only with the Katangans. If one is to believe an article by Pierre Darcourt in LE FIGARO of 3 August 1978, the Cuban and East German military cadres had abandoned the Katangans on the eve of their clash with the French.

Conclusion

It is possible to draw certain conclusions from the analysis of the actions of the East on the African continent. The first is that the Soviet Union, having no colonial experience, has had a lot of trouble securing a foothold through cooperation. At the outset the USSR benefited from a favorable bias because it was free from the sin of African colonization, but the human factor has unquestionably played a role for the Russians increased their errors. Their successes are finally due to the direct action of the Cubans, and everything occurs as if Moscow had been motivated by Havana.

Of Spanish-oriented culture and descended from black slaves, the Cubans were more successful than the Soviets, especially in the Portuguese-speaking countries where they found familiar elements. The former Portuguese empire was still impregnated with Catholic influence, and Marxism-Leninism has reiterated on its own a dimension of Catholicism, the shunning of profit. One finds this dimension in Ethiopia, and it is possible to believe that it is not a coincidence if the Amhara people, who are Christian, have adopted socialism. Anglo-Saxon Protestantism does not have the attitude toward profit, and the penetration of Marxist ideology is thus more difficult among the peoples affected by the Protestant missionaries. Islam, even though egalitarian, offers a system which is even more impenetrable.

The East intervenes however only if there is a vacuum and only if its analysis indicates that there is no risk of direct confrontation with the West. If the latter holds its ground or answers back as in Kolwezi [Shaba Province], the Eastern camp concedes its setback even though it may then be ready to pick another alternative.

One may wonder what is the final goal sought by the Eastern camp in this manner. Is it conquest for economic reasons? The East indeed has a great need for some African raw materials, but it would be more judicious for it to obtain them through trade. The hypothesis of a triumph for a purely political goal remains questionable. How indeed should one establish socialism in a developing African country and pursue economically the building of socialism in the socialist camp while sustaining the effort in other parts of the world, in Asia and the Orient? A more likely hypothesis then seems to be a goal of being able to cut Europe off from its sources of raw materials.

In the last analysis, the final goal sought by the Soviet Union in Africa is Europe. This falls within one of the frameworks of Soviet strategy as advertised--that of the concentration of effort. On what countries will the opportunism of the West bear in the future? For the Westerners, the Union of South Africa is difficult to support. Its encirclement is continuing and Zimbabwe, newly independent and full of social contradictions, should tip toward the socialist camp. Farther north after the disappearance of charismatic leaders such as Leopold Sedar Senghor and Felix Houphouet-Boigny, can the situation remain stable? In the short-term future is the Central African Republic not an indicator?

The West declares that detente is indissociable, but the Soviet framework is that of peaceful coexistence, the only possible solution for it, and one which it can take or leave. This same peaceful coexistence asserts that war is not inevitable but underscores the implacable character of the struggle between different social systems and the obligation of the duty of international and revolutionary solidarity. Can international relations resist such contradictions?

2662
CSO: 3100

TANK TROOPS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Battalion Training in Mountains

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Nov 80 p 1

[Article by Maj R. Belyayev, Red Banner Turkestan M. D.: "Battle in the Mountains"]

[Text] The night was coming to an end. The dim light of a gloomy morning was showing through the camouflage nets at the battalion command and observation post. Leaning on the trench breastwork, tank battalion commander Maj A. Zhukov peered attentively in the direction of the enemy, now and again making marks on his map.

The battalion commander had made his decision. His narrow face with sharply defined cheek bones was calm and concentrated, although his entire being, of course, was straining to be there, in front, where the foothills merged into a range of rugged mountains, where the enemy was.

After the exercise he would tell how his plan of battle originated and thank the chief of staff and other officers on whom he relied in a difficult moment. But that would be later, while now...

The enemy had set up a defense saturated with antitank weapons and engineering and other obstacles. To break it he needed to establish fire superiority in the decisive axis, outsmart the enemy, and attack in the most unexpected place. Naturally, the men had to be properly prepared for energetic, decisive actions. This was particularly true because some members of the subunit had been unsuccessful in the preceding stage of the exercise. In short, the battalion commander and all the communists headed by the secretary of the party organization Maj V. Maslovskiy, had their work cut out for them in the subunit to develop an aggressive spirit. But now Major Zhukov was confident: the men would not let him down and everything would depend on how good his plan was, whether he would be able to carry out his intention.

He took his gaze away from the map. The terrain in front of him was relatively unbroken. A concealed advance by the battalion would be possible only to the line of deployment in platoon columns. Beyond that everything would take place before the eyes of the defenders. Of course, they too would be in view.

"So," the major thought out loud, "now the artillery battalion will take charge of suppressing fire means on the right flank of the strongpoint. If the artillerymen perform their mission we can expect the tanks to break through in this sector. But on the left flank..."

Major Zhukov had been worried about creating superiority on the left flank during the night. Under cover of darkness he moved one of the companies to direct-aiming range. This company dug in and camouflaged itself well and now it was keeping low. This meant that it could expect to achieve surprise.

The men of the regiment know communist Zhukov to be an experienced methodologist, skillful organizer, and active individual. When speaking of him they invariably remark on his great tactical skill. Zhukov has studied the specific characteristics of modern battle thoroughly, applies the requirements of the field service regulations creatively in practice, and skillfully relies on the initiative of his subordinates.

I had had occasion to watch him in training battle before. He and his battalion had often been on the cutting edge of the attack, as they were today. And he was always calm and even-tempered in dealing with his subordinates: he kept his self-control and precision of thought and decision in the most difficult situations.

I had heard that it was especially difficult to be his opponent in two-sided exercises: you could never guess what Zhukov would do at any particular minute. This was certainly true. As I observed the battalion commander at work, I could not help recalling an incident from a recent training battle.

The enemy had suffered losses and began to withdraw into the mountains where, behind spurs of the range, canyons, and passes he would set up solid resistance to the battalion. But Major Zhukov simply did not give the enemy a chance to dig in and set up the defense. While continuing to pursue the enemy from the front, he sent one of his companies around a peak adjacent to the pass and struck in the flank.

To attack the enemy in the flank or from the rear would have been the most appropriate alternative for the battalion in this case too. But could the men make it? After all, those in the encircling detachment would have to cover a good distance to penetrate to the enemy rear along mountain slopes and canyons.

Major Zhukov remembered a talk the night before in the company commanded by Sr Lt V. Gus'kov. The subject was mistakes in the actions of personnel in the preceding stage of the exercise. The battalion commander remarked that the men had suffered their first failure. He did not reproach them for being inactive, although he could have mentioned this. The company had taken on difficult obligations for the exercise, but they had not made the special effort needed to accomplish them. Major Zhukov merely emphasized that the battalion still faced many difficult missions and that he was counting on this company. Observing how the eyes of his subordinates were flashing, the battalion commander knew that he did not have to say anything more. And now again, as he ran through the alternatives of battle in his mind, he remembered Senior Lieutenant Gus'kov and his subordinates. Well, maybe the time had come when they would, as the saying goes, "show their stuff."

Calling Senior Lieutenant Gus'kov to the command and observation post, Major Zhukov gave him the mission of moving through a canyon to the pass and holding it until the approach of the main forces.

The canyon curved and twisted and the ascent became steeper and steeper. The mountains spread out and then closed in, as if threatening to flatten the armor of the tanks with their power. The mechanic-drivers held their vehicles almost flush against the cliffs, moving slowly but confidently forward. The roar of the tank engines shook the mountains. Somewhere off to the right the thunder of battle could be heard; the battalion main forces were breaking through the pass from the front.

They came to a plateau. This was the place from which the enemy was expecting its reserves to approach. But the reserves were not there yet. Therefore, the company had accomplished one of its primary missions, preventing the enemy from seizing a favorable line.

After receiving the report from Senior Lieutenant Gus'kov Major Zhukov ordered him to immediately move part of his forces from the plateau into the canyon and prepare for an attack on the approach to the pass. The artillery battalion received the mission of opening fire against the planned target. As soon as the artillery opened fire, the attached motorized rifle battalions moved out toward the pass. Major Zhukov gave them the mission of wiping out the remaining enemy antitank weapons. Under cover of artillery fire the motorized riflemen quickly crossed the sector covered by fire and began advancing in combat vehicles. The enemy, without time to regroup his forces and weapons, came under the fire of the tanks and infantry combat vehicles. The subunits which had attacked from the front raced into the pass. The mission was accomplished.

The tank troops did not have an easy road to success. But they withstood all the trials with honor. The battalion commanded by Major Zhukov, a winner of the Order "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3rd Degree, became a leader in the pre-congress competition.

Use of Simulators

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Nov 80 p 1

[Article by Guards Lt Col V. Mikhaylov, deputy commander of the Kantemir Guards Tank Division: "With the Help of Simulators"]

[Text] Last training year many of the subunits in our division had excellent results in combat and political training.

Analysis shows that the improved skill of the mechanic-drivers, gun layers, and other specialists resulted largely from skillful use of technical training equipment, including simulators, in the training process. This is natural.

Even before the start of the training year we calculated the carrying capacity of each simulator. Using this data the units worked out precise

schedules for subunit drills. It was necessary to do some work with the officers. Some of them were too slow to incorporate progressive training methods, and some completely underestimated the role of simulators in the training process. In the battalion commanded by Guards Maj V. Pozhidayev, for example, they preferred tank firing drills using live ammunition to training periods with simulators.

Many officers revised their attitude toward simulators after we conducted a series of training periods during which the most efficient ways to use technical training equipment, as developed by leading commanders, were demonstrated. Everyone was convinced that the simulators would make it possible to avoid many difficulties in training specialists and greatly simplify the work of training period leaders. At drills where ammunition is used, for example, the training leader and trainee are separated by the armor. In such conditions, of course, it is difficult to monitor the actions of the specialist, analyze his mistakes, and eliminate them at the right time. But the simulator brings the training leader together with the trainee and helps him eliminate problems with his training quickly. Thus, the intensity of the training period is increased and the time necessary to develop practical skills in the specialist is reduced.

After the demonstration training period the officers began to use technical training equipment more actively. As a result many of them were able to improve the skill levels of their subordinates significantly. For example, by using simulators Guards Capt V. Markuzov, a battalion commander, was able to greatly increase the carrying capacity of the firing grounds and make every training period highly efficient. As a result, at the final firing exercises all his subordinates demonstrated good firing skills.

We also have great hopes for the simulators in the upcoming training year. In particular, before the beginning of the winter training period we plan to conduct a demonstration tank firing drill using simulators based on the battalion commanded by Guards Major Pozhidayev. The officers of this battalion had taken the critical remarks directed to them into account and by the end of the year had accumulated considerable experience with the use of technical training equipment.

Work is now underway to install simulators at the tank firing range, rifle range, and tank training area. We plan to establish simulator complexes in these places. This will help the subunit commanders use each trip to the field more efficiently and employ a more meaningful individual approach in personnel training.

We also need to think about how to raise the use efficiency of these complexes. After all, contemporary stimulators demand an appropriate attitude. We must organize things so that each officer who has to take the part of training period leader is able, for example, to adjust the simulator, put the necessary program in it, and so on. It has been decided to keep special logs of the working time of the simulators to prevent downtime. We hope that this will in some degree promote greater responsibility on the part of training period leaders for efficient use of this expensive equipment. Of course, a great deal will also depend on the high standards and

principles of those who are monitoring the training process, including division staff officers.

It is gratifying that the division has a growing number of men who are setting an example for efficient use of simulators in the training process. Many of the fighting men these days, including officers, are demonstrating notable activism in efficiency and invention work. They are developing new simulators on their own and making suggestions to improve existing ones. Guards Sr Lt V. Zagoreychuk, for example, with a group of efficiency workers made a simulator for training tank commanders and gun layers to scout targets. It has already been tested and received high praise from specialists.

The new training year is approaching. Everything that is now being done in the division shows the fervent desire of the men of the Kantemir Division to greet the 26th congress of their native party in a worthy fashion.

Tank Regiment Tactical Training Evaluated

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by Guards Lt Col A. Kovtun, tank regiment commander: "Lessons in Tactics"]

[Text] Probably every regimental commander participating in exercises gives special attention to the actions of company and battalion level officers. This is natural. The outcome of the battle depends on how each of them performs his missions. To be more precise, the combat readiness of the regiment depends largely on the tactical skill of the battalion and company commanders. And the more creativity and initiative these officers show in exercises, the greater their chances for success will be.

What were the notable aspects of the past training year for us in this respect?

I recall one of the last tactical exercises with field fire. The tank company commanded by Guards Capt I. Malinovtsev was attacking a defending enemy on the run. The company was advancing successfully, carrying on close fire cooperation with its neighbors and the attached motorized rifle subunit. Suddenly the company commander received reconnaissance information that tanks and infantry had been moved up from the rear of the defense. It became clear that the enemy was bringing up reserves for a counterattack.

A counterattack could have been repulsed by stationary fire. In the situation that had developed this was an attractive plan: by waging stationary fire the company could be sure of a higher percentage of hits. But Guards Captain Malinovtsev figured differently. Slowing down would mean losing the initiative. To crush the enemy reserves, he figured, they would have to prevent them from taking a favorable line. So the officer decided to attack.

He chose an appropriate moment before the enemy had had time to deploy in battle formation. The company commander quickly issued specific missions to

the platoons and attached subunits. Two platoons of motorized riflemen went on the attack from the front. But the platoon commanded by Guards Lt V. Buyanovskiy moved swiftly through a forest clearing to the enemy flank. Its attack was decisive in the outcome of the battle. Thus, Guards Captain Malinovtsev's combination of maneuver and fire proved successful.

There were many such cases in our training year, some of them at final, summing-up training periods. This is gratifying, of course. The facts show that we now have more officers who have mastered the techniques of modern battle and are able to use the increased potential of the equipment and weapons to accomplish complex tactical missions. All the same, life forces us to be more demanding in evaluating the tactical and fire training of our officers. The summing-up training period showed that many of them still have not completely mastered the art of controlling subunits and using the fire power, speed, and maneuverability of the equipment to its full extent. Guards senior lieutenants Yu. Zolotarev, V. Pashin, and certain other officers still fall short in this respect, for example. A concise formulation of the primary mission which now faces each commander is: learn to fight effectively yourself and teach this to your subordinates. There is no need to say that success in this is inconceivable without a further increase in the effectiveness and quality of training periods and exercises.

Experience shows that you can tell what an exercise will be like by the tactical drill training periods that usually precede it. I was reminded of this again from the example of the battalion where Guards Maj V. Razzorenov is acting commander. Most of these training periods in the battalion are interesting and instructive. The tank troops usually work on foot at them. This also helps in their training period. Specifically, the officers drill in control of subunits using portable radios. Signal flags are used extensively to control the crews. But the main thing is that a complex situation is created in the training periods which requires great exertion and determined, enterprising actions by the men. They learn to overcome various types of obstacles and accomplish tactical missions in conditions where the enemy is using both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

Guards Major Razzorenov also creates complex situations that greatly resemble combat at short tactical training drills and group exercises which he conducts with the officers. This helps them develop flexible thinking and the ability to find the most effective ways of fighting an active enemy in the course of battle. These were exactly the qualities that distinguished the officers of the battalion in the exercises we conducted at the end of the training year.

The picture was different, unfortunately, in the neighboring battalion. During a tactical exercise with field fire the company commanded by Guards Capt L. Perevalov took an important line and found itself in a better position than the other subunits. Of course, everyone hoped that the company commander would take the initiative and race forward to develop the success. He had adequate men and equipment, but the hopes were disappointed. The officer was indecisive. While he waited for instructions from the battalion commander, the enemy was able to bring up antitank reserves to the threatened sector.

What can we say about this? The actions of Guards Captain Perevalov revealed shortcomings in the organization of the training process in the battalion. Training periods, including tactical training periods, had frequently been held in simplified, easy conditions. The short tactical training drills held with officers by the battalion commander were not very original. And this was the result: when the company commander found himself in a situation that demanded quick adoption of a plan and independence, he was unable to break away from the stereotyped thinking to which he had become accustomed.

How can this be prevented in the future? We are thinking about this, of course, as we analyze the year's results and plan further work to raise combat readiness. First of all we must strengthen work in the subunits to instill officers with a high sense of responsibility for their assigned work and intolerance of inertia, stereotyped thinking, and conservatism. This is the job of party organizations, political workers, and staff officers. We are trying through combined efforts to see that all the men study the experience of those who show initiative in exercises and take a creative approach to performing the mission of training and indoctrination. In my opinion, the recent discussion of the know-how of Guards Captain Malinovtsev in preparing for and conducting company tactical exercises with field fire was very useful.

We are also thinking about ways to improve the organization of commander training. The effectiveness of exercises, of course, is largely determined by this. But we have not always taken it into account in organizing the training of company and battalion level commanders. An inspection revealed that some of them were uncertain of themselves in the role of exercise leader, and needless to say, this had a negative effect on subunit results. Specifically, the inertia and stereotyped approaches of Guards Captain Perevalov can be explained in large part by the fact that the exercise leader, Guards Maj R. Utayev, did not show creativity and initiative in controlling the subunits and was unable to create an instructive tactical situation for the trainees.

We consider improving the professional skills of the officers, who are bound by service duty to be the leaders of tactical training periods and exercises, to be one of the primary areas of all our work in the coming training year to raise the combat readiness of the regiment even higher.

At the present time, when the subunits are adopting socialist obligations for the new training year, we are trying to direct personnel primarily to improving field training, qualitative performance of tactical exercises, and mastering the combat equipment and weapons. We understand that our accomplishments in the pre-Congress competition will depend largely on this. Staff officers, members of the regimental party committee, and political workers are working hard in the subunits.

Questions of improving tactical and fire training and the effectiveness of exercises are also reflected in the obligations of the officers. In this respect, the example of Guards Capt Yu. Tarchuk, chief of regimental reconnaissance, is instructive. He has taken on the obligation of introducing in the subunits a number of effective methods, developed and tested in the reconnaissance subunit of the regiment, for training tank troops to scout

targets. We are involving other specialists in work to introduce progressive training methods also. The chiefs of the combat arms and services are now making significant contributions to equipping the tactical training field and improving other physical facilities for training.

There was a business-like discussion of ways to make fuller use of existing opportunities to improve the tactical and fire training of our personnel, above all officers, at the regimental report and election party meeting. I think that the measures that were planned will help us eliminate shortcomings and achieve more in the competition to greet the 26th Congress of the CPSU in a worthy fashion.

Regimental Training Evaluated

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by Guards Lt Col V. Zarya, commander of the Shepetovka Guards Tank Regiment, Order of Lenin Moscow M. D. "Speed Is a Fighting Characteristic"]

[Text] At the tactical exercises held in the regiment during inspection days the subunits frequently had to perform marches under complex conditions and enter battle on the run. In most of the cases they demonstrated fairly good mobility and an ability to cover significant distances in a short time and appear suddenly where the enemy did not expect them. On this level, the tactical exercise in the battalion commanded by Guards Maj A. Koltun was perhaps the most instructive.

The battalion received an order to move to the enemy rear and capture and hold a tactically important line until the approach of the main forces.

Guards Major Koltun constructed his march formation to insure constant subunit readiness for rapid deployment and commitment to battle. The battalion commander also anticipated that during the march the tank troops would have to cross water obstacles and swampy terrain and that mine fields and other obstructions along the route were not impossible. Mounted bulldozer equipment on tanks allocated to clear roads was prepared for use. Guards Major Koltun ordered several vehicles in each company equipped with minesweepers.

The battalion had already almost reached the target when reconnaissance reported that an enemy column was moving forward to meet them. Evaluating the situation Guards Major Koltun adopted a bold plan: converge with the enemy moving in a collision course on a parallel route and then, beating the enemy to deployment, attack.

After reaching the parallel route the battalion raced forward at top speed. The subunits set the distances necessary for deployment on the move. When the battalion drew even with the enemy column Guards Major Koltun ordered the company commanders to turn all vehicles 90 degrees. Thus, deployment of the battalion in battle formation took a matter of seconds. Opening fire from long range the tank troops attacked the column with great force.

Maximum use of the great speed and maneuvering potential of modern equipment. This is one of the paramount challenges which we worked on in the past training year and will work on in the future. Exercise experience, including the above-mentioned battalion, shows convincingly that success in struggle against a well-armed and aggressive enemy is achieved most often by the one who, in addition to other positive qualities, has great mobility on the field of battle.

Experience at the front also convinces us of this. Specifically, the combat history of our regiment contains many examples that illustrate how speed and an aggressive attack decided the outcome of the battle during the war years. Everyone knows this. At the same time we also know something else: to wage combat successfully one must know how to do more than simply get speed out of the vehicles. The problem of mastering contemporary combat speeds has several other facets.

The exercise we are going to discuss took place in our unit before the inspection. But the lessons from it were in many ways reflected in the results which we achieved at the summing-up training periods. They were reflected in the best sense. What was noteworthy about this exercise to us? I will give just one instance.

Many subunits of the regiment who attacked in the first echelon were successful in breaking through the enemy defense. However, the resistance of the defenders stiffened. They brought up reserves and counterattacked, trying to dig in at an intermediate line. The second echelon had to be committed to battle to develop the success.

While amplifying the mission of the tank battalion commanded by Guards Maj V. Lubyanenko, I called the attention of the officers to the necessity for the subunits to reach the starting line of the second wave at the same time. For one, the success of the attack depended in large part on this. For two, the subunits were located at different distances from this line and some of them had to cover considerable distances in a short time. In other words, speed would be very important.

Let me observe right away that despite all our efforts, only one company reached this line at the appointed time. What had happened?

It turned out that the battalion commander, upon receiving the plans, had not evaluated the terrain correctly and had figured average traveling speed. He did not do everything necessary to support the march; he did not organize proper reconnaissance, security, camouflage, and protection of subunits against weapons of mass destruction. It ended the way it should have ended; two companies lost their way and were not able to attack at the right time.

Later, analyzing this case, we found other problems with the actions of the battalion commander and the company and platoon commanders. The regimental staff was assigned to study the questions of march training in other subunits. This check showed that many officers still had not mastered the skills of controlling march formations and orientation in an unfamiliar area. The personnel of certain subunits were found to be poorly trained for driving

vehicles in columns at high speed. This indicated serious shortcomings in all our work to master our current equipment and weapons. Needless to say, appropriate organizational steps had to be taken to eliminate them. A certain change in the consciousness of the men was also required. Above all we had to try to see that every officer, in both his personal training and in training subordinates, began from the requirements of modern combat, which does not tolerate stereotypes, inertia, and sluggishness in thinking or in action.

The challenge we set for ourselves was to put an end to indulgence and simplification in training periods and to teach the men in conditions maximally approximating those of combat, taking into account the lessons of winter training and the summer training period. During commander assemblies we showed the officers the most effective ways to use simulators. During the training process the regimental staff carefully watched to see that everyone working with the equipment, including officers, went through the simulators. This permitted a significant reduction in time necessary to develop practical vehicle driving skills in personnel.

It became a rule in the regiment to begin all tactical exercises with a march. We take advantage of every movement to the field and every tactical drill training period to work on particular elements of the march. Tactical training periods with platoons and company exercises at which personnel participate on foot are especially effective. They give the men good conditioning and help develop their ability to see combat in all its measures and to orient themselves in a complex, fast-changing situation.

In my opinion, constant attention by the regimental staff to the march training of officers played a decisive part in increasing the mobility of the subunits, which was illustrated by the results of the training year. At all exercises that we held during the summer the staff tried to create a complex situation that would help officers develop skills in leading columns along roads and in roadless areas, on crosscountry routes and unprepared, unregulated routes. We accumulated some experience in teaching personnel related specializations also and we are now trying to pass this on to all officers. We used deomnstration training periods for this purpose. The know-how of Sr Lt V. Chaplygin, for example, is well-known in the regiment. Every one of his subordinates, regardless of his primary specialization, is able to drive a tank and fire its cannon and machine gun.

The regiment did very well based on the results of the training year. But this does not mean at all that we have already brought all reserves into action. The summing-up training period showed, for example, that all the subunits still are not working hard to achieve mutual replaceability in their crews. Certain officers demonstrated weaknesses in controlling subunits on the march. There are also problems in the work of various services on which the subunits depend for all essential logistical support during the performance of combat training missions involving movement.

We believe that the most reliable way to continue improving march training and increase the mobility of the regiment is to insure the quality and effectiveness of each training period with drivers and with officers. We also need to think about ways to use the mobilizing force of socialist competition

more fully for this purpose. Following the example of the personnel of the Guards motorized rifle regiment from the Red Banner Central Asian MD the tank soldiers are taking on obligations of improving the quality of performance of combat training missions and using the capabilities of the equipment and weapons with maximum effectiveness. These obligations reflect the men's desire to work for full mutual replaceability in the crews and to improve their ratings. One of the important points in the obligations of the officers is to improve their skills in subunit control.

I think that this purposefulness in the campaign for high-quality performance of training missions will help us raise the combat readiness of the regiment even more and achieve new successes in the pre-Congress competition.

Problems in Training Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Nov 80 p 1

[Comments by officers of the Berdichev Guards Tank Regiment imeni Sukhe-Bator: "Ready for Training"]

> [Text] The rhythm of the training process and the successes of the fighting men in pre-Congress competition will be largely determined by the level of skill of their commanders and the condition of physical facilities for training. This is well understood in the Berdichev Guards Tank Regiment imeni Sukhe-Bator. At the request of our KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, officers of the unit tell how they prepared for the training year.

Guards Maj A. Markin, regimental chief of staff:

In the last training year several subunits of the regiment did not fulfill their obligations. One of the main reasons, as analysis shows, was that officer training was not organized precisely enough. In certain disciplines we were not able to fulfill their training program. For example, fewer training periods in the equipment were held for officers than envisioned by the program. There were also omissions in their methodological training.

To prevent the same thing from happening in the current training year we focused our attention on planning officer training periods. We carefully selected the staff of training period leaders and thought through the questions of using training facilities. Several demonstration and methodological training periods for the commanders of companies, platoons, and crews have already been held. The regimental commander and other administrative officers took an active part in this work. I must say that we were able to create an atmosphere at the demonstration training periods which inspired the officers to be creative and search for new ways to improve the quality and effectiveness of the training process.

Of course, commander assemblies and demonstration training periods held just before the new training year are just part of all the work that was done

to improve officer skills. I think that the experience of the leaders in competition will be very helpful to them. In particular, all the officers were very interested in the work know-how of Guards Capt A. Plakhotnik and Guards Sr Lt S. Tsarev, the commanders of the best companies in the regiment, in organizing competition.

When we look carefully at the new obligations of the initiators of the pre-Congress competition we can feel that they were adopted by men who intend to work hard and search carefully for unused reserves. The men of our unit share this attitude.

Guards Maj Ye. Vasil'yev, chief of the regimental chemical service, secretary of the staff party organization:

A few days ago the staff party organization held a meeting. The question of the role of communist leaders raising the level of training and indoctrination was on the agenda. We took a firm hand with those who had not worked hard enough in the last training year to eliminate simplification and indulgence at training periods and had not set an example for personnel in fulfillment of socialist obligations. Guards Maj V. Taran, deputy regimental commander for weapons, Maj Yu. Liska, chief of the armor service, and Guards Maj A. Apanaskevich, chief of the vehicle service, were subjected to serious criticism. One could not say that they lack knowledge and experience. What hurts them is something else: an inadequately developed sense of personal responsibility for the state of affairs in the assigned sector. These comrades were rarely seen at the motor pool during servicing of the vehicles or in the shops when they were being repaired. They rarely held training periods with personnel in their specializations. All these things left an imprint on the working style of their subordinates in the subunits, the deputy commanders in charge of technical affairs in the battalians and companies. It was no accident that several subunits of our regiment received merely satisfactory scores for technical training, maintenance of equipment and weapons, and their use.

A great deal has already been done. Party activists conducted a surprise inspection of the readiness of physical facilities for training periods. A great deal of work was done with the new recruits. We familiarized the young soldiers with the rich combat traditions of the unit and showed them the combat equipment and weapons of the regiment. The best-trained officers, including the service chiefs, conducted the first training period for them.

I think that all these things will help us set a fast, precise rhythm in every training period and drill from the start of the new training year.

Guards Sr Lt V. Zavodskoy, commander of an outstanding tank company:

I am often asked how it is that the officers of our subunit, burdened as they are by everyday affairs, find time for independent study and improving their own methodological skills. There is no secret in this. We receive very able assistance from our NCO's.

We solved many problems with their help during the period of preparation for the training year. We had to install new equipment at the training posts assigned to the company, prepare the company training year, make up graphic agitation material, and talk with each soldier during the development of individual obligations. We were able to do all of this and do it well.

But even now some commanders often complain that the sergeants do not help them enough. What can we say? It means that the officers themselves are not working hard enough with their own assistants.

We, for example, do not begrudge the time spent working with NCO's. Before the start of the new training year we held several teaching methods training periods with them on the most difficult subjects of tactical, fire, drill, and physical training that are to be worked on in the near future. Experience shows that such work is repaid manyfold. Well-trained sergeants are a reliable support to officers.

We see daily, purposeful work with the NCO's as one of the key conditions for raising the effectiveness and quality of training periods and strengthening discipline and order in the company.

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VETERANS AFFAIRS: HEALTH, REST FACILITIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVZEDA in Russian 1 Nov 80 p 4

[Interview with Nikolay Afanas'yevich Storozhenko, deputy chairman of the Central Council for Administration of Trade Union Resorts: "For Veterans of the War"]

[Text] In recent years the Communist Party and Soviet Government have done a great deal to improve living conditions for veterans of the war. The recent decree of the Presidium of the AUCCTU entitled "Additional Measures to Improve Sanitarium-Resort Treatment and Rest for Veterans of the Great Patriotic War" was a new manifestation of this concern.

Our correspondent met with Nikolay Afanas'yevich Storozhenko, deputy chairman of the Central Council for Administration of Trade Union Resorts, and asked him to comment on this document.

[Answer] The decree obligates trade union committees, within the limits of their capabilities, to give preference to satisfying the requests of veterans of the Great Patriotic War for passes to sanitariums, clinic-sanitariums, hotels, rest homes and centers, and tourist facilities.

An improvement in work to provide veterans of the war who are not working and live on pension with passes for sanitarium-resort treatment is contemplated. For this purpose, beginning in 1981 social security agencies will allocate an additional number of sanitarium passes. For veterans of the war who are visiting trade union resorts without passes, a system has been organized to sell board and treatment authorizations for walk-in resort treatment when they show their sanitarium-resort card and identification as a veteran of the Great Patriotic War. It has been decided that those who purchase authorizations for USSR resorts beginning on 1 October and ending 30 April inclusively, and throughout the entire year at other resorts, will pay full cost only for board and room. They receive the walk-in resort treatment at these times free of charge. The decree adopted by the Presidium of the ACCUTU obligates republic, kray, and oblast councils of trade unions, the Central Council for Management of Trade Union Resorts, and the Central Council for Tourism and Excursions to organize controls to see that these privileges are fully granted.

[Question] Nikolay Afanas'yevich, we receive many letters from veterans of the front. They ask about practical implementation of the decree of the Presidium of the AUCCTU. They range from questions of how to begin if one needs resort treatment to where do people stay who have come to the resort without a pass or authorization?

[Answer] One begins, of course, by visiting a doctor at the place of residence. After determining the nature of the illness the doctor will advise the patient as to precisely what kind of resort to choose for treatment. This advice cannot be ignored. All our resorts are specialized. Each of them accepts people suffering from a definite illness. This talk with the doctor can also clarify something else: whether one should make a long trip to a well-known resort or obtain equally effective treatment at a nearby resort. In terms of treatment the latter are often just as good.

The advantage here is two-fold. For reasons of age and health not every sick person can travel to a distant resort because the effect of the move itself and of new climatic conditions may cause damage to health or make it impossible to use the resort treatment effectively. And in such a case the expenditures incurred for a trip to a distant resort are hardly justified.

But assume that doctors have recommended a resort and it is from all information appropriate for treatment. In this case the war veteran is given a sanitarium-resort card. Until now sanitarium-resort cards were issued only if one had a sanitarium pass. Now, following the 17 September 1980 order of the USSR Ministry of Health, if veterans of the Great Patriotic War go to local clinics and undergo the appropriate examinations, where the indications for sanitarium-resort treatment are present a sanitarium-resort card, not a medical certificate, is issued. With it the war veteran receives a pass to the resort or an authorization for walk-in treatment at the resort from the trade union organization at his place of work or at a social security agency.

[Question] Therefore, Nikolay Afanas'yevich, is every veteran of the front who goes to a resort with a sanitarium-resort card and identification as a veteran of the Great Patriotic War guaranteed walk-in resort treatment?

[Answer] Absolutely. But I would like to note that the capacities of sanitariums and resorts are not all the same. Walk-in resort treatment is a simpler matter than housing. Arrangements must be made by leasing an apartment from the local population or making a reservation at a hotel. This involves certain problems, of course. For this reason I would recommend strongly that veterans of the Great Patriotic War get in touch with the resort ahead of time in order to derive the maximum benefit to health from the stay at the resort and to avoid any problems with accommodation and service. After receiving the sanitarium-resort card, send a post card to the sanitarium notifying them of the time of your arrival. They will quickly review your request and answer whether they can accept you at the time you have said. The post card is also necessary to plan your stay at the sanitarium from the moment of meeting at the terminal until your departure and to avoid arriving at the health institution when it is shut down for repairs.

The Central Council for Management of Trade Union Resorts has issued orders to its subordinate organizations to see that resorts and the arrival points (railroad and bus terminals, docks, and airports) provide essential information on where to buy authorizations for walk-in resort treatment. At the places where they are sold there must be information on how to buy the authorizations, arrangements for food and finding housing, and the working hours of the resort services.

[Question] Nikolay Afanas'yevich, the decree of the Presidium of the AUCCTU went into effect in August. What can you tell us about early results from it?

[Answer] Our early experience shows that we have begun to do a large, necessary, and very useful job. The people in the local areas, at the resorts, have gone at it with enthusiasm. Their employees are trying to give war veterans all possible care and attention. The past months have confirmed that the war veterans must get in touch with the sanitarium ahead of time for things to go smoothly. Most problems result from situations where the number of persons arriving for treatment on holidays exceeds the resort's capacity.

Authorizations granting war veterans the right to free treatment are sold by councils for management of trade union resorts through their subordinate resort bureaus or through clinics, city mudbath institutions, and sanitariums and hotels that offer treatment. It should be emphasized that in those cases where authorizations for walk-in resort treatment have been purchased at the place of residence, not at the above-listed sanitarium-resort institutions, the cost of treatment will not be repaid when one arrives at the resort.

The Central Council for Management of Trade Union Resorts has suggested that republic, territorial, kray, and oblast councils for management of trade union resorts and the managers of the trade union health institutions subordinate to them carefully review suggestions received from war veterans concerning ways to improve treatment and service for them and take steps based on these suggestions.

In conclusion I would like to wish the veterans of the Great Patriotic War a pleasant and useful time at our sanitariums and assure them that the employees of the trade union health institutions will make every effort and use all their skills to cure and strengthen the people who carried on their shoulders the entire burden of the struggle against the fascist aggressors for the freedom and independence of our native land.

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MILITARY SCHOOLS: NEPOTISM

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Pilatov: "Nephews -- The Results of Patronage in Admission to Military School"]

[Text] Col A. Trin'ko, secretary of the party commission of the political department of the Khar'kov Higher Military Aviation Command School of Communication imeni Leninskogo Komsomola Ukrainy, "persuaded" his son Yuriy to enter this school. He did not persuade him by sitting him down and telling him, "Go to the school, I will get you in." Things happened differently. The colonel has only been working at the school for a year, and before this he served in various places, including some garrisons in the Transbaikal M. D. Army life with all its hardships and deprivations passed before the eyes of his son and somehow the lad was able to see the main thing, some great meaning, in the difficult everyday life of an officer. When he finished 10th grade the young man had no doubts. He applied for admission to the Khar'kov Communications School. His academic record from secondary school showed two grades of "4," and all the rest were "5."

That is how Colonel Trin'ko "persuaded" his son to attend the school.

When cadets are discharged or go away on leave they enter a different world from the world of the military school. When Colonel Trin'ko's son is at home, it is the same world, strict and demanding, in short the military world. Yuriy graduated from school with distinction. From childhood he dreamed of becoming an officer, and he did so. He now serves in a military unit. The communists have elected him secretary of the party organization.

Political worker Trin'ko is from the Kirovograd region. He "sponsors" many students entering military schools, some of them from his own region. For example, I read the manuscript of his article "There Is a Profession of Defending Our Native Land," which was written for a young people's newspaper. In the article the colonel tells of our glorious army, its heroic traditions, and the school where he works. Trin'ko never misses an opportunity to publish such material in the local press and broadcast it on local radio. When cadets go off on leave Colonel Trin'ko always assigns them to go to their old secondary schools and tell about the army and the military school. Never once has such an assignment gone unfulfilled.

On his days off Trin'ko usually goes to his native city of Dobrovelichkovka where he speaks at schools, enterprises, and kolkhozes. Everywhere the subject is the same, heroism, military affairs, the army, its soldiers and officers. And of course, he encourages his listeners to enter military schools. He does not promise the young people an easy life, and certainly no special patronage; he promises them an important and meaningful life of service to the Fatherland.

What is the result? This year the admissions commission received twice as many applications from the Kirovograd region as were expected.

"During a unified political day a short time ago I was giving a lecture," Trin'ko related. "I looked over and there in the first row was a young man from Dobrovelichkovka. My neighbor's son Yura Tkachenko. I called him up after the lecture. How did you get here, I asked. He smiled and said, 'I want to be an officer like your son Yura. I used to meet him often when you visited us in Dobrovelichkovka.'"

Colonel Trin'ko offers one way to "place" students in military school. Another way was used by P. Plotnikov to "place" his son. Pavel Plotnikov, a graduate of 10th grade, came to the Khar'kov Communications School to take entrance exams. He passed the exams, went through competitive interviews, and was enrolled. He did not receive all "5" grades, but he did perfectly well. Finally the graduation party came. Like other fathers of cadets, Pavel Plotnikov's father came to this celebration. He was inconspicuous, wearing civilian clothes. But he was recognized nonetheless, a reserve major general of aviation, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. This was when people at the school learned for the first time who cadet Plotnikov's father was.

When I arrived at the Khar'kov school papers were prepared to expel two cadets: A. Belitchenko and A. Rusnak. Both were "locally prominent." No one before at the school had ever gotten away with all that these young men did. In their place another cadet would not have lasted a single day, but they were kept for two full years. Only now were they being expelled: the former for poor academic performance and the latter for lack of discipline.

Maj L. Lobun'ko, chief of the class, describes Belitchenko as follows: "He had average grades on his school-leaving certificate, 3.5. He proved to be a poor student during his time of study here. A great deal of explanatory work was done with cadet Belitchenko. Two very good students, Kal'chevskiy and Golovlev, were assigned to help him. He does not like the military uniform. The hardships and deprivations of military service are a burden to him. He is morally unreliable."

"School and work are a burden to him," Sr Lt S. Mokriy said tersely about Belitchenko.

"He does not work to improve his ideological-political level. He takes no part at all in the life of the Komsomol group and Komsomol organization," adds cadet Yu. Vakula, secretary of the Komsomol organization.

His current grades are all '2' or '3.' "We have worked with him on an individual basis, but without results. He could not answer a single question from his card at the exams," says Maj-Engr A. Ivanov, senior departmental teacher, about Belitchenko.

The descriptions of cadet A. Rusnak are no better. He is being expelled, as stated above, for lack of discipline. I dare say that the term "lack of discipline" is hardly applicable to the things Rusnak did. The phrase could only be used for Rusnak's activities if we rolled our eyes expressively at the same time.

Rusnak came to the school with a school-leaving certificate in which the average grade point was 3.5. With scores of only "3" he is lazy and keeps to himself. He constantly evades work. His attitude towards performance of his service duty is not always conscientious. He reacts incorrectly to criticism by NCO's and is rude to them — this is the description of Rusnak given by Capt L. Aloyan, his company commander. Battalion commander Col A. Zubov agrees completely.

Most of the teachers characterized Rusnak about the same as teacher A. Kravchenko, who says:

"His answers at the board and scores on quizzes and examinations are very poor. We have done extra work with him, but to no avail. He shows little promise for continuing his studies."

For two years the commanders, political workers, and teachers have literally nursed Belitchenko and Rusnak along. But they have proved obstinate. Individual study plans were compiled for them. The best cadets were assigned to help them. The material was interpreted for them and gone over again and again. They were allowed to take tests in the same subjects twice and three times. Belitchenko was kept in school even after he failed the final examinations for the second year. These two flaunted regulation requirements, elementary rules of behavior, and the requirements of our morality and ethics. Now let us ask: what was the reason for this soft treatment, which is so unique in the army? Why did it continue for years?

This is the time to speak of Col N. Belitchenko, chief of the school political department. Of course, today he is the former chief of the political department. One week before my arrival he left the school for a new service position. The cadet Belitchenko is the nephew of Colonel Belitchenko, while Rusnak is the nephew of his wife. And needless to say, in both cases their admission to the school was, so to speak, not without the colonel's participation. But the school has entrance competition each year. They have never had less than three applicants for each position. The school is very popular among young people, and it does a great deal to further the attractiveness of the occupation of communications officer. Competitive selection, which is selection of the best applicants, is a state, party-principled approach.

But then we have these nephews. It is certainly a shame that the chief of the political department, a man who has served in the military, has

recently been talked about at the school only as a patron and protector of trouble makers and bad students.

According to stories, the atmosphere during the period of admission to the school is sometimes somewhat unhealthy. Telephones never stop ringing. Some of the calls, it is said, cannot be shrugged off. In addition to phone calls there are also personal appeals.

It is odd that the phone calls and personal appeals are usually not for the person's own children, but rather for the children of a subordinate, friend, or neighbor who has little "status," so naturally their telephone call would not arouse the least attention at the school. These kind-hearted uncles, working for others, not like N. Belitchenko for his own nephews, probably think that their conscience is clean. After all, they are not asking for themselves and do not seek the slightest personal benefit. They are naive. Indeed there is no pe[illegible]al benefit. But what a social and moral loss! It is difficult to tur[illegible]m down; some have high positions and excellent military records, wh[illegible]rs arouse natural respect. But they are usually placing weak students [illegible]er a while we are "programming" graduates who are known to be weak. They are weak in a professional sense and have moral weaknesses. This shows up from the first day they arrive in the unit where they will be trusted to train and indoctrinate soldiers, sergeants, and warrant officers (praporshchiki). And then we say that only poor commanders have poor subordinates — this is the price of patronage.

I was told that one can sometimes read through the lists of those who were admitted and those who did not pass the competition, and suddenly among the ones who were rejected one sees the name of a person who fits in all categories. He is involved in social work, came on a Komsomol pass, is an athlete, and has a good academic record. But he was not admitted because he received an unexpected "2" grade in some particular subject, even though he passed all the other subjects irreproachably. But even from the papers it is obvious that others are absolute good-for-nothings, like Belitchenko and Rusnak, but they were admitted. What is going on? Why does it happen? It is all because, in addition to the competition among examinees, there is sometimes a completely different type of competition: a competition among relatives, their positions and ranks.

But are those telephone calls and personal appeals for one's own children and the children of others so omnipotent after all? There was a case at the school where a comrade in the administration was discharged into the reserve. He was somewhat prominent at the school. He was one of the people about whom it was said, in addition to other thin[illegible]s, "[illegible] has connections!" And then just before entrance examinations this comrade showed up with what amounted to a list of sons of various respected persons and said they must be admitted. The admissions commission thought it over and decided to go ahead on general principles. They did so. The next year the man with connections came again with a list of names. They listened to him, but then ignored him as they had done the year before. Since that time the comrade has not been back to the school.

So perhaps the point is not in phone calls and personal appeals. Perhaps it is a question of the principled approach of the admissions commission.

There was once a case at the school where Lt Col Khudyakov was found guilty by a comrades court of officers, expelled from the party, and discharged from the army for manipulating admissions. Captain Savchenko was excluded from the party and discharged from the army for similar actions. So it is possible to fight back if the commission wants to.

In the case of Colonel Belitchenko's nephews, unfortunately, the commission did not. The cases to expel them were not begun until everyone knew for sure that the patron of these "losers" would be leaving for a new place of service. For two years the nephews got away with everything. The men around them knew why, because they were relatives of the chief of the political department.

This is a state interest. What will our commanders tomorrow be like? We can form an idea today if we look carefully at the cadets in the first class at military schools. As the saying goes, the men who are admitted to the first class are the ones who will graduate and be seen later in the regiments. At the school a young man is prepared for very specific activities. The success of this work depends greatly on whether this young man was admitted to the cadet family exclusively for those excellent qualities and strengths which will in the future help him become a real commander.

This is a state interest. The chief of the political department, of all people, should know by party conscience that no interest except that of the state is or can be represented in his actions. This does not begin with teaching everyone else to be guided by the high requirements of morality and duty; it begins with the person himself, even in his thoughts, following only this, the interests of the state.

Belitchenko's nephews were outsiders from the minute they came to school. They reached cadet status only because their uncle acted in an unprincipled manner. Great damage was done to the indoctrination of cadets at the school, and not just to them. Those responsible should answer for this.

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RECONNAISSANCE TRAINING EXAMINED

In the Moscow Military District

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Ivanenkov, staff officer, Order of Lenin Moscow M. D.: "Train Reconnaissance Troops Skillfully"]

[Text] When I read the article "What Is Lacking in Reconnaissance Troop Training," by Lt Col V. Parfenov in the 2 October 1980 issue, I recalled the days of the check training periods. The author raises the point that some reconnaissance subunits devote little attention to the tactical and fire training of their personnel. It is observed that unit staffs sometimes keep reconnaissance troops in the status of "step-children," and fail to insure that they have a well-organized and precise training process.

In our district I had occasion to visit many subunits during the inspection. Unfortunately, I did see such things in certain places. Troop reconnaissance personnel were not always given the right to use the tank training area or firing range, and in some cases they were allowed to fall behind in performance of the training programs. Insufficient practical help and monitoring from the unit staff is the reason, for example, that the personnel of the subunit commanded by officer V. Koreshunov did not fulfill their obligations.

As the inspection showed, shortcomings in the training of reconnaissance troops also originated from poor methodological training of officers and the inability of some officers to conduct training periods well or organize competition. It is hard to expect good results from a subunit which did not begin working hard until a few weeks before the inspection, where before this the training process was sporadic. "Cramming" has never been an effective way to improve the knowledge and skills of personnel. This was graphically demonstrated by the actions of the subordinates of officer S. Krivoretenko during the inspection. The subunit, which for a long time had been considered one of the best, fell far back in competition. When we began looking for reasons, it was found that certain officers had forgotten about independent work and showed no enthusiasm for improving their tactical training. They tried to straighten things out at the end of the training year, but they could not catch up on what they had missed.

In this connection I would like to mention the role of the officers of higher ranking staffs who are expected to give practical help and monitor

the training of troop reconnaissance personnel. A great deal depends on them. They must be thoroughly familiar with the concerns and needs of the commanders of reconnaissance subunits, help them organize training periods, and promote improvement in the methodological skills of subunit officers. Unfortunately, this work is not always done diligently and purposefully.

In short, only the comprehensive approach to training troop reconnaissance personnel insures an appropriate level of tactical, fire, and special training for them.

In a Small Unit

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 18, Sep 80 pp 6-7

[Article by Lt Col N. Makhno: "Hill of Fire"]

[Text] Outwardly nothing foretold the slightest danger. But Grigoriy Ivanov, a broad-shouldered lieutenant of medium height who was slightly bent over under the weight of his knapsack was almost certain that the enemy had detected his reconnaissance group and was secretly, unseen, watching it.

Mentally sorting through his actions, the officer could find no mistakes. He could not reproach the reconnaissance personnel either. Nonetheless, it seemed likely that a mistake had been made. When? Where? Was it during the descent into this miserable ravine strewn with enormous boulders and covered by broken rock? It was while crossing the plateau that Grigoriy Olegovich seemed to feel someone's fixed gaze on him. And the further he led his group along, the stronger this feeling of unseen surveillance became.

The lieutenant tried to convince himself that he was tired and his imagination was playing tricks. It was unfamiliar terrain, and very rugged. It occurred to him that he should set out an ambush party here. He stopped for a minute to get his breath. For the hundredth time he carefully studied the surrounding area. It still seemed that there was no reason to be suspicious. The wind was herding obedient flocks of clouds through the mountain peaks as it had an hour before. Heat haze was dancing above the dark blue cliffs. Below them the trail was cut by a rushing stream sparkling with the rays of the setting sun. The patrol headed by Warrant Officer (Praporshchik) Rychkov was moving quickly and secretly toward it.

Sergey Nikolayevich was an experienced soldier and reconnaissance man. Lieutenant Ivanov, who had graduated from military school just two years earlier, sometimes found his methods and actions to be instructive, wise, and — so to speak,professionally attractive. There he was, hiding behind an enormous rock, studying the terrain on the opposite bank of the river.

The officer suddenly put himself in the enemy's place. What would he do in this situation? If he were the enemy, he would try to neutralize the reconnaissance group by opening fire from the opposite bank of the rushing stream, from the adjacent heights. Indeed, at that spot, washed by the river, there would be no possibility of maneuvering or holding out. If he

were to take up a defense, it should be on one of the two heights on the far bank. It would be best on the steep, inaccessible eastern peak that dominated its sister. There they could take a short break and he could allow the men to rest after a long and difficult move.

Ivanov left an ambush party of four soldiers led by Warrant Officer Rychkov behind. He led the rest of the group across the water. It was a small stream and not broad, but it was very powerful. Staggering from fatigue the men scrambled up the jumbled accumulation of boulders. They were ready to throw down their knapsacks and weapons, fall on the rocky ground, and just lie there, enjoying a rest. The lieutenant did not let them relax. The only concession he made, in answer to an unspoken request of his subordinates, was, after they climbed, or to be more accurate crawled, onto the crest of the lower peak gasping for breath from their exertion, he did not lead them on to the neighboring peak, whose inaccessibility was frightening.

Later he would mentally reproach himself for this concession and his pity for his men; in battle that may cost a life. But at this moment Grigoriy Olegovich understood that his men could not climb the few hundred meters more of cliffs. Moreover it was late and darkness was already gathering in the ravines.

It was time to call in the ambush party, while it was light and easy to cross the river. If necessary, it would be simpler to cover the patrol with fire from this height.

The reconnaissance group commander called Warrant Officer Rychkov and his men out of ambush using the standard signal. But they were not able to join their comrades. The enemy opened fire on them. From this moment on the problem inputs came one after the other, testing the will, training, and physical condition of the men.

After setting up his defense Lieutenant Ivanov thought with alarm of his subordinates. He had approved the warrant officer's plan to occupy a position on the flank of the group, near the base of the height, in the place where the river made a sharp turn, washed over the bank, and there was a good view of the terrain, ford , and mountain trail from a steep cliff.

The enemy, however, was plainly superior in forces to the reconnaissance group. Most important, the machine guns were firing from above, from cliffs on the side where the sun was setting, and so it was hard to see their fire points.

Privates Nikolay Zinov and Ravil' Zaripov were disabled. Warrant Officer Rychkov, driving back an enemy onslaught, moved his men to a safe place. Lieutenant Ivanov and the other reconnaissance troops were hitting targets accurately from their fairly advantageous position. Then the enemy concentrated his fire on the height.

According to the input, the reconnaissance group commander was in an extremely risky situation; he could not control his subunit. His good-natured face with slightly prominent cheek bones and his deep-set eyes seemed to reflect desperation and a reproach to himself: "I should have

climbed to the neighboring peak! Then the enemy could not reach us from above." But immediately the inner voice protested, "But the men did not have the strength for it'" He sighed and recalled how, a few days before when conducting a political training period, he had told his audience that in battle you must have the iron will for which the veterans of the front were famous and teach yourself to conquer fear and fatigue and show initiative. Could it be that his words, like a breeze on the plains, left no mark in the consciousness of the men?

He felt guilty for thinking this when the machine gun of Oleg Morozov opened up in furious fire next to him. The force of the enemy fire immediately diminished. "Thanks, Morozov!" the lieutenant wanted to shout. But he restrained himself. He only shot a thankful glance at the soldier, ran his dry tongue over his wind-chapped lips, and shouted to Private Peremkulov: "How are communications?"

The thing the reconnaissance group commander feared most was losing his radio. Then he would be unable to send the commander information on the enemy, the location of his personnel and equipment. It was for this information that his group had marched and crawled such a distance.

Now Grigoriy Olegovich understood why the enemy had not attacked the subunit earlier. The intention was not to neutralize the group, but rather to allow it to pass into the rear and take prisoners.

"Is the radio ready to use?"

"Yes, sir."

"Transmit the following..."

The lieutenant dictated a radiogram, thinking with respect how Private Peremkulov, operating on inputs from the umpire, had twice crawled out of his shelter to adjust the antenna and fix problems in the equipment. He had performed this dangerous mission outstandingly.

The enemy again began an attack. Although it was dark the targets could be distinguished. The lieutenant gave Sergeant R. Aziyev his missions and began firing himself. His irritation grew as the stream of input problems also grew. But combat is combat.

Private Morozov was disabled. Ivanov ordered one of the automatic riflemen to take the wounded comrade's machine gun. It was fortunate that every member of the platoon could handle all the regular weapons. And once again, as a few minutes earlier, the peak continued to beat off the onrushing enemy. Tracer bullets cut through the soft black night, searching for the many targets in it. In the jumbled mass of silent mountains the peak was thundering, fiery, and inaccessible.

"Private Peremkulov!"

"Here."

"Send this radiogram."

The commander of the reconnaissance group slowed himself down, either thinking over the presentation of the report or reflecting on how a reconnaissance man at the front would act in his position. In concise, dispassionate language he reported additional information on the enemy and his system of fire. Suddenly he felt relief: he and his subordinates had performed the mission! And he knew further that his battle comrades, loyal to front traditions, would not leave him alone with danger, but if necessary would come to his aid. No matter what! As if in confirmation, the radio said: "Thank you for a good job. I am sending out vehicles."

The familiar sound of a motor was soon heard. A few minutes later the vehicle stopped at the base of the peak. The first to jump out of it was Capt R. Latypov, Ivanov's likable but strict commander. Covering one another with fire the reconnaissance men began descending.

Grigoriy Olegovich looked at the rocky cliff where the unquiet night had passed. The peak was surrounded by heat haze from the sun, as it had been the day before. Clouds were floating lazily above it in the sharp blue sky. The mountain stream could be heard below. His tired body demanded peace, quiet, a cool place, and something for his thirst. But the trials were not yet over for the men of the platoon. Permitting no indulgence or simplification, the men continued shooting at the enemy and carrying out wounded. The lieutenant himself covered Sergeant Aziyev who was carrying a wounded comrade.

Only when he was in the vehicle did Lieutenant Ivanov allow himself to relax. Only now could he say: "Everybody in the group did everything possible to perform the mission and win the battle."

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AIR FORCES: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Preflight Check by Pilots Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Petrov, Order of Lenin Leningrad M. D.: "Objective Control in Action"]

[Text] After hearing the signal Lt Col-Engr P. Godnyy, deputy regimental commander for the aviation engineering service, glanced at the light panel of the electronic display unit and made a mark in the planning table: one more plane could be confidently allowed to take off. The objective monitoring data confirmed that the machine had been excellently prepared for flight.

But there were some problems with another aircraft. Sr Lt A. Zhurov, head of the group in charge of analyzing and decoding objective monitoring data, came to the command post of the aviation engineering service. Ordinarily Zhurov reported the results of checking the films from the system for automatic recording of flight parameters by loud speaker, and then more recently he had been using the general-purpose electronic display unit. But now he brought the films himself. Polikarp Polikarpovich Godnyy understood that something had happened.

Zhurov was brief. There were no criticisms of the physical equipment. All the parameters corresponded to norms. It was the actions of the pilot that aroused concern. Judging by the records of the recording equipment, there had been a short drop in pressure in the booster system at the technical post. The analysis made by the group showed that the pilot had worked the fin too vigorously. Moreover, he had not made a full check of the aircraft systems before starting. He was in a hurry.

"This is already the second case today of shortcutting checks at the technical post," the engineer remarked. "You must do something."

Thanking Zhurov for the information, Godnyy looked at the planning table. Both pilots had started their engines at almost the same time and taxied away without delay. At this moment a flight of interceptors in right echelon departed to work on group flying. Stop! Was this the stumbling block? The engines are started and taxiing is done in a group. This means that

while the first missile-carrying plane is being checked at the technical post the others are forced to park and wait with their engines running. Fuel is being wasted, and they have a long flight in front of them in different regimes, including using afterburner power. Awareness of this spurs on the pilots and hurries them.

The engineer calculated quickly. He figured that the last aircraft in the group stood idle for several extra minutes. At the starting point the picture was the same, except now the lead plane did the waiting. This led to a significant waste of fuel and engine life. To save a little time the pilots sometimes, as Zhurov noted, reduced the scope of checks at the technical post. Sooner or later this practice could lead to a flight accident.

But what should be done? After talking with the flight control officer the deputy commander of the aviation engineering service recommended that on their next takeoff the pilots "stagger" the schedule for starting engines and insisted that each pilot follow the instructions for operation of the equipment and the sequence of checks at the technical post exactly. This helped avoid the unnecessary risk. The next day there was a meeting of the methods council at which communist officers P. Godnyy and V. Sharov, directors of the aviation engineering service, spoke. Their proposal was sound and backed up by precise engineering calculations. The essential point was to set up another technical post for periods of intensive flying.

"Of course, such a system demands precise organization of checks on the condition of the aircraft before takeoff and coordination in the actions of those who authorize the planes to take off. It will require a certain increase in the number of specialists," P. Godnyy said. "But this is necessary in the interests of insuring flight safety. Moreover, the fuel savings under the new servicing system reached an impressive figure in just one shift."

With the establishment of the second technical post (it was set up and given radio communications not far from the point where planes taxi onto the takeoff runway) there were no more cases of violations of rules for operation of contemporary aircraft equipment on the ground. In addition, this had a good effect on the performance of flight missions by the pilots; after all, they no longer had to hurry or be nervous before takeoff. The emotional attitude of a pilot toward a difficult flight is, of course, quite important.

All this became possible because of attention paid to objective monitoring data and thanks to a carefully thought-out system for using it. The special recording equipment is highly accurate and dispassionately records all the pilot's actions and the performance of the aircraft in the air. It is invaluable to pilots in identifying possible malfunctions in the combat equipment and causes of violations of flight regimes. It is also an unbiased judge in evaluating the quality of performance of flight assignments.

The specialists of the group headed by Sr Lt A. Zhurov understand the importance of their work very well. They work creatively, introducing elements of scientific organization of labor and valuable efficiency proposals into the complex process of processing and decoding the films. For example, they were able to work out a procedure for interflight analysis of an impressive

volume of data from monitoring and recording equipment and set up a system to provide operational information to flight and engineering-technical personnel on the condition of the equipment, mistakes made, and the quality of performance of flight assignments.

The regiment works hard to teach its pilots and technicians respect for the "controllers" and tries to see that every specialist masters the use of films from the system for automatic recording of flight parameters. Regular training periods and drills are conducted for this purpose, methodological outlines are written, and effective steps are taken to introduce efficiency advances into practice quickly.

Monitoring and recording equipment is an irreplaceable aid not only in training flight personnel, improving the quality of aviation servicing, and insuring flight safety. The creative approach to using advanced know-how made it possible to find another sphere of use for objective monitoring data: in the interests of organizing socialist competition. The flight recorders give a commander objective material for evaluating the quality of performance of missions and the preparation of the aircraft. This is an invaluable aid in summarizing the results of competition and analyzing performance of obligations by the airmen. The regiment used this potential extensively at the end of the last training year to determine the leaders in competition among pilots and technicians. The method has now been significantly refined. I think that it will serve commanders very well when comparing results in the intensive struggle to greet the 26th Congress of the CPSU in a worthy manner.

Bomber Regiment Training Goals

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Nov 80 p 1

[Socialist obligations of bomber regiment: "To New Heights of Aviation Skill"]

> [Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is publishing today the socialist obligations of the personnel of the Guards bomber aviation Red Banner regiment commanded by Guards Lt Col V. Rodinov. The guardsmen call on the fighting men in aviation in the USSR Armed Forces to undertake even broader socialist competition to achieve better results in training and celebrate the 26th Congress of the CPSU with a further increase in combat readiness.

The fighting men of the Guards bomber aviation regiment commanded by Guards Lt Col V. Rodionov fulfilled their plan of combat and political training and their socialist obligations in the last training year completely and well. The personnel achieved a significant reduction in time required to reach combat readiness. At flight tactical exercises all the combat training missions were accomplished, usually with nothing but outstanding scores. The level of air and fire training among crews and subunits in the regiment rose markedly. All the crew commanders and navigators are top-rated specialists. The ranks of outstanding servicemen grew. The regiment has operated for 15 years without a flight accident. Based on the results

of socialist competition the unit was first in the formation and earned the title of outstanding. These successes are graphic confirmation of the airmen's faithfulness to the ideas of the Communist Party, their military duty, the requirements of the military oath, and the glorious combat traditions of the Soviet Guards.

The Guards airmen, participating in the national movement to greet the 26th party congress in a worthy fashion, are drawing their own practical conclusions from the resolutions of the October 1980 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech there. They are searching creatively for ways to make combat training even more effective.

After discussion of the missions of the upcoming training year in the crews and subunits, the pilots, navigators, engineers, technicians, and junior aviation specialists at a regimental meeting set out new goals and decided to appeal to all fighting men in aviation in the USSR Armed Forces to undertake broader socialist competition to achieve even greater results in combat training and to celebrate the year of the 26th CPSU Congress with a further increase in combat readiness and strict regulation order.

In their statements at the meeting of personnel communist military pilots 1st class Guards Maj B. Podchinennov and Guards Capt V. Malashitskiy, combat-qualified master Guards Capt Tech Serv V. Vinokurov, Komsomol specialist 2nd class Guards PFC A. Polyakov, and others expressed profound approval of the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and Soviet Government and fervent support for the strength, high principles, and firm stand of the Central Committee of our party and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee headed by Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev in the struggle for peace. They welcomed the measures to insure the security and defense of our native land and the cause of socialism.

Military navigator-marksman Guards Maj A. Libenkov said: "We understand that the militaristic line of imperialism and the build-up of NATO nuclear potential leads to a greater threat of war. Under these conditions our Armed Forces must be constantly ready to repulse any aggressor. Soviet airmen have the latest equipment which embodies the latest advances of scientific-technical progress. We are the heirs of the heroic glory of the older generations of Soviet fighting men and will make every effort to master these mighty weapons. Communists and Komsomol members have always been, are, and will be the leaders in this."

The Guards airmen took on the following obligations in socialist competition:

— Constantly maintain high combat readiness, teamwork in the flight crews and subunits, and their ability to perform their missions night and day under any weather conditions and to destroy the target on the first attack, with the first missile, bomb, or shell. By the end of the year reduce the time required to bring the regiment to takeoff readiness by six percent. Conduct all flight tactical exercises with scores no lower than "good" and "outstanding." Confirm the title of outstanding regiment and keep first place in competition.

- Constantly improve air training, work hard to master new tactical procedures and the art of using the aviation complex in battle. Raise the average score for the primary types of combat training to 4.65. All crew commanders and navigators must have first-class qualifications and seven crews will win the title of marksman. Strive for thorough knowledge of the equipment, aerodynamics, tactics, and creative use of the experience of airmen in combat during the Great Patriotic War and the best achievements of masters of bombing and missile strikes. Win the title of outstanding for 66 percent of the flight crews and subunits.

- Maintain the aviation equipment and weapons in exemplary condition, strive constantly for an improvement in the quality of its use and fulfillment of regularly scheduled servicing and other types of mechanical maintenance. Involve every serviceman in competition for the title of best specialist in the unit. By the end of the year at least 80 percent of the technicians and mechanics in the regiment will become specialists 1st and 2nd class and 80 percent of the technical groups, teams, and aircraft will be outstanding.

- All personnel will take an active part in improving physical facilities for training. Develop technical creativity, and work out and introduce at least 45 efficiency proposals. During the training year reduce expenditures of ground support means per hour of flying by eight percent.

- Insure thorough knowledge and strict observation of the laws of the flight service, rules for operation and maintenance of aviation equipment, and rules for organization and control of flight by all categories of personnel. Constantly improve flight training skill among instructors, raise the level of technical and special training among airmen, and have nothing but outstanding and good scores in the disciplines. On the basis of all this in addition to high personal responsibility, organization, and discipline, guarantee flight safety.

- In the struggle to be the best unit in the formation, direct socialist competition to strengthening regulation order in the subunits, maintain exemplary appearance, military bearing, and irreproachable behavior by the servicemen. Strive for a further solidification of the military collectives, stronger military friendships, and the development of comradely mutual help. Observe the norms of communist morality. Work on a daily basis to improve the appearance of the military post and service and residential quarters.

- Participate actively in mass cultural and sports work. Make at least 90 percent of personnel rated sportsmen and winners of the Military Sport Test medal, and win a place in the competitive inspection of units for physical training and sports.

- Constantly improve political consciousness and ideological conviction and indoctrinate personnel with absolute devotion to the cause of the CPSU, love of our Soviet homeland, and class hatred of the enemies of socialism. Work regularly studying the teachings of V. I. Lenin, the decisions of the 26th party congress, and the words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on questions of strengthening the country's defense capabilities. Strive to see that the ideological maturity of each airman in the regiment finds expression in

an active posture in life, lofty moral-fighting qualities, and readiness at any moment to selflessly perform his patriotic and international duty of defending the interests of our state and the countries of the socialist community.

After unanimously approving these obligations, the guards airmen challenge the personnel of the bomber aviation Red Banner regiment commanded by Lt Col A. Sheatakov to socialist competition and give their assurance that during the year of the 26th party congress they will work in a Leninist, communist fashion and will fulfill the missions assigned by the USSR Ministry of Defense for the new 1981 training year and their socialist obligations with honor.

Role of Communists in Bomber Division

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by Col V. Izgarshev: "Without Taking Away from Their Contribution"]

[Text] Before the start of the party conference I met an old friend, Major Anatoliy Gun'ko. On his chest I noticed the insignia of a military pilot-marksman.

"Eighteen other pilots in addition to me have been awarded the marksman qualification," Gun'ko said.

"How are you doing at the academy?"

"I passed the entrance exams, and I am now an extension student."

Lieutenant Colonel Yevgeniy Belyakov was also a delegate at the conference. As usual, he did not say much, "I have been flying a lot. But more and more as an instructor."

A master of flying the modern supersonic interceptor aircraft would probably want to take the tests for pilot-marksman as Gun'ko did, but perhaps it is equally important to teach new aerial fighters and pass on one's rich experience to them.

"That may be so," Belyakov agreed, "but you yourself must grow too."

"Yevgeniy Veniaminovich is being modest," Gun'ko remarked. "He is a good example to all our interceptor pilots."

Colonel Gennadiy Shchitov, division commander and military pilot-marksman who was recently commander of an outstanding regiment of interceptor-bombers, mastered a modern missile-carrying interceptor with variable wing geometry that was new to him in the past training year.

No matter who I talked with, they all had gratifying reports of success in training and service.

I listened to the reports by Lt V. Novikov, chief of the division political department, and Maj A. Bulgakov, secretary of the party commission, as well as the statements by delegates. Once again I heard talk of changes for the better. This is natural, of course. Life does not stand still; it constantly puts new challenges, more complex ones, naturally, before our airmen. The party organizations are the reliable helpers of our commanders in meeting these challenges.

In the report time, the last two years, the communists of the Interceptor Aviation Red Banner Division imeni 60-Letiya Velikogo Oktyabrya made a great contribution to the common cause. One year ago the division won the title of leading formation in the Air Force. It has now confirmed and held this honorary title. Moreover, they did not simply repeat what they had done, but surpassed their earlier achievements.

How was this expressed? Convincing instances of the campaign by communists for high qualitative indicators were given at the party conference. The ranks of the pilot-marksmen and top-rated specialists increased. They performed all flight-tactical exercises and all practice launches of air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, bombing strikes, fire missions against ground targets, and other types of combat flights with outstanding scores. The time required to put the subunits and units in combat readiness was reduced by 10 percent and the number of outstanding evaluations for flight shifts increased by the same amount.

For the first time new pilots were prepared for combat flying not by the end of the year, as had been true earlier, but by the end of the winter period. The airmen had no flight accidents and completely fulfilled their flight training plan. As a result, two regiments of the leading formation achieved the best indicators in Air Force based on the year's results.

The personnel of the division, inspired by the decisions of the October 1980 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, are now taking an active part in socialist competition to greet the 26th CPSU Congress in a worthy fashion and fulfill the obligations they have assumed.

These and other facts, as delegates at the conference correctly emphasized, are a graphic result of the campaign of party organizations to see that communists play a vanguard role and that effective socialist competition is pursued under the slogan of the 10th Five-Year Plan: high efficiency and high quality of labor in all spheres of activity.

At the conference the leading communists were named, men such as lieutenant colonels A. Vakulenko, L. Zotov, and V. Khmelevskiy, Lt Col-Engr V. Rybanov, majors A. Gun'ko, N. Kirichenko, A. Lebedev, and B. Plotnikov, and captains M. Antonov and A. Boldyrev. Among the best were commanders of the units, squadrons, and flights, political workers, engineers, technicians, and party activists. They are the cementing force of all personnel. And it is a great credit to the party organizations that they are constantly raising such men in their ranks. Last year, incidentally, the political department took care to see that party organizations and groups were formed and worked actively in all crews, technical groups, and combat control agencies. Of course, this promoted a further increase in the party influence on all

aspects of the life and activities of the large and complex military organization which is the division.

The communists who work right in the crews, teams, and groups have done and are doing a great deal to establish an atmosphere of high standards and mutual exactingness and to strengthen regulation order and discipline in the primary elements of the military collective. Convincing examples were given at the conference and aviation flights, crews, technical groups, and entire subunits which have gone for long periods of time without violations of military discipline were named. Eighty percent of the subunits of the division have no flagrant offenses or accidents on their records.

But what about the other 20 percent? Here, perhaps, we must say bluntly, without taking away from the contributions of this generally outstanding collective, that unfortunately the "campaign" for order and discipline in certain party organizations is still largely formalistic and merely on paper. In some cases there is lack of objectivity in evaluating the state of military discipline, and offenses are covered up. Nor do all party members, including some officers and leaders, set an example for non-party members in their behavior on the job and away from work. What about the party organizations of these subunits? You cannot say that they are not doing anything. One of the party organizations, for example, discussed the question of discipline at five meetings during the year, but no changes took place.

It seems to me that the political department must also recognize its own mistakes here. As the facts indicate, it has not always succeeded in teaching primary party organizations to struggle for highly effective party work. Political branch officers did not do enough to propagate progressive know-how. It would seem that a firmer hand should be taken with those whose diligence showed only at meetings, who were more concerned with looking good on paper than in fact.

Right near the political branch there is a subunit which not long ago was widely known for its successes. It has now lost its leading position. Is this unusual? After all, during training and service it happens that some are leaders today, and others lead tomorrow. But in this case the fact that many of the members of this formerly leading collective do not seem to mind what has happened puts us on guard. In any case, neither Maj G. Vasil'yev nor Lt Col A. Slaykovskiy, who spoke at the conference, expressed any special concern that the subunit had fallen behind. It is a shame that the political branch was not able to help the communists of the subunit get rid of such attitudes on time.

Here is another case. Many of the communists of the airfield support subunit were severely criticized at the conference. When the deputy commander of this subunit took the floor, no one expected that he would dodge the critical remarks in his statement. They expected a self-critical evaluation of the results of party work in the subunit. But his long and detailed talk concerned the successes of the subunit in saving materiel. Only in conclusion, quickly in passing, did he mention that the criticism was fair, that they admitted it and gave assurances...

I must say that the report of the chief of the political department, which was generally informative and business-like, also lacked self-criticism. The souvenir pins, greetings in verse, telegrams to conferences held on the same day in other garrisons of the district, and flowers to members of the Presidium hardly helped create a spirit of criticism and self-criticism at the conference.

More self-criticism! This is what will help the communists of this leading division achieve even greater successes in their military labor.

Helicopter Training Successes Noted

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Nov 80 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Archegov, commander of the Red Banner Helicopter Regiment imeni V. I. Lenin, military pilot-marksman: "The Main Guide"]

[Text] Final preparation for the new training year is being completed now in all the squadrons, flights, and groups of our unit. In general, everything is already prepared for intensive training on the ground and in the air. Great work awaits us. The plans and obligations were carefully figured out. Our main guide is the goals of the Guards airmen who initiated socialist competition in Air Force units in the new training year.

After weighing and discussing their possibilities and identifying additional reserves, the personnel of the Red Banner Helicopter Regiment imeni V. I. Lenin set new goals in combat improvement. From the first day of the winter training period we will work to reduce the time required to put the regiment in readiness for takeoff. Another difficult goal for the pilots is to achieve an average score of 4.6 for piloting technique and an average of 4.7 for launching unguided missiles.

Responding to the appeal of the initiators of socialist competition in the Air Force, we have assumed higher obligations for increasing the number of outstanding airmen in combat and political training, specialists 1st and 2nd class, and holders of the Military Sports Test medal. What was our starting point? Successes in combat and political training in the just-ended training year give us the right to hope for better results in the upcoming period. Military pilots 1st class majors V. Olenyik, A. Kurnaleyev, S. Sidorenko, and A. Vinokurov have shown themselves to be skillful methodologists and teachers. Their progressive know-how is already being applied in practice.

The response of the personnel of the Red Banner Helicopter Regiment imeni V. I. Lenin to the appeal of the initiators of socialist competition in the aviation of the USSR Armed Forces will be intensive combat training, precise organization, and regulation order. We are filled with a desire to achieve new heights in mastering the equipment and weapons, to improve our combat skills, and to win the title of outstanding unit for the 12th time during the socialist competition to greet the 26th Congress of the Communist Party in a worthy fashion.

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SOVIET VIEWS: U.S. FORCES IN MIDDLE EAST

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 80 p 3

[Article by I. Tarutin: "Zeroing in on the Persian Gulf"]

[Text] The United States changes strategy — New Pentagon bases of operations — Rehearsal for intervention.

"The mission assigned to us is global, but our attention is focused on the Persian Gulf." This statement was made recently by U. S. Marine Lt Gen P. Kelly, commander of the interventionist "rapid deployment forces." The entire world is watching events in the Persian Gulf region today with alarm, but this does not upset Pentagon figures at all.

American imperialism has always tried to subject the countries of the Middle East to its domination. The Persian Gulf has occupied a special place in its strategy. After all, this is the location of a large part of the petroleum reserves of the capitalist world. It provides 60 percent of the deliveries of this strategically important raw material to the West. For a long time the United States exercised control over the Persian Gulf through the shah's regime. The Iranian revolution, which swept away a tyranny hated by the people, caused the United States to lose its position in the region. This then led to an abrupt change in American strategy, which had placed its primary emphasis on stationing U. S. armed forces in the gulf region.

At the start of this year President Carter declared the Persian Gulf to be a sphere of "vitally important interests" of the United States which he intended to defend using force. Using the events in Afghanistan as a pretext, the United States began an unprecedented build-up of its military presence in this region. An armada of naval ships led by assault aircraft carriers was moved toward the gulf. The Pentagon hastily began putting together a "rapid deployment corps" of 200,000 men.

But these enormous numbers of troops, of course, cannot operate effectively thousands of kilometers from U. S. territory without support bases in their region of "deployment." Therefore, one of the main problems of the Pentagon was to set up these support points. As deputy U. S. secretary of defense R. Comer announced, "A network of regional bases is the key facet of the military foundation of current American policy."

Rapid modernization of the naval and air base on Diego Garcia Island was begun. It is considered the "bastion of American military might" in the Indian Ocean. The United States has been able to conclude agreements with Somali and Kenya to use ports and airfields in these countries. Egypt and Israel have offered their services to Washington.

But the Pentagon wanted to have a base of operations right in the Persian Gulf region in order to supplement the de facto naval brigade by stationing ground and air forces there. As the American weekly TIME wrote, "Officials would be glad to have American bases located at a distance from the oil-fields which is equal to the radius of operations of tactical aviation."

Despite intensified pressure from the United States, none of its friends in the gulf wanted to provide this service. The countries of the Persian Gulf have been increasingly disturbed by Washington's all-out support of Tel Aviv. The position of outright connivance with Israel which the United States took on the issue of the Zionists' annexation of East Jerusalem aroused a storm of indignation. The gulf countries responded negatively to the intrusion of the U. S. naval armada into its waters. Growth in anti-American attitudes forced even those regimes which traditionally followed in the wake of American policy to put distance between themselves and Washington. Rear Admiral Hansen, member of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, was forced to acknowledge that "the leaders of the states in this region have let it be clearly understood that they do not want to have American bases in their territory." The only exception was Sultan Qaboos of Oman. He signed an agreement with the United States by which it received "broader access" to military facilities in Oman. The Pentagon's attention was attracted by Ses Sib airfield, the bases in Tamrid, and the ports of Matrah and Salal. But the main interest is in the air force base on the island of Masira, which still belongs to the English. According to the Kuwaiti newspaper AL ANBA, the United States has appropriated 800 million dollars for its reconstruction. The base is being reequipped to supplement the base on Diego Garcia. According to information from the People's Liberation Front of Oman, a runway is being built on Masira that is capable of handling strategic B-52 bombers. The command of U. S. armed forces in the Persian Gulf is also located there. Storage facilities, shops, and refueling points to serve American ships and aircraft are being set up in the sultanate.

The Pentagon has become particularly active in Oman in connection with the escalation of the armed conflict between Iraq and Iran. After military operations developed Gen D. Jones, member of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, rushed to the region. His job was to convince Qaboos, in view of the "extraordinary situation" that had developed, to grant the American military machine the right to operate uncontrolled in the country, turning the sultanate into a forward base for the "rapid deployment forces."

The United States has become just as active, if not more so, in Egypt, which is located "on the road" to the Persian Gulf. Its position there has grown markedly stronger. In return for many millions of dollars in military aid Washington received President Sadat's consent to use Egyptian territory for American purposes. The primary purpose is to build up the American military presence in this Arab country. Thus, since the beginning of this year American aircraft of the AVAKS [expansion unknown] system which

keep vast segments of the Middle East under electronic surveillance during their patrol flights have been based at Kena in Upper Egypt. The Pentagon has already appropriated 400 million dollars for reconstruction and modernization of the Egyptian military base at Ras Banas, on the coast of the Red Sea. After completion of the primary work this base will be, in the concept of American strategists, a "transit point" during possible movement of units of the "rapid deployment forces" from the United States to the Persian Gulf region.

Just recently a squadron of U. S. Air Force Phantoms visited the West Cairo base. For three months the pilots "worked to master" the tactics and flight conditions in a region identical to the Persian Gulf, which is the target against which the "rapid deployment forces" are aimed. As it turned out, this was just the first step in this direction. At the present time 10-day joint American-Egyptian maneuvers are underway in Egypt under the code name "Bright Star." The basic participants are 1,400 soldiers and officers from the "rapid deployment forces." After moving from the state of Kentucky to the West Cairo base in a matter of days this contingent, equipped with antitank weapons and mortars, is learning to aid combat operations under the conditions of the Egyptian desert, which is very similar to the landscape of the Persian Gulf. The American press does not conceal that the Pentagon, by conducting these maneuvers, is demonstrating its ability to move armed forces to "hot spots" quickly and commit them to battle immediately.

We cannot fail to see that the United States is attempting to use the outbreak of military operations between Iraq and Iran for further purposes in addition to digging in in Oman and Egypt. Playing on this conflict and the natural concern and alarm it has aroused in neighboring states, Washington has begun a campaign to impose its military presence on them, supposedly to shield them from the storms sweeping the gulf.

The United States was able to make a breakthrough in relations with Saudi Arabia, which previously had been very cold to Washington's military flirtations. Riyadh gave its consent to station aircraft of the AWACS system and 800 service personnel in the country. They were followed by special refueling aircraft. But the United States hopes to use the territory of Saudi Arabia for more than just keeping the Persian Gulf in the electronic sights of airborn spies. Reports have appeared in the American press that the United States wants permission from the kingdom to move American F-15 interceptors there.

Washington is putting great pressure on the small island state of Bahrain. The countries have had an agreement since 1977 which allows American warships to call at the ports of Bahrain. The Pentagon has been trying to convert them into its own bases for a long time. The naval base at Jufair is especially attractive to them. In exchange for it they promise the Emir of Bahrain "reliable defense" in the form of an American military umbrella. Similar offers are being made to Kuwait.

In pursuit of its expansionist objectives, the United States is trying to warm its hands at the conflagration of the Iraqi-Iranian conflict. They are building up tension in the Persian Gulf zone and want to use it to impose their own military protection on the states located there, which would mean de facto American domination. Behind the increased expansion of American imperialism we can clearly discern its general strategic line of suppressing national liberation movements in the region and establishing control over its petroleum riches.

SOVIET VIEWS: CHINESE IN PAKISTAN

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Nov 80 p 3

[Article by A. Gol'ts: "Why They Are Arming Islamabad"]

[Text] Highly placed Chinese military figures have been visiting Pakistan more frequently recently. The military delegation headed by Chinese Air Force commander Wang Tingle had not even completed its visit in Islamabad when acting commander of Chinese Naval Forces Liu Daosheng arrived in the country. The facts show that these visits are by no means mere protocol. What is going on is implementation of a secret agreement between Beijing and Islamabad which was signed in June of this year.

It was apparently no accident that the arrival of the commander of the Chinese Air Force coincided with the beginning of deliveries of Chinese Shenyang F-9 Fantan interceptor bombers to the Zia-ul-Haq regime. These bombers have an operating radius of about 800 kilometers and use anti-aircraft missles. A plant for major overhaul of military aircraft has just been opened in the Pakistani city of Kamre. It was built with Chinese aid. It is noteworthy that Wang Tingle personally attended 12-day maneuvers of the Pakistani Air Force conducted in the immediate vicinity of the border of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The baton was passed to acting commander of the Chinese navy Liu Daosheng. As observers note, the purpose of the negotiations which he is conducting with high Pakistani military figures is a "further increase in deliveries of modern weapons to Pakistan." As the Indian Information Agency INE reported, as these negotiations proceed more and more groups of "instructors" and "advisors" in organizing sabotage and large-scale terrorism are arriving from China in the Yaslu region, which is the location of one of the major bases in Pakistan to train Afghani counterrevolutionaries.

The Indian press wrote that during the visits of the high Chinese military figures in Northern Pakistan maneuvers were conducted in which Chinese forces participated.

Washington is also stepping up its efforts to develop the Pakistani base of operations. Admiral R. Long, commander of U. S. Armed Forces in the Pacific, has already visited Islamabad. An American mission is now in Pakistan "studying Pakistani needs for arms."

These foreign guardians of the Pakistani military regime are doing everything they can to see that Islamabad has the money to buy modern military equipment. The International Monetary Fund, which is controlled by the United States, recently reached a decision to give Pakistan a loan of unprecedented size. It will be 1.6 billion dollars.

The newspaper WASHINGTON POST has written very frankly about why Islamabad is being armed so intensively: "Geographically Pakistan has a very convenient location because it provides the base to support the Afghani rebels and convenient sites for air bases and naval facilities" in the region of Southern Asia and the Persian Gulf.

These facts permit us to draw the conclusion that the role of armed vassal of Washington and Beijing in Asia has been set up for Pakistan. Realization of this policy has already begun. Indeed, Pakistan has become a base from which an "undeclared war" against democratic Afghanistan is being waged. Arms deliveries to Islamabad also arouse considerable concern in India. The attempts of Washington and Beijing to arm the Zia-Ul-Haq regime and create a center of constant tension in Southwestern Asia cannot fail to arouse a firm protest by those who are truly striving for peace and security on this continent.

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SOVIET VIEWS: U.S. MILITARY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Nov 80 p 3

[Article by Col M. Ponomarev: "Militaristic Fever in the United States"]

[Text] To please the all-powerful complex — The Pentagon receives additional appropriations — Pressure on allies intensifies.

The closer the leaders of the present administration in Washington, which lost the election, come to the end of their days in office, the more feverish their activities become. These activities move in a single, definite direction. Carrying out the will of the all-powerful military-industrial complex, the masters of the White House and Pentagon who are leaving the political arena are hurrying not only to move previously planned militaristic programs ahead quickly but also to develop new, even more dangerous programs.

Many reasons can be given for this energetic behavior on the banks of the Potomac. But as observers remark, one of the most important is the desire of the Carter administration to leave to the country and the Republican government a heritage of the military-political doctrines and strategic goals by means of which they tried to turn back the process of international development, undermine detente, and return the world to cold war times. At the same time the ruling circles of the United States would like to build up the material base for realizing their aspirations to military supremacy and solidify their leading position in the world.

These aspirations have recently been given a new portion of "theoretical" substantiation. This includes the report entitled "Strategic Guidelines" prepared by W. Schneider, an associate at the Hudson Institute in New York, and retired general R. Stillwell. In this pretentious report the authors state without the slightest embarrassment: "There is no region in the world which should be outside the sphere of American interests."

To carry out its hegemonistic pretensions, the report says, the United States "must be able to use force unilaterally." From this premise there follows the "necessity" for an all-out build-up of arms, above all strategic arms. "American strategic strike forces," the authors of the report write, "should be capable of delivering strikes against the entire enemy

complex of military, political, and economic targets." At the same time, the report demands a build-up in forward-based American weapons in Europe and other regions of the world and a build-up of conventional armed forces and weapons.

Militaristic appeals like those contained in this report, which was concocted on demand for the Pentagon and military monopolies and received broad publicity, have become the rule, not the exception in the United States. To illustrate this it is enough to refer to a statement by the notorious Democratic Senator H. Jackson. In a recent speech in Washington he said that the United States faces the "challenge of constantly building up both conventional arms and strategic nuclear weapons."

The stock market on Wall Street, a very sensitive barometer of American political and economic life, reacted immediately to the policy adopted in the White House and Pentagon, backed up by pseudotheoretical studies and militaristic appeals. The stocks of the military industrial corporations are selling like hot-cakes on the market today.

The most generalized indicator of militaristic activity in the United States is found in the swift and steady increase in military appropriations and spending. It is impossible not to observe that the executive and legislative powers in Washington have recently become involved in an odd kind of competition to see who can spend most on the arms race.

In fact, total Pentagon appropriations for the fiscal year that began on 1 October 1981 [sic] were just recently approved at 157.5 billion dollars with a general ceiling on military spending of 171.5 billion dollars. But then the Pentagon chief H. Brown demanded an additional billion from the Senate. What did the Senators do? They immediately added not one but 3.5 billion dollars to the budget of the military department, bringing the figure to 161 billion.

Criticizing the Senate's decision, observer J. Wighart wrote: "The Senate did not simply exceed Carter's request for defense spending. By voting for enormous appropriations for new types of weapons, some of them doubtful at best, and not even creating the appearance of serious debate, the Democrats in the Senate showed that the voters were right on November 4, not to trust control of the Senate to them any longer."

However, the Democratic administration simply shrugs off such criticism. The Carter Government is hastening to consolidate accelerated growth in military spending for the future. It is now preparing a new military budget. According to the NEW YORK TIMES, the defense department will receive 200 billion dollars in 1982, 16 billion more than was planned only recently. The real increase in the military budget, taking inflation into account, will be seven percent in 1982 compared to 1981.

This fantastic amount of money is being used primarily for accelerated re-equipping of the United States' strategic nuclear forces. Additional appropriations are being used for stepped-up testing of the MX intercontinental ballistics missile and preparing basing regions for these missile in the states of Nevada, Utah, Texas, and New Mexico. Great emphasis is

being put on completing construction and commissioning the atomic submarine Ohio, the first in the series of Trident system submarines armed with long-range ballistic nuclear missiles. More and more money is being invested in refinements of various types of cruise missiles, testing them, and setting up series production.

Additional money has also been appropriated to increase the production of plutonium, which is necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons. The NEW YORK TIMES wrote that under existing programs the United States must produce a minimum of roughly 2,000 warheads for MX missiles, about 5,000 for Trident missiles, and 1,500 for ground-based and air-based cruise missiles in addition to 1,000 aerial nuclear bombs. All this requires a large amount of plutonium. To produce this material it is contemplated that three new reactors, in Barnwell and Hanford, will be added to the three now in operation.

Ambitious programs are going forward to build up conventional forces in addition to the development and build-up of U. S. strategic nuclear forces. New tanks, field guns, ships, aircraft and helicopters, and missiles have been ordered for the army, air force, and navy. Considerable attention is being devoted to the adoption of new types of weapons based on the latest scientific and technical advances. Thus, according to information in the WALL STREET JOURNAL, the U. S. Department of Defense is focusing attention on laser devices. They have already spent 2.2 billion dollars for research in this area in recent years. At the present time scientific research centers of the departments of the navy, air force, and army as well as the National Aernautics and Space Administration (NASA) are doing parallel work on laser weapons.

While stepping up the arms race and other militaristic preparations, the Government of the United States is also putting increasing pressure on its allies to make them obediently follow the Washington line. American politicians and strategists are particularly persistent in pushing their NATO partners to carry out the 1978 decision on an annual three-percent increase in military spending by countries of the bloc and the long-term program for building up arms and armed forces.

Numerous deliberately panic-stricken reports have appeared in the Western press recently saying that certain NATO countries cannot (or do not want to) carry out the increase in military appropriations promised two and one-half years ago. What is striking in reality, however, is not that certain countries would like to slow down the rate of growth of military spending, but rather the fact that this growth is continuing. Take West Germany for example. Under pressure from Washington they renounced a contemplated slowdown in growth of military spending with virtually no resistance. After Chancellor H. Schmidt's trip to Washington the Reuter Agency reported from Bonn: "In response to allegations that West Germany is not fulfilling its NATO obligations he will increase defense spending next year and probably surpass most partners in the alliance in this respect."

Washington pressure on its partners when some of them attempted to loosen the strangling militaristic noose just a little ultimately forced them to

retreat. "After protracted heavy and painful diplomatic pressure," the newspaper LOS ANGELES TIMES wrote recently, "the impression is now being given that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in general will accomplish its goal on time; it will increase defense spending by three percent overall in the coming year." It is expected that this will be officially announced at the session of the NATO Council which opens next week.

The American allies in NATO are also feeling ever-growing pressure to participate in Washington's hegemonistic and militaristic actions in different parts of the world that are not in the NATO sphere of action, chiefly the Persian Gulf Region. Speaking at a seminar on foreign policy and military problems held two weeks ago, Z. Brezinski, who will also be leaving the White House soon, stated bluntly that the Western European allies of the United States "should play a more active role in creating a security system in the Persian Gulf region." He went on to say that the NATO countries could perform this role both by direct participation in preparations for armed intervention in the region or by increasing their contribution to military efforts in Europe which would free American forces and materiel for militaristic adventures in other regions.

Washington is undertaking its measures to step up the arms race in a complex international situation. These steps themselves are one of the chief elements that build tension. These measures, and their initiators do not conceal this, are aimed at disrupting the military-strategic balance that has taken shape in the world and undermining the strategic stability that follows from it. At the same time, these measures are linked to the desire of ruling circles in the United States to create a nuclear first-strike potential. Finally, it must be soberly considered that in certain areas the arms race unleashed by the United States is approaching a point beyond which the possibility of effectively controlling it can be lost.

That is why the peoples of the world are watching the actions of the instigators of a new round in the arms race with well-founded alarm. At the same time, the entire world is increasingly understanding the hopelessness of attempts to achieve military superiority over the USSR. The Soviet Union is not a country that can be talked to on that basis.

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DEFENDING SOCIALISM: ROLE OF PARTY EMPHASIZED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 80 signed to press 23 Sep 80 pp 3-9

[Article by Prof, Col V. Izmaylov, and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col A. Mitrokhin: "The International Significance of CPSU Experience in the Building of Socialism and Its Armed Defense"; passages in italics printed in boldface]

[Text] The CPSU is approaching its 26th Congress having gained very rich experience in the revolutionary struggle, in socialist construction, and the armed defense of the victories of Great October. Created and fostered by V. I. Lenin, it steadily led the workers and the working peasantry of bourgeois-landowner Russia through the class storms. Under its leadership, the socialist revolution in our country overthrew the exploiters, it established the dictatorship of the proletariat, and shook the entire edifice of world capitalism to its very bases, having opened up a new age in the history of mankind. The construction of a developed socialist society in the USSR is the highest achievement of the revolutionizing activities of the CPSU and the Soviet people at present.

Great is the international significance of our party's experience in building socialism and its armed defense. Even in May 1918, V. I. Lenin with unshakable certainty said: "This experiment will not be forgotten...on this experiment a future international revolution will construct its socialist edifice."[1]

The experience of the CPSU is the experience of pacesetters. It provides an opportunity to elucidate the common patterns in the revolutionary struggle of socialist construction and its armed defense. From it, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, "scientifically based and practically tested guidelines are developed helping under specific conditions in various countries to find the correct solutions to complicated problems...."[2] What does the experience of the CPSU teach? All its diverse activities affirm the correctness of Marxist-Leninist teachings about the *vanguard role of the party of the proletariat and its leadership* as a decisive condition for the working class to carry out its world historical mission, and as a most important source of its strength and might in the struggle against capital.

The distinguishing trait of a truly Marxist-Leninist party is its *revolutionary nature*. V. I. Lenin taught that the role of a fighter could be carried out only by a party led by revolutionary theory. This was again pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress: "Marxism-Leninism is the only reliable basis for the elaboration of a correct strategy and tactics. It provides us with an understanding of the

historical future, and helps in defining the direction of socioeconomic and political development over long years to come, and to correctly understand international events."[3] Loyalty to Marxist-Leninist theory and its creative development are one of the most important traits of the new type party.

History also teaches that a powerful source of strength and invincibility in a Marxist-Leninist party is the *ideological and organizational monolithiness of its ranks*. This is not only the conscious but also the organized vanguard of the working class, not a mere total of organizations, but a structured system based upon the principle of democratic centralism and strict discipline obligatory for all. The attitude toward these concepts serves as a watershed between true revolutionaries and reformists. All sorts of renegades rabidly attack not only Marxist-Leninist theory but also the organizational principles of the Marxist-Leninist parties. The experience of the CPSU acquired by it in the struggle for the unity of its ranks is very instructive. It is useful both for each individual party as well as for the international communist movement as a whole. V. I. Lenin considered the *inseparable link of the party with its class and with all workers* as the most important source of its strength and the condition for its existence and fruitful activities.

Also characteristic of the new type party is the principle of proletarian internationalism. The CPSU in its policy successfully combines *the national with the international*. Inherent to it are a respectful attitude toward the fraternal parties and their experience and the greatest possible support for the workers of other countries who are struggling against exploiters.

Of important international significance is the experience of our party's struggle for *establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat*. V. I. Lenin repeatedly pointed out that the question of power and of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the question of the ultimate content of the proletarian revolution, "this is the most important question of the entire proletarian class struggle."[5] Life has clearly shown that the path to socialism lies only through a socialist revolution and a proletarian dictatorship which in our country assumed the form of soviets. In a number of nations where socialist revolutions have been victorious, the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established in the form of a people's democracy. L. I. Brezhnev has emphasized: "Either power of the working class acting in alliance with the working people. Or power of the bourgeoisie. A third way is not possible."[6]

The party can lead the working class to victory only when it wins over a majority of the people to its side. For a revolution is not a conspiracy, not a coup of the upper clique, but rather a movement of the broadest masses. This is why a most important condition for the working class to carry out its historic mission is a correct party policy which provides *its firm alliance with the poorest peasantry*, and the broad support of the working people.

Our party, particularly in the period of the preparations for and carrying out of the October Revolution, provided a fine example of winning over the masses to the side of the proletariat. "...At the moment of winning power and creating the Soviet republic," wrote V. I. Lenin, "Bolshevism was united, it won over all the best of the close currents of socialist thought, and united around itself the entire vanguard of the proletariat and the gigantic majority of the workers."[7]

The winning over of the army to the side of the revolution is a particular concern of the party which raises the people to assault the old order. V. I. Lenin pointed out that "if a revolution does not become mass, if it lacks troops, then there can be no question of a serious struggle."[8]

In the October Socialist Revolution, the Bolsheviks had a dominant influence in the army. This was one of the most important factors of the victory. V. I. Lenin pointed out: "If there had not been a general uprising of the soldiers and workers, power would never have fallen from the hands of those holding it."[9]

At present the role of the army in the revolution is no less significant. This can be seen from the victorious revolutions in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and a number of other countries. Where the armed forces do not act along with the people, the revolution ultimately does not achieve its aim. The tragedy of Chile serves as an affirmation of this. For this reason, the experience of winning over the army to the side of the revolution is of timely significance.

These are certain lessons which derive, in using Lenin's words, from the Bolshevik struggle and the Bolshevik Revolution.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the workers of our nation successfully carried out the most important and most complicated task of a socialist revolution, namely its creative aspect. In this great undertaking, the CPSU began virtually from scratch. In the expression of V. I. Lenin, the bourgeoisie when it came to power had an "already tested crew, an already prepared path and previously tested mechanisms. But now neither the crew, nor the path nor anything else has been tested before!"[11]

Bourgeois "prophets" repeatedly predicted the downfall of the Bolsheviks and the inexorable death of Soviet power. But the Soviet people, under the leadership of the party, repudiated these concoctions and built socialism. The actual experience of this construction has shown *the inevitability of transitional period from capitalism to socialism*. In our nation it lasted from the end of the Civil War and Intervention to the middle of the 1930's. During this time the party and the Soviet government carried out the New Economic Policy (NEP). The USSR also successfully carried out such grandiose tasks as industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, the cultural revolution and the national question. In the shortest period of time the Soviet Union was turned into a powerful socialist state. The experience of the CPSU in solving these problems has been widely used in the countries which have taken up the path of socialist development.

In advancing toward communism, socialism, as practice shows, *should go through definite stages of maturation*, including the stage of developed socialism, as a necessary element of the social transformations in any country regardless of the level of its productive forces. This is an extended process.

The teachings about developed socialism which have enriched and clarified our notions of the patterns of the new economic formation are the result of *the collective thought of the fraternal parties*. This very fact shows its enormous international significance.

At present, developed socialism is being built in a number of the European socialist states. It is being improved in the USSR. This task is no less complicated and no less responsible than the creation of the bases of socialism.

A thorough description of developed socialism can be found in the materials of the 25th CPSU Congress and in the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. The USSR Constitution is the vivid historical result of the revolutionary changes and difficult accomplishments of the Soviet people. It proclaims that a developed socialist society is a society in which powerful productive forces and advanced science and culture have been created, in which the prosperity of the people grows constantly, and ever better conditions are established for the all-round development of the individual. This is a society of mature social relations, where a new historical community of people--the Soviet people--has formed. This is a society of patriots and internationalists. A law of life in this society is concern for the well being of each and the concern of each for the well being of all. This is a society of authentic democracy.

The enormous experience of the CPSU in the construction of socialism and communism has made it possible to formulate a number of conclusions and provisions which are of lasting significance.

The main one is that the transition from capitalism to socialism and the successful solution to the problems of socialist construction are possible only on a basis of the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, that is, political and state leadership of society by the working class. The dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible except *through the communist party*, under which a mechanism of new state power is created, and the defense of socialist victories is ensured. The basic function of the dictatorship of the proletariat is creative, that is, economic organizational and cultural-indoctrinational. With the construction of a developed socialist society, the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat is turned into a state of all the people, and the communist party becomes the vanguard of the entire people.

Another important concept is that the victory of socialism is possible only in the instance that *the working class and its party are able to unify*, inspire and mobilize the workers to build a new society. One of the greatest merits of the CPSU is that it, in a fierce struggle against rightist and "leftist" capitulators, defended, concretized and realized Lenin's plan for building socialism in the USSR. This plan is a model of a scientific and comprehensive approach to solving the problems of socialist construction. The fundamental basis of it is the elimination of capitalist ownership and the establishing of public ownership of the basic means of production.

The world's first experience in the planned socialist transformation of the economy and the planned management of the economy on all levels has proven effective. *"Planning the development of the national economy,"* states the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 50th Anniversary of the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Soviet National Economy," *"is one of the most important scientific and social victories of the 20th century...."*[12] It has become a feature of many other states, and above all the CEMA members. From their experience socialism has proven the supriority of the planned organization of economic ties on the international scale as well. It is no accident that this experience has attracted the attention of the developing countries.

Also exceptionally important is the conclusion that socialism can become established only in the instance that worker power is able *to defend the victories of the revolution* against attacks by the class enemy, both internal and external. From the very first day of the existence of the Soviet nation, imperialism has shown itself to be the vilest enemy, and together with the Chinese hegemonists, also of the entire socialist commonwealth. It is a source of wars and the main obstacle on the path of human progress. In this regard, more timely than ever before is one of the most important legacies of Marxism formulated by V. I. Lenin: "Any revolution will be worth something only when it is able to defend itself...."[13] This legacy has been incorporated as an inexorable truth in the treasurehouse of the experience of world socialism. The defense of revolutionary victories is one of the general patterns of the socialist revolution and the construction of socialism. Precisely the stubborn and diverse military work by our party and the creation and strengthening of the Armed Forces made it possible for the workers in October 1917 to overthrow the bourgeois order and defend the socialist fatherland in the flames of the Civil War and Intervention, as well as during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

The experience of the CPSU teaches that the defense of the revolutionary victories and the ensuring of the peaceful creative labor of the builders of socialism and communism must be approached with all seriousness. A strong army is essential for successfully carrying out this task. Our party has created such an army. Its duty, as the USSR Constitution states, is to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing the immediate rebuff of any aggressor.

Elaborated by V. I. Lenin and developed by the CPSU, such underlying *principles* as a class approach to the organizational development of the Armed Forces, the leading role of the Communist Party, an unbreakable link of the army with the working masses, proletarian internationalism and the friendship of the Soviet peoples, the complete conformity of the forms of military organization to the specific historical conditions and tasks of the armed defense of the fatherland, one-man leadership on a party basis, creative military discipline, and others have withstood the test of time, they have endured all testings and are of international significance.

The unchallenged leadership of the armed forces by the party is an objective pattern, an indispensable principle of Soviet military organizational development, and the main source of the strength and might of the army and navy. During the most crucial moments of class struggle and military hardship, the Communist Party has become a fighting, militant party. It assumes the entire responsibility for the fate of the motherland, it completely subordinates its activities to the interests of the armed struggle, it reorganizes its ranks, it changes the content and methods of work in accord with the requirements of wartime, and acts as the collective military leader. This was particularly apparent during the Great Patriotic War.

The experience of the CPSU in directing the armed struggle of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces against the domestic and external counterrevolution and imperialist aggression is excessively rich and diverse. It shows that the solution to the problem of defending the socialist fatherland must be approached comprehensively, that is, an active peace-loving foreign policy combined with constant concern for maintaining the defense capability of the nation on the proper level. For the first time in history our party has in fact shown how to combine the construction of socialism and its defense, having thereby substantiated the objective

necessity of solving economic and sociopolitical problems considering the needs of national defense. For this reason each five-year plan has made provision for a rise in economic, scientific-technical, and moral-political potential, as well as the balanced development of the bases for the military might of the socialist state.

In military organizational development, our party has carried out the *Leninist principle of friendship of peoples and proletarian socialist internationalism.* The Soviet Armed Forces are a united multinational military organization. In the USSR, all nations and nationalities have been granted an equal right for the armed defense of the socialist fatherland. The CPSU from the very first days of creating the army and navy, has carried out a policy of military cooperation between Soviet Russia and the young Soviet republics which arose as a result of the October Socialist Revolution. It strengthened the cooperation of the Red Army with the internationalists during the years of the Civil War and with the military formations of a number of European states during the years of the Great Patriotic War. As a result there arose, has now been strengthened and is developing, a fraternity in arms within the Warsaw Pact which this year celebrated its 25th anniversary. It is a reliable shield of socialism and peace.

In the present-day situation, when the adventuristic actions of the United States and its supporters have strengthened the military danger, the task of deepening military cooperation among the Warsaw Pact nations remains one of the most important. As long as the NATO bloc survives, as long as the militaristic circles conduct an unrestrained arms race, the Soviet Union, together with the other participants of the Warsaw Pact, will strengthen this military-political alliance. The 25th CPSU Congress discussed this. And at present the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized that "the intrigues of imperialism and the other enemies of peace demand constant vigilance and the greatest possible strengthening of our state's defense capability in order to thwart the plans of imperialism to achieve military superiority and dictate to the world."[14]

The defense of the victories of socialism against external and internal enemies, as was stated in the Declaration of the Conference of Representatives from the Communist Parties of the Socialist Countries in 1957, is a common pattern. Life has shown that with the turning of socialism into a world system, the defense of the revolutionary victories becomes an international matter. For this reason, Lenin's ideas and the very rich practical experience of the CPSU in military organizational development "have inestimable significance for the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties and for all the progressive forces of the modern world who are struggling for the revolutionary transformation of the world."[15]

The attitude toward the experience of the CPSU in building socialism and its armed defense against our enemies is a subject of acute ideological struggle. In every way blackening the achievements of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, our enemies are waging unrestrained anti-Soviet and anticommunist propaganda, showing no shame in the choice of forms and methods. The Chinese hegemonists have joined their chorus. To the Beijing and other similar allies of imperialism who have slipped in their policy to anti-Sovietism, the following very apt words were said by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Syrian Communist Party H. Bagdash: "...We are profoundly convinced that the quagmire of anti-Sovietism is the worst, the dirtiest and the most dangerous quagmire into which a communist, a revolutionary or a progressive person can fall."[17]

The vain attempts of the anticommunists and the anti-Sovietists of all hues to underplay the international significance of the experience of the CPSU under the leadership of which our people have traveled a heroic distance are to no avail. The Marxist-Leninist parties and all the revolutionary forces of the modern times highly value, study and creatively employ it. This, in particular, was mentioned in the speeches of many foreign guests who attended the ceremony of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in honor of the 60th anniversary of the victory of October.

The fraternal parties in the socialist countries are learning from us in building developed socialism. The experience of the CPSU, friendship with it, commented the General Secretary of the SEPD Central Committee, E. Honecker, are "the foundation of our achieved and future successes in building a developed socialist society and laying the basic prerequisites for a gradual transition to communism...."[18]

The experience of the CPSU serves as a reliable marker and guide to action for the parties of the young states which have recently escaped from colonial suppression and those which are following the path of noncapitalist development. "The Soviet Union," said the Minister of National Defense of the People's Republic of the Congo D. Sassou-Nguesso, "is a pioneer of world revolution and is a vital source from which the peoples fighting for their happiness draw strength."[19]

In noting that the experience of the CPSU is effective aid for the communist parties in the capitalist states, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party H. Florakis, said: "We are learning and will learn from the CPSU loyalty to the great principles of scientific communism, and we will learn from the CPSU the art of their creative application...."[20]

In turn, the CPSU carefully studies and creatively employs the experience of the revolutionizing activities of the other communist and workers parties which are leading their peoples along the socialist path. Loyal to Lenin's legacy, the CPSU has always viewed and does view socialist and communist construction and its armed defense from the positions of internationalism. "Fraternal solidarity among the socialist countries," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "multiplies the might of each of them.... The militant cooperation of the Marxist-Leninist parties is its firm basis and its unifying force."[21]

The rich and diverse experience of the revolutionizing activities of the CPSU is vivid proof of the correctness and vitality of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. It has become part of the treasure in the treasurehouse of world revolutionary experience, and is a powerful force in the struggle of the peoples for peace, social progress and the happiness of all mankind.

FOOTNOTES

[1]V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 383.

[2]L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 6, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 638.

[3]"Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 72.

[4][Not in text.]

[5]V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 37, p 240.

[6]L. I. Brezhnev, "Velikiy Oktyabr' i Progress Chelovechestva" [Great October and the Progress of Mankind], Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, p 18.

[7]V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 39, p 216.

[8]Ibid., Vol 13, p 372.

[9]Ibid., Vol 35, p 64.

[10] Not in text.

[11]Ibid., Vol 44, p 416.

[12]PRAVDA, 18 March 1979.

[13]V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 37, p 122.

[14]PRAVDA, 24 June 1980.

[15]"V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" [V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces], Voyenizdat, 1980, p 499.

[16][Not in text.]

[17]PRAVDA, 5 November 1977.

[18]Ibid., 3 November 1977.

[19]Ibid., 4 November 1977.

[20]Ibid.

[21]L. I. Brezhnev, "Na Strazhe Mira i Sotsializma" [On Guard for Peace and Socialism], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 449.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: SPECIAL FEATURES OF NIGHT COMBAT

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[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Prof and Candidate of Military Sciences, Maj Gen V. Panov: "Special Features of Conducting Combat Operations at Night from the Experience of the War"; passages in italics printed in boldface]

[Text] Over all of military history, starting from deepest antiquity up to the present, combat operations at night have been widely used by belligerents. Their significance increased as military equipment and weapons developed. The saturating of armies with technical means of combat and the increase in the power of weapons forced the troops to resort to such actions which could weaken the fire effect of the enemy for the purpose of preserving the combat capability of the units (formations) and for successfully carrying out of their combat missions.

One of the ways to achieve the given aim was to widely use conditions of restricted visibility for an offensive. Nighttime darkness sharply restricts the possibility of observation and the effectiveness of weapons fire and aviation strikes, and contributes to concealing the concentration and maneuvering of the advancing side, surprise, the continuity of combat and increasing the rate of advance. Decisive actions by the troops at night had a demoralizing influence on the enemy. It is no accident that World War I in the course of which large masses of artillery, tanks and aviation were used for the first time, provided a number of examples of conducting an offensive under nighttime conditions by large troop formations. The Civil War is rich in numerous examples in this regard. Indicative would be the nighttime assault on the Perekop fortifications and the crossing of Sivash Bay under the leadership of M. V. Frunze in November 1920. Nighttime combat operations assumed an even broader scope during the years of World War II.

The article is aimed at generalizing certain experience in preparing for and conducting a nighttime offensive during the years of the Great Patriotic War and bringing out the trends which have maintained their significance under the present-day conditions of armed combat.

According to the prewar views, nighttime combat operations of the troops were a customary phenomenon. At the same time, the 1936 Field Manual recommended that a nighttime attack be conducted by battalions, sometimes by a rifle regiment, and as an exception, by a rifle division.[1] In the draft of the 1940 Field Manual it was

emphasized that the difficulties of control and maneuver restrict the depth of troop offensive operations in nighttime combat, and for this reason the operations should carry out limited missions such as seizing individual strongpoints and lines.[2] However, the war introduced substantial corrections in defining the place and role of nighttime combat, having significantly increased its proportional amount and scope.

Thus, even during the first period of the war, along with the extensive execution of regroupings and the bringing up of troops to the jumping-off position, nighttime began to be more widely used by the units and formations for capturing population points (the liberation of the town of Mikhaylov by the 330th Rifle Division and the town of Serebryanyye Prudy by the 332d Rifle Division of the 10th Army in December 1941), for carrying out raids and setting up ambushes in the course of combat operations of cavalry troops in the enemy rear (the I Guards Cavalry Corps on 3 February 1942), for pursuing the enemy (the 250th Rifle Division of the 31st Army during the night of 22 December 1941, and the 173d Rifle Division of the 50th Army during the night of 20 April 1942), as well as for counterattacks and counterstrikes (by the 138th and 152d Rifle divisions on the Aksay River during the night of 6 August 1942). Greater attention began to be paid to organizing nighttime combat operations by the military councils of the fronts and armies. The directive of the military council to the troops of the Western Front of 29 December 1941, for example, stated: "...As of today to commence extensive surprise nighttime operations. In the evening to send out ambushes of small fighting detachments on the roads deep in the enemy positions. All nighttime attacks on population points are to be prepared for before nightfall. The troops are to be brought up to the jump-off position for an attack also before nightfall. Guides and submachine gunners are to be widely used."[3]

In the subsequent periods of the war, the range of missions carried out by the troops under nighttime conditions was broadened, and they assumed an operational scale. The combined-arms armies under conditions of limited visibility began carrying out the breakthrough of intermediate defensive lines (the 3d and 8th Guards armies in the Zaporozh'ye Operation of 14 October 1943), the crossing of water obstacles (the 8th Guards Army in the Lublin-Brest Operation of 20 July 1944), and carry out pursuit (the 51st Army in the Crimean Operation). The tank armies operated even more actively, such as: the 3d Guards Tank Army to the west of Kiev (Kiev Operation), the 5th Guards in the region of Shpola (Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation), the 6th Guards on the Hron River (Budapest Operation), and the 3d Guards on the Kepno, Oppeln axis (Vistula-Oder Operation). In the Berlin Operation nighttime operations were organized on the front level with the First Belorussian Front going over to the offensive at night.

Consequently, in the course of the Great Patriotic War, the mass use of large combined-arms and tank (mechanized) field forces and formations became a new phenomenon in military art, and there was a significant broadening of the range of not only tactical but also operational missions carried out under conditions of restricted visibility. The designated trend was a consequence of seeking out the most effective ways for maintaining the viability of the troops, reducing casualties from enemy fire, and achieving surprise. This was also caused by the increase in the quantity and improvement in the quality of weapons and military equipment, by the appearance of more powerful and advanced illuminating equipment and the first models of night vision instruments, as well as by the increased art of employing

Soviet troops in an operation (combat) and by their high moral-military qualities. The war clearly affirmed the well-known truth that the night helps only the bold and the brave soldiers. Darkness is an ally of an able, experienced and knowledgeable commander.

The methods for preparing for nighttime combat operations in the last war were largely predetermined by the conditions for going over to the offensive. In a number of operations, the troops went over to an offensive at night from immediate contact with the enemy from the outset of an operation in the aim of breaking through the most fortified positions (Berlin and Manchurian). Here the combat operations were planned and prepared for ahead of time. Plans of the offensive were worked out in detail. In certain operations, it was planned for the second half of the night, considering the possibility of a rapid exploitation of the achieved success in the morning. From several hours to several days were allocated to the formations and units to organize the nighttime combat operations. At the same time, for ensuring a continuous offensive, in virtually all the operations of the Great Patriotic War, the troops went over to nighttime combat operations in the course of already developing engagements and battles. The troops carried out various missions: securing the success achieved during the day, capturing important strongpoints and centers of enemy resistance, completing the breakthrough of the enemy tactical defensive zone, crossing intermediate lines, crossing rivers, pursuing the enemy in the operational depth and so forth.

Although the troops were prepared ahead of time for nighttime combat operations, still their organization was difficult since the time was very limited. From the experience of 16 rifle divisions, it was 2-14 hours, and this included only 1-7 hours of daylight.[4] This circumstance made it necessary for the commander more often to make his plan on the map, giving its content to subordinates personally at the command (observation) post or traveling to the formations (units, subunits). Here the necessity was always considered of leaving daylight for organizing nighttime combat by the inferior commanders and staffs. The time for the start of the attack was set proceeding from a consideration of the nature of enemy defenses, the capabilities of one's own troops, and the state of the terrain, the night and the weather. In a majority of instances, in order not to allow the enemy to dig in or bring up reserves, the time was set in the early evening hours. But under conditions when the enemy had succeeded in digging in at intermediate positions (lines), the start of the attack was usually planned for the middle or the second half of the night, and this made it possible to prepare more carefully for it.

Most characteristically, regardless of the conditions for going over to nighttime combat operations, the plan for the operation (combat) was marked by simplicity, excluding complicated maneuvers. In setting the direction of the main thrust, along with other factors, consideration was given to the possibility of achieving surprise and rapidly seizing important strongpoints and objectives, the capturing of which would disrupt the stability of Nazi defenses and provide for the successful exploitation of the offensive during the day, and in addition consideration was given to the terrain conditions, primarily from the viewpoint of its passability for military equipment and the presence of clearly visible markers. Moreover, great attention was given to light support. In the formation of the troops, as a rule, provision was made for echeloning them in depth. This provided an opportunity to conduct combat operations continuously both at night and in the day.

The particular features of the work of the commanders and staff on the operational level were expressed chiefly in the fact that the questions of organizing cooperation in the fronts and armies (Zaporozh'ye, Budapest and Berlin operations) were settled on the map, and sometimes on terrain models, by issuing instructions to coordinate the efforts of the rifle, tank and mechanized troops with the artillery fire and air strikes. In a number of instances a plan was worked out for the cooperation of the night bomber aviation with ground troops (the 5th Air Army with the IV Mechanized Corps in August 1945).[5] But the basic activities of the generals and officers in the headquarters of the fronts and armies were focused on providing help in preparing for nighttime combat operations directly at the tactical level.

In the formations, if time allowed, special nighttime attack plans were worked out. From the experience of the 88th and 89th Guards rifle divisions in the 8th Guards Army (the Lublin-Brest Operation), they determined the objectives of the attack, the resources assigned for the nighttime offensive, their combat missions, the units (subunits) to be involved in the transition from nighttime combat operations to daytime, and the bases for organizing cooperation and control of the troops. Sometimes (in the divisions of the 65th Army in the East Prussia Operation), a procedure was worked out for reconnaissance, for the relationship of the flanks and for material and technical supply. The questions of organizing and conducting nighttime operations were reflected in the battle orders and plans of offensive combat.[6]

In the formations and units exceptional attention was paid to organizing cooperation directly on the spot during daylight. Here the places were designated for making passages in enemy obstacles and the procedure for designating them, uniform markers were set, the questions were settled of organizing a proper service, light support and camouflaging, and in addition the actions of the units and subunits of all the branches of troops were coordinated in terms of the target, time and place. The staffs of the formations worked out tables for the light signals, target designation and cooperation.

In the preparatory stage of the operations, the troops trained most attentively in nighttime offensive actions. Up to 50 percent of the exercises were conducted at night. In a number of instances, the units of the rifle divisions which were in the second echelons changed over to a nighttime regimen (they worked at night and rested during the day (the V Guards Rifle Corps of the 28th Army in preparing for the East Prussian Operation). The methods of conducting battle under conditions of restricted visibility were carefully worked out from the individual soldier up to a reinforced rifle battalion. The tank troops prepared particularly for nighttime combat operations. For example, in the 3d Guards Tank Army (Vistula-Oder Operation), virtually one-half of all the exercises, including for artillery and gunnery, were conducted at night.

In the activities of the staffs, a significant place was taken by generalizing the experience of preceding battles and promptly making this available to the troops. In many field forces and formations, for this purpose instructions were published on the methods of training the troops for operations under nighttime conditions. Thus, the staff of the 8th Guards Army on 8 June 1943 issued a special order on instructing the troops in the extensive use of light signals under nighttime conditions,[8] and in the 4th Tank Army there was the order of 3 September 1944 on preparing the troops for nighttime operations using the experience of a combat exercise.[9] The 162d Rifle Division of the 70th Army in March 1945 worked out procedural instructions

on training battalions for nighttime combat operations.[10] Instructions on the use of tracer and incendiary weapons and on troop command were worked out in June 1943 by the staff of the 248th Separate Rifle Brigade and were distributed in the 50th Army.[11] The generalization and introduction of experience and practical recommendations to a significant degree helped to improve the quality of preparing the troops for nighttime combat operations.

The role of party political work increased in preparing for operations under conditions of restricted visibility. This was caused by the fact that the night had a strong psychological effect on the men and had a negative influence on their physical and moral state, helping to strengthen the impressionability and nervousness of a person. Under conditions of darkness, even the most insignificant danger was often overexaggerated. For this reason, along with disseminating the experience and explaining the carrying out of specific missions under nighttime conditions, great importance was given to strengthening primarily the inferior party organizations and sending party political workers to the units and subunits for immediate work with the men.

Thus, among the particular features of organizing nighttime combat operations, it is valid to put primarily the fact that the commanders and the staffs, in possessing limited time, endeavored to provide a larger portion of it to the troops, and many questions (planning, the organization of cooperation and so forth) were carried out almost simultaneously on several command and staff levels. Also characteristic was the fact that the preliminary working through of the combat missions on the terrain was carried out chiefly on the tactical level. But on the operational level, the questions were solved of planning the fire effect on the enemy, as well as light and material and technical support.

An essential feature in breaking through enemy defenses at night was in all instances a desire to achieve surprise for the initial thrust. This was achieved by the troops going over to the offensive without softening up by the artillery (the 10th Army in the counteroffensive at Moscow in December 1941, the Separate Troop Group of the 46th Army in the Third Ukrainian Front in crossing the Dnestr Estuary in August 1944, and the 5th Army in the Manchurian Operation in August 1945) or by employing unusual methods of attack using searchlights (the Berlin Operation, April 1945), the light from tank headlights and the sounding of sirens (the 3d Guards Tank Army in the Kiev Operation, November 1943). Here the artillery was always ready to hit detected enemy targets, as well as to conduct barrage fire for isolating the area of the attack. However there could be no standard solution. Under conditions when the Nazis expected the attack and had prepared to repel it, the offensive started at night after brief artillery softening up or intense shellfire (East Prussian, Berlin and other operations).

An increase in effort was most frequently achieved by committing the second echelons and the reserves to the engagement. Thus, in the East Prussian Operation, in breaking through a strongly reinforced enemy tactical defensive zone by the V Guards Rifle Corps of the 39th Army during the night of 16 January 1945, specially trained rifle battalions were used from the second echelons of the 17th and 19th Guards rifle divisions. In the morning the main forces began to carry out their missions. On the night of 17 January, battalions from the second echelons were again committed, and this prevented the enemy from digging in on the second line. On the morning of the same day, the success was exploited by the main forces of the corps.

Often the success of nighttime battle was exploited by committing mobile army groups to the engagement. This is how the mission was carried out by the 69th Army where on the night of 15 January 1945, the XI Tank Corps (Vistula-Oder Operation) was used for completing the breakthrough of the second line and capturing the town of Zwolen.

In pursuing the enemy at night, forward detachments were widely used. Their operations, particularly for those units allocated from the tank and mechanized formations, were marked by high results. In the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation, for example, a forward detachment from the IX Guards Tank Corps by a night attack captured the town of Grojec, by 2300 hours on 16 January had initiated the battle for Sochaczew, having thereby cut the enemy's escape route from Warsaw to the west. Operating predominantly at night, the detachment fought over a distance up to 90 km.

During the war years a number of trends can be noted in the use of forward detachments. In the first place, there was the desire of the commanders and the staffs to increase their fire and maneuvering capabilities, and secondly, more attention began to be paid to preparations for the pending operations during darkness (prior to the East Prussian Operation in the 11th Guards Army, at least five exercises were conducted for the forward detachments).

The results of nighttime combat operations were also increased by using diverse, at times original methods of conducting combat. In this regard instructive are the enterprising operations during the night of 22 November 1942 (the counteroffensive at Stalingrad) by the forward detachment from the XXVI Tank Corps of the 5th Tank Army in seizing the bridge across the Don in the region of Kalach. Being in the enemy rear, the detachment by surprise with headlights on crossed the bridge, destroyed the guard, took up a circular defense and thereby ensured the crossing of the main forces. For the courage, heroism and resourcefulness shown, its commander, Lt Col G. P. Filippov, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

An example of exceptionally daring actions was the complete surprise nighttime attack during the night of 28 March 1944 on the Mosheni railroad station (to the north of Chernovtsy) by forward detachments from the 1st Guards Tank Army. As a result warehouses were captured with diverse supplies, as well as several trains, some with tanks. For these actions, the commander of the forward detachment (of the 69th Tank Regiment), Col I. S. Boyko, was awarded the second Gold Star Medal.

For the purpose of outflanking and capturing enemy strongpoints under nighttime conditions, during the war years wide use was made of such a stratagem as using small groups (four-five men) of submachine gunners operating ahead of the advancing troops on a broad front, in firing on the move and using grenades, they created the appearance of an offensive by a large mass of troops and demoralized the enemy. To a significant degree the mastery and mass heroism of the Soviet soldiers contributed to the success of nighttime combat.

The use of unusual methods for conducting combat operations and the manifestation of troop boldness and daring are an important factor in achieving success in nighttime combat. Under present-day conditions this also obliges us to carry out an active creative search for the most effective methods of the combat employment of the troops and the use of their combat capabilities.

Particular features of the use of the units of the branches of troops and services of the Armed Forces. In the rifle units and formations, in breaking through enemy defenses, the most effective results were achieved by reinforced rifle battalions, assault detachments and groups which were specially trained for nighttime operations, and in pursuit by forward detachments of the same reinforced battalions.

A large amount of artillery was assigned to the rifle subunits as close support guns and was used with direct laying (up to 30 percent in the XXVIII Guards Rifle Corps of the 8th Guards Army in eliminating the Zaporozh'ye bridgehead). As experience showed, the success of a nighttime attack in a whole series of operations was achieved with artillery fire having a density much less than under daylight conditions. In the instance that the nighttime attack was carried out after a brief artillery softening up (20-25 minutes from the experience of the 5th Assault Army and the 8th Guards Army in the Berlin operation), an effort was made to achieve a high artillery density (up to 325 guns per km of breakthrough front in the formations of the 8th Guards Army). The attack was supported by a double rolling barrage.[13]

For the tank units and formations used for the purposes of direct infantry support, characteristic was their close cooperation with the infantry, artillery and engineer troops. At the same time the Great Patriotic War showed the possibility and advisability of using tank (mechanized) field forces and formations in conducting nighttime combat operations. The rate of their advance at night often reached the daily average.

During the war years there was a significant rise in the scope of the combat employment of aviation under nighttime conditions. This trend was reflected in the formation of the night bomber air formations and in the broadening of the range of missions carried out by it. This aviation was used for conducting both independent operations in the aim of making nighttime strikes against major military-industrial and administrative-political centers, airfields, railroad junctions, as well as for the immediate support of the formations advancing at night. Its role was also increased in light support and in guiding the ground troops. Also carried out was the task of delivering materiel by air to the areas of combat operations (Uman'-Botosani, Belorussian, Vistula-Oder and Manchurian operations).

The air defense troops were also widely involved in nighttime combat operations. Along with carrying out their basic mission of providing air cover for the advancing troops, for the first time in the history of Soviet military art the searchlight units were so widely used for illuminating the battlefield (the Berlin Operation).

Experience has shown that in all instances the success of nighttime operations was largely predetermined by the continuous and firm troop control. The preciseness of its organization was achieved by bringing the command post closer to the troops, by establishing a rigid procedure for the moving up of the commander and the staff in time and according to the lines, by designating with code light signals the location of the command and observation posts, the message and communications centers, and by the positioning of staff officers in the units during the period of attack. Sound and light signals duplicated by radio were widely used for communications.

As a whole the improvement in the preparations for and execution of nighttime combat operations by the Soviet Army determined their high effectiveness. This the enemy

was forced to recognize as well. The former inspector of the General Staff of the Ground Troops of Nazi Germany, Middeldorf, wrote: "At the end of 1943, the Russians drew correct conclusions from their rich experience in conducting nighttime offensive operations. They began to conduct a night offensive with the assigning of missions to the troops, as a rule, to reach a significant depth. For carrying out these missions, large tank forces were used. This often brought them success."[13]

We should point out that the Soviet troops conducted nighttime battles during the war, but under conditions of darkness they did not succeed in carrying out operational missions.

Thus, the combat operations of the Soviet troops at night during the years of the Great Patriotic War took a significant place in carrying out the given combat missions, and their proportional amount continuously increased. The prediction of M. V. Frunze that "with the new victories of technology, the role of nighttime operations should increase even more" was substantiated.[14] The basic trend was that from enemy attacks at night by individual units and formations with limited missions, the troops went over to operations by field forces in close cooperation with the formations and units of all the branches of troops, the special troops and services of the Armed Forces which carried out the most diverse missions in the offensive. For our times, also important is the conclusion that wartime practices clearly substantiated the possibility of widely using diverse military equipment under conditions of limited visibility. The trend noticeable in the war years and expressed by an increase in the scope and, consequently, the role of nighttime troop operations can to an even greater degree be developed with an improvement in military equipment, ammunition and night vision instruments under present-day conditions. The experience of the war suggests that the troops should be equally capable of operating both during the day and at night. This is why the tactics of nighttime operations has acquired urgent significance in modern warfare. The necessity of being constantly ready to carry out combat missions under conditions of limited visibility is determined not only by the wartime practices but also by the fact that nighttime operations are an important component in many troop exercises of the aggressive NATO bloc. The 1976 U.S. Army Field Manual, FM 100 5, emphasizes that the increased fire power and mobility of troops equipped with modern night vision instruments make it possible, without reducing the role of the offensive, to shift from daytime operations to nighttime ones. This obliges the Soviet military to widely use the very rich experience of the war and to creatively develop it further.

Combat experience shows that the most important questions in the preparations for nighttime combat operations should be the following: the careful organization of reconnaissance, the coordination of all the branches of troops, control and all-round support. Their results are achieved by the surprise of making the attack, by the bold and decisive use of the tank and mechanized formations, by the skillful use of the second echelons and reserves, as well as previously prepared forward detachments. The use of combat procedures that were unusual or unexpected for the enemy proved highly effective.

The experience of the war also showed that nighttime operations can lead to a positive result only in the instance that the troops possess high moral qualities, are well prepared and trained for operations under nighttime conditions.

FOOTNOTES

[1]"Polevoy Ustav RKKA (PU-36)" [Field Manual of the Worker-Peasant Red Army (FM-36)], Voyenizdat, 1937, Articles 261, 264.

[2]"Polevoy Ustav (Proyekt)" [Field Manual (Draft)], Voyenizdat, 1940, Article 312.

[3]TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 398, inv. 19842, file 2, sheet 156.

[4]VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 12, 1977, p 51.

[5]TsAMO, folio 607, inv. 20368, file 4, sheets 11-12.

[6]Ibid., folio 438, inv. 221611, file 3, sheets 21-24.

[7]A. I. Radziyevskiy, "Tankovyy Udar" [Tank Attack], Voyenizdat, 1977, p 97.

[8]TsAMO, folio 345, inv. 8750, file 8, sheet 129.

[9]Ibid., folio 324, inv. 27726, file 5, sheet 248.

[10]Ibid., folio 1224, inv. 67684, file 3, sheets 118-121.

[11]Ibid., folio 417, inv. 20087, file 16, sheets 82-83.

[12]G. Ye. Peredel'skiy et al., "Artilleriya v Boyu i Operatsii" [Artillery in a Battle and Operation], Voyenizdat, 1980, p 51.

[13]"Taktika v Russkoy Kampanii" [Tactics in the Russian Campaign], translated from the German, Moscow, 1958, p 277.

[14]M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Vol 2, Voyenizdat, 1957, p 50.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

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[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period" by Col Gen Avn N. Dagayev and Candidate of Historical Sciences Col V. Chernetskiy: "Trends in the Development of the Organizational Forms of Frontal and Long-Range Aviation During the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] An improvement of organizational structure is a component part in the organizational development of the Air Force and one of the basic elements of its combat might. The organizational structure must provide the most effective balance of the types and branches of aviation, as well as the best composition of each aviation subunit, unit or formation, making it possible with maximum effectiveness to employ their combat capabilities in combat and an operation. The organization of the Air Force is influenced by numerous interrelated factors among which of crucial significance is the quantitative and qualitative state of the aviation equipment, the airfield network and weapons, as well as the requirements of military art as based on combat experience and the nature of armed combat.

A number of publications has been devoted to the development of the organizational forms of the frontal and long-range aviation during the years of the Great Patriotic War, and they in detail and in a chronological sequence have described the measures carried out in the designated area as well as evaluating them. However, of equal cognitive and practical interest are, in our view, those trends which have appeared in the course of this process.

As is known, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army Air Force consisted of the aviation of the Chief Command (long-range bomber aviation), the frontal aviation (the air force of the military districts), the army aviation (the air force of the combined-arms armies) and the organic (of the individual corps air squadrons).

The dividing of aviation used for joint combat operations with the ground troops into frontal and army has a prehistory and causes making it possible to better elucidate the trends in the subsequent reorganization of these types of aviation.

Even the Provisional Instructions to the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Air Force of 1936 provided that all the Air Force units and formations in the front would be concentrated, as a rule, in the hands of the front command and used for operations

in the interests of one or another army according to the principle of support without being made subordinate to the latter.[1] But even in the 1937 RKKA air maneuvers, the conclusion was drawn that for organizing "reliable cooperation" it was essential to put a certain portion of the combat aviation directly under the army command. And the role of the front command should consist "in coordinating the efforts of this aviation for carrying out the common task of fighting for air superiority and assisting the offensive operation."[2]

The designated trend was carried out in the organizing of the air force of the operational army during the period of the Finnish-Soviet military conflict (1939-1940). Here for the first time air forces of the armies and the front were formed with the assigning of 49 and 36 percent of the forces to them, respectively.[3] Moreover, in the course of the combat operations, the commanders of the combined-arms armies often turned over the assigning of missions for the army aviation to the commanders of the rifle corps.

In the final report to the Chief Military Council of the RKKA of 19 March 1940, the chief of the Red Army Air Force, Ya. V. Smushkevich, wrote: "Beyond any doubt the necessity has been proven of dividing the air force into army aviation which is specially designed for cooperation with the ground troops, and operational aviation which operates in the interests of the operation and war."[4]

This conclusion underlay the new organizational structure of the Air Force during the wartime, and provided for the turning over of a portion of the divisions of frontal aviation to the combined-arms armies for tactical cooperation with the troops. For these purposes the combined aviation divisions which existed as part of the air force in the military districts were used chiefly for these purposes. And two-three air divisions were to be assigned each army operating on the main sector, and up to one on the secondary sector (as a total for the front there could be four-six combined-arms armies). The remaining forces remained at the disposal of the front, comprising the so-called frontal aviation group. As a total, the front, according to prewar views, could have 15-30 aviation divisions,[5] that is, up to 5,000-7,000 aircraft.

The creation of army aviation met one of the most important principles in the combat use of the aviation, namely the establishing of close cooperation with the troops on the battlefield. However the basically correct idea did not correspond at that time to our actual capabilities. Even the Kiev Separate and the Leningrad military districts which were the strongest in terms of the air force numbered just 10 and 8 aviation divisions, respectively. In the other western border military districts, the situation was somewhat worse. For example, in the Odessa District there were only 4 aviation divisions.[7]

On the eve of the war, ground attack aviation, basically destined for cooperation with the troops on the battlefield, was the smallest branch of aviation. It numbered just 11 air regiments, of which 7 were part of the air force of the western border military districts. The number of ground assault aircraft in them did not exceed 4.5 percent of the total aircraft fleet. Moreover, these were obsolete I-15 bis and I-153 fighters which had been adapted as ground attack planes. The new special ground attack aircraft the IL-2 had just begun to be received. During the first half of 1941, a total of 249 IL-2 aircraft were produced.

The combined air divisions consisted of regiments of ground attack, fighter and bomber aviation. The scattering of the two latter branches of aviation over the combined-arms armies impeded the organization of their massing, and had a negative effect in carrying out missions by the front troops. This was one of the reasons for the appearance of a trend to transform the combined air divisions into single-branch ones. While at the beginning of the war in the air force of the Soviet Army there were 64 percent combined air divisions, by the end of 1942, they numbered only 7 percent.

Thus, the putting of a larger portion of the air force in a front at the disposal of the combined-arms armies at the same time led to a scattering of the limited aviation forces, and ultimately to a reduction in their combat might. This was visibly substantiated by the experience of the initial period of the war. Moreover, our air force suffered great losses during the first days and months of the war, and aircraft output declined sharply because of the forced evacuation of the aviation industry enterprises into the interior of the nation.

It must be pointed out that in practice the shedding of the air force of the fronts into frontal and army aviation was carried out differently. In certain fronts (the Northern) it was carried out immediately with the start of hostilities, and on others, later. Sometimes the formations and units of army aviation were taken away from army subordination, and then turned back to the army command. But as a whole the trend in the organizational maintenance of army aviation lasted right up until May 1942, when the final decision was taken to reduce all the air forces existing in a front to one operational formation, an air army (AA). Thus, the Order of the USSR NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense] of 5 May 1942 states: "For the purposes of increasing the air strike power and successfully employing massed air strikes, to combine the aviation forces of the Western front into a single air army, giving it the name 1st Air Army."[4]

During 1942, the air forces of all the remaining operational fronts were combined into air armies.[5] By the beginning of the second period of the war, the Air Force of the Soviet Army already numbered 13 air armies.

On the questions of organizing aviation combat operations in front operations, the air army commanders were directly under the troop commanders of the fronts, and in special terms (combat training, manning, material and airfield support, and so forth), under the commander of the Air Force of the Soviet Army.

The tendency to strengthen the combat might of frontal aviation was apparent not only in the changeover to the seemingly most successful form of its organizational structure, but also in the strengthening of the material base of the new formations. Due to the successful solving of the problem of training aviation personnel and to the growth of the production capabilities of the aviation industry which month after month increased the output of evermore advanced combat aircraft, the quantitative and qualitative composition of the air armies steadily increased. While in the operations of 1942, an AA as an average numbered 150-160 aircraft, in 1943, 550-1,000, in 1944-1945, around 1,500. In individual, most important operations in the third period of the war, they had 2,000-3,000 aircraft. Thus, in terms of the number of aircraft the AA in the concluding period of the war surpassed the AA of 1942 by 6-8-fold. And if one considers that by that time significant changes had occurred in the aviation equipment and weapons, the qualitative indicator of their combat might had risen even more.

With the creation of the AA, broad opportunities were opened for carrying out in practice the basic principles of the combat employment of aviation, that is, the massing of its forces, providing close cooperation with the troops, the centralizing of command, the economic consumption of resources, and so forth. This contributed to the fuller utilization of the combat properties and capabilities of the aviation, and to a significant rise in the effectiveness of its use. Correspondingly the scale of the combat operations of Soviet aviation and its role in the strategic and frontal operations rose.

As is known, after the formation of the air armies, they often made it a practice to specifically allocate (assign) individual air formations (usually ground attack) for air support for the combined-arms or tank armies operating in the main sectors. In these instances, the commander of the air army gave them only general missions and defined the flying time. But the specific missions such as indicating the objectives, the time and the purpose of the actions were received from the commander of the combined-arms (tank) army.

The composition of the air forces allocated for the support of the combined arms (tank) army was determined by its role in the offensive operation of the front and by the presence of formations of the ground-attack and bomber aviation of the air army. During the second period of the war, for example, support for the combined-arms army advancing in the sector of the main thrust of the front was carried out by one or two ground attack air divisions, and in the operations of 1944-1945, by two-three and sometimes by four of them.

The immediate support and cover for a tank army which had been thrown into a breach required even larger forces. Thus, in the operations of 1943, for this purpose one ground attack and one fighter air division were assigned (the counteroffensive at Kursk); in the operations of 1944-1945, in keeping with the increase in the fighting strength of the air armies, two and more air corps (ground attack, bomber and fighter). For example, in the Vitebsk-Orsha Operation of the Third Belorussian Front, for supporting and covering the 5th Guards Tank Army, the following were assigned: The I Guards Bomber Air Corps, the III Ground Attack Air Corps, the I Guards Fighter Air Corps and the II Fighter Air Corps. Often the same ground attack air corps cooperated with the combined-arms armies over the extended period of two or three sequentially conducted offensive operations (Belorussian, Vistula-Oder and Berlin) in order to achieve greater success as a result of the close and regular contact between the combined-arms and air commanders. This contact helped to establish close ties between them, to achieve mutual understanding and had a positive influence on the results of the combined combat operations.

That portion of the ground attack aviation which directly provided air support for the troops on the battlefield, in essence, carried out the role of army aviation. The command posts were as close as possible to the battlefield. There were air representatives in the combined-arms (tank) formations, and guidance officers in the units.

Thus, the idea of close cooperation between aviation and the troops, after the change in the structure of frontal aviation, continued to exist, although in truth, in a somewhat altered form. In our view, it has not lost its importance under present-day conditions, although its realization, of course, requires new organizational forms.

Another clearly expressed trend in the development of the organizational forms in the Air Force of the Soviet Army was the desire to create strong air reserves. Our air force, having entered the war, used as air reserves the formations and units of the DBA [Long-Range Bomber Aviation], the GVF [Civil Air Fleet], and of the interior military districts, as well as the obsolete-design trainers from the flying schools. But there were not enough of them for the needs of the front. This is why immediately the search was commenced for other rational forms for organizing the reserve of frontal aviation. Initially these were the reserve air groups (RAG). In March-April 1942, they began to create larger strike air groups (BAG). With the creation and successful employment of the air armies of frontal aviation, there was a trend toward a further organizational improvement in the air reserves of Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC].

In accord with the Order of the USSR NKO of [illegible] they began forming two fighter armies and one bomber air army. And although their combat capabilities had increased significantly in comparison with the reserve and strike air groups, serious shortcomings were also discovered. A cumbersome structure, insufficient maneuverability, and difficulty of control over two armies at once (air and aviation) within one front, as well as in organizing the interaction between them and the troops of the front. Moreover in practice it was difficult to use the aviation army as a single whole. For this reason usually it was divided into groups of varying composition which were put under temporary operational command of the commanders of the air armies of the various fronts. For example, the 2d Fighter Aviation Army even in the course of its formation was split into two groups of two aviation divisions in each and they reinforced on [illegible] July 1942, respectively, the 1st and 3d Air armies. It became clear that the basic organizational unit in the aviation reserves should be a formation which, being strong in composition, would also possess high mobility or maneuverability, and upon arrival at the front could easily be "fitted into" the organizational structure of the air army or with equal ease could be removed from it after carrying out the given missions.

The aviation corps became such an organizational unit. The formation of the first of them started under the Order of the NKO of [illegible] August 1942. Each corps included two-three divisions. They were created with both a uniform as well as combined composition,[11] and were armed only with new types of aircraft. By the middle of 1942, there were already 10 aviation corps of the RVGK [Supreme High Command Reserve], and these comprised over 32 percent of the total number of combat aircraft in the frontal aviation.[12]

As a total during the war years, 50 uniform aviation corps and 27 separate aviation divisions of the RVGK were formed.[13] The proportional amount of the aircraft fleet in the reserve aviation corps within the Air Forces on 1 January 1945 had risen up to 43 percent.[14] This made it possible to broadly maneuver in aviation, to quickly create powerful aviation groupings on the major strategic sectors, and sharply alter the ratio of forces in favor of Soviet aviation. And the proportional amount of the aircraft in the aviation formations of the RVGK in their groupings during the major operations reached 50-55 percent of the total aviation of the fronts.

The use of the RVGK air corps which arrived at the front for reinforcing an air army in no way differed from the use of the army's "own" formations. A portion of them during the time of the operation was also attached to definite combined-arms (tank) armies for their support and cover.

The advantages of the new organization of frontal aviation and the aviation reserves of the Supreme High Command made it possible also for the Soviet command at the required moment to rapidly create a large air grouping in the Far East for the defeat of the Kwantung Army.

The role of the aviation reserves as proven by the experience of the past will rise further in a future war. At the same time, the preparation of these reserves will be significantly more complicated. While in the past war they could be readied in the course of armed combat, in a future one such a possibility will be limited.

Simultaneously with improving the organizational forms, there was also a continuous process of improving the internal structure of the units and formations as well as disclosing the most rational balance between the branches of aviation. Here one could clearly trace a tendency for a steady increase in the proportional amount of attack aviation (bomber and ground attack) due to the rapid development of ground attack aviation.

The Communist Party, the Soviet government and all our people made a maximum of effort to restore and then significantly surpass the production capacity of the aviation industry lost at the outset of the war. For example, by the spring of 1942 the number of ground attack aircraft was already up to 30 percent of the entire aircraft fleet. During the first period of the war, as a whole, the proportional amount of attack aviation in the Air Force increased up to 66 percent, while the bomb payload rose by 2-fold.[15]

In 1944, for every 100 Soviet combat aircraft there were approximately 50 fighters, 30 ground attack planes and 20 bombers.[16] By the end of 1944, the Air Force included 170 air divisions, including 63 fighter, 50 ground attack, 55 bomber and 2 combined.[17]

Another area of implementing the trend and increasing the strike power of frontal aviation was the creation of nighttime light bomber aviation. Its organization commenced in the autumn of 1941, during the period of the battle for Moscow, when the first regiments of night bombers were being created. They were armed with PO-2 (U-2) and R-5 aircraft, and partially with R-zet. As a total from October until December 1941, the Air Force organized the following air regiments: 71 with PO-2 aircraft, 27 with R-5, and 5 with R-zet aircraft.

The idea of employing obsolete-design aircraft for nighttime operations was not new. Thus, the 1940 field regulations for bomber aviation (BUBA-40) stated: "Nighttime operations make it possible to utilize for combat service aircraft which in terms of their performance, and above all speed and altitude, cannot be used under daylight conditions."[18]

With the creation of regiments, and as of May 1942, divisions of night bombers, the frontal (tactical) bomber aviation began to be divided into daytime and night.

The night light bomber aviation became rather numerous. Its proportional amount in the aircraft fleet of the air force of the operational army was: 27.9 percent in 1942, 17 percent in 1943, and 7.2 percent in 1945. The decline in the proportional amount of the night frontal bombers in the second and third periods of the war occurred due to the absolute and relative increase in the daytime bombers and ground

attack planes in the frontal aviation. The night frontal bombers made up over 65 percent of the total number of the aircraft sorties by the frontal bomber aviation.[19]

The creation of the night light bomber aviation made it possible not only to increase the strike force of the frontal aviation, but in practice to achieve one of the basic principles in its combat employment, continuous operations against the enemy.

The experience of recent local wars has shown that the significance and the proportional amount of combat operations by aviation at night have continuously risen. And the present level of aviation equipment, control, combat and special support, as well as the training of the personnel make it possible to conduct them with the same effectiveness as during the day.

Major changes also occurred in the organizational structure of the Long-Range Bomber Aviation of the Chief Command (DBA GK). On the eve of the war it consisted of air corps and individual air divisions. With the start of the war it had to be used for carrying out missions in the interests of the front, since the frontal aviation had suffered high losses in the very first days of the war. The DBA bombers were often incorrectly used, for example, during the day without a fighter cover. As a result its aircraft fleet declined sharply. By August 1941 the DBA consisted of individual air divisions. According to the decree of the GKO [State Defense Committee] of 5 March 1942, it was to be transformed into the long-range aviation (ADD) and put under Hq SHC

As a whole, the improvement in the organizational forms of long-range bomber aviation can be characterized by an overall trend to create an independent strong air grouping for operations against the objectives in the operational and strategic rear of the enemy. However, due to the particular features and nature of armed combat, the given trend was not developed. During the entire war, the situation on the fronts required the use of attack aviation in an operational and tactical cooperation with the ground troops. For this reason, the Soviet Command was forced as before to concentrate the efforts of the ADD on supporting the ground troops. Over 40 percent of all the sorties of the long-range bombers were carried out for the purpose of this mission. They began to be used basically at night. The major air operations against objectives in the deep enemy rear were operations against war industry enterprises and the state administrative centers of Helsinki in February 1944 and Budapest in September 1944. As a whole, the operations of the DBA in the deep rear were not widely employed, and comprised a little more than 3 percent of the total number of its aircraft sorties.[20]

Such use of the ADD as well as the necessity of unified leadership over the entire Air Force of the Soviet Army led to a situation where in December 1944 the ADD was transformed into the 18th Air Army, and put directly under the commander of the Air Force of the Soviet Army. In the course of the powerful drive which our troops undertook at the concluding stage of the war, the units and formations of the 18th AA actively participated in it together with the all arms of the frontal aviation, and played an important role in the defeat of the large enemy groupings.

But the predominant use of the DBA (ADD) as an operational-tactical and not a strategic means was an inforced measure and in no way meant a revision of former views.

According to the 1944 Regulation on the Combat Operations of Bomber Aviation (NBA-44), the long-range bomber aviation was to be "the basic means for carrying out independent air operations," and had as its basic purpose "the attacking of objectives in the deep enemy rear for the purpose of undermining its military-economic might and the moral state of the army and the population, disorganizing the lines of communications and winning air supremacy."[21]

We have taken up only certain of the most general trends in the development of the organizational forms of frontal and long-range aviation during the years of the past war without examining the manifestation of these trends in the organizational structure of the tactical elements, that is, the air subunits, units and formations, as this question has already been taken up on the pages of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.[22]

A knowledge of these trends, conditions and reasons for their appearance makes it possible to more fully consider the experience of the past in the interests of the organizational strengthening and further rise in the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces at the present stage.

FOOTNOTES

[1]TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 4, inv. 11, file 48, sheet 158.

[2]Ibid., folio 29, inv. 34, file 204, sheet 57.

[3]Some 15 percent of the forces was assigned to Leningrad air defense (TsGASA, folio 29, inv. 34, file 556, sheet 19).

[4]TsGASA, folio 29, inv. 26, file 202, sheet 110.

[5]"Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 3, Voyenizdat, 1974, p 414.

[6][Not in text.]

[7]"50 Let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" [Fifty Years of the USSR Armed Forces], Voyenizdat, 1968, p 251.

[8]TsAMO, folio 290, inv. 51719, file 7, sheet 27.

[9]The combined-arms armies were left one combined regiment each (a squadron of fighters and a squadron of PO-2 aircraft) for carrying out reconnaissance and liaison missions. In the spring of 1943, these regiments were broken up and only the liaison squadrons were left in the armies. The organic aviation (the corps squadrons) had been eliminated previously, in 1941.

[10]For example, the 16th AA prior to the start of the Vistula-Oder Operation in January 1945 numbered some 2,290 aircraft (TsAMO, folio 368, inv. 6476, file 555, sheet 3), and in the Berlin Operation, 3,188 (ibid., file 549, sheet 10).

[11] In September 1944, the combined air corps were transformed into uniform ones.

[12] "Sovetskiye Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne 1941-1945" [The Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Voyenizdat, 1968, p 120.

[13] VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1976, p 32.

[14] "Sovetskiye Voyenno-Vozdushnyye...," p 445.

[15] Ibid., p 121.

[16] "Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza. Kratkaya Istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. Concise History], Voyenizdat, 1970, p 589.

[17] "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy...," Vol 9, Voyenizdat, 1978, pp 501, 502.

[18] "Boyevoy Ustav Bombardirovochnoy Aviatsii (BUBA-40)" [Field Manual of Bomber Aviation (BUBA-40)], Voyenizdat, 1940, p 114.

[19] "Istoriya Voyennogo Iskusstva. Uchebnik" [History of Military Art. A Textbook], Monino, Izd. VVA imeni Yu. A. Gagarina, 1978, pp 309, 310.

[20] I. V. Timokhovich, "Operativnoye Iskusstvo Sovetskikh VVS v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne" [Operational Art of the Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War], Voyenizdat, 1976, p 246.

[21] "Nastavleniye po Boyevym Deystviyam Bombardirovochnoy Aviatsii (NBA-44)" [Regulation on Combat Operations of Bomber Aviation (NBA-44)], Voyenizdat, 1944, p 138.

[22] See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1978, pp 25-31.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: SUBMARINE EMPLOYMENT IN 1941-1942

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[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Capt 1st Rank (Res) V. Dmitriyev: "The Combat Employment of Submarines in 1941-1942"]

[Text] Submarines in the prewar period were viewed as a branch of forces with the mission mainly of disrupting sea lines of communications. The temporary regulations on the combat activities of submarines stated that they could carry out the missions assigned them by the station and maneuvering method, here operating alone or in groups, independently or in cooperation with other branches of forces. The correctness of these theoretical concepts was substantiated by combat experience. During the first, most difficult period of the war, submarines were the only branch of the naval forces which systematically disrupted enemy navigation. In 1941-1942, they achieved the greatest success in operating on enemy lines of communications in comparison with surface vessels and naval aviation.

By the start of the Great Patriotic War, the USSR Navy had 712 submarines. They were grouped in brigades (BPL) which were directly under the fleet commanders. The brigades consisted of divisions. The Baltic and Black Sea fleets each had two combat BPL, and the Northern Fleet one. As a total our three western fleets had 127 submarines.[1]

The navy submarine forces were basically comprised of subs of the "K," "D," "L," "Shch," "S," and "M" class built during the years of the first five-year plans, and good submarines for those times.[2]

Torpedoes were the main weapon of the subs. They were armed predominantly with the "53-38" torpedoes which were gas-steam (trail) straight-running with a contact fuze (speed up to 44.5 knots and range of 4-10 km). In July 1941, the fleets began receiving the steam-gas "53-39" torpedoes with a range in the three operating modes of 4--8--10 km, and at that time these were the world's fastest (51 knots in the first operating mode). As a whole, our torpedo weapons met the requirements of the times. The domestic steam-gas torpedoes were powerful and reliable, surpassing the torpedoes of foreign fleets in many of their indicators.

The situation was worse with the equipping of the subs with radar and sonar gear. The subs were armed only with the "Mars" underwater listening devices which provided

the subs with the possibility in running at a speed up to 5 knots to detect the enemy at a range of up to 40 cable lengths, and this provided only a closing in for the attack or an avoidance of pursuit.

The commanders of the BPL as well as the war commanders excelled in good theoretical training, but, as a rule, were young and did not have combat experience.

During the first period of the war, in line with the developing operational-strategic situation, substantial changes occurred in the basing of the subs, and along with other factors, this influenced their combat employment. Thus, the submarines of the Baltic Fleet from August 1941 until the autumn of 1944 were forced to be based only at Kronshtadt and Leningrad. For reaching the open sea, they had to cross 420 km in the Gulf of Finland, periodically surfacing to recharge the storage batteries and replenishing the supplies of air. With the constant strengthening of the enemy antisubmarine defenses, this was dangerous, particularly under the conditions of the summer Arctic nights. The submarines of the Black Sea Fleet in September-October 1941 were shifted to insufficiently equipped ports along the Caucasian coast, where the distance to the positions assigned to them in the western part of the sea reached 600 miles.

The restricting of the basing system in the Baltic and Black Sea theaters of war greatly complicated the combat employment of the subs and made difficult the conditions of their combat preparation and deployment. The small submarines of the Baltic Fleet due to their limited range could not be used in the Baltic Sea. For the purposes of increasing the range of the small and medium-sized subs of the Black Sea Fleet, one of the tanks of the main ballast was requipped for holding diesel fuel. The sharply curtailed repair capability substantially lengthened the period for restoring the battleworthiness of the boats. The winter repairs on the subs of the Baltic Fleet under the conditions of blockaded Leningrad were carried out by the crews themselves and required enormous effort. The ports of the Caucasian coast could not only not handle the medium and major repairs but even routine and emergency ones. Combat training was carried out unsystematically. For example, on the Baltic Fleet, the subs began to work on their missions in 1942 in Leningrad on the Neva, and then continued until they reached the Baltic. The Neva "range" with its depths did not meet the requirements of even a minimum combat training course. They could not even determine the basic underwater maneuvering elements of the subs (underwater speed, and so forth), a knowledge of which would have been essential to the commanders for crossing antisub defenses.

During the years of World War II, the sea lines of communications were of great military-economic and operational significance for the enemy. In the North and the Baltic, over them German industry was supplied with strategic raw materials from Norway, Sweden and Finland, and the maritime troop groupings received their supplies. On the Black Sea, the Nazis from August 1941 began to use the sealanes intensely for transporting Romanian oil.

Shipments at the outset of the war were carried out by vessels traveling singly, and only transports with particularly valuable cargo were given a small escort. However, our subs even in 1941 forced the enemy to shift over to a convoy system. For protecting its navigation it used surface vessels, submarines, aviation, coastal artillery, minefields and net booms.

The Baltic Fleet subs operated under exceptionally difficult conditions. The shallowness of the Baltic Sea made it possible to extensively use mines and other positional antisub devices. In 1942, the enemy created in the Gulf of Finland, an antisub barrier which was based upon the Gogland and Nargen-Porkkalaudd positions. In 1942 alone, the enemy set 12,873 mines in the Gulf of Finland, having concentrated up to 75 percent of them in the Gogland position. For the subs of the Black Sea Fleet, the basic difficulty was the high mine danger and the shallows in the western and northwestern areas of the sea with their characteristic variable (drifting) currents. The combat employment of the Northern Fleet subs was substantially influenced by the navigational-hydrographic and hydrometeorological features of the Arctic, the duration of the periods of polar night and day, the great length of coastal communications (1340 miles) and the real possibility of its strong seaward screening. In January-March 1942, for example, the enemy screened its lines of communications with a minefield consisting of 2,183 mines and 110 antisweep mines, it deployed hunting patrols, equipped signal and observations posts on the shore, and moved in coastal artillery. The Nazi command began to include destroyers, escort boats and aviation in the convoys. In 1942, the number of attacks by Northern Fleet subs which ended with their pursuit by antisub forces rose up to 67 percent, instead of 17 percent in 1941.

The organization of the combat control of the subs which was exercised by the fleet commanders and the brigade commanders included a study of the situation in the theater of war, planning sub combat operations, determining the methods of their employment, giving them missions, working out the necessary documents, developing security for the subs in the move, organizing systematic servicing for the subs on certain areas of the lines of communications, providing information on the situation and promptly shifting efforts to the required sector, and support for the setting to sea and return of the ships to their bases. Control over the subs was determined by the nature of the given missions, by the military-geographic features of the theater of war, and by the developing operational situation.

Radio communications via shore radio centers was the basic means of combat control. However, there were not sufficient reliable means of communications, and there were also flaws in the organization of their use. As a result, an enormous overloading of communications occurred. The subs received up to 50 and more radiograms per day.[1] The appropriate documents provided that the radiograms would be transmitted to the subs at a designated hour. But in fact the information on the situation was received by the subs, as a rule, during darkness and often was of no use. One of the most complicated communications tasks in the "sub -shore" link was to provide concealment of the subs. At the outset of the war, radio traffic was done in code, and this significantly increased the time for handling the radiograms. The reliability of radio communications and, consequently, the combat control of the subs improved sharply after the introduction of symbol tables [TUS].

The organization of operational support for the combat activities of the subs also was not devoid of shortcomings. In all our naval theaters of war, they had to commence combat operations possessing only the results of "their own" reconnaissance. In 1942, they did succeed in establishing air reconnaissance over the enemy sea lines of communications in the Black Sea and Northern fleets. However, the reconnaissance aviation did not have any direct link with the subs.

The planning and maintaining of operational cooperation between the subs and the other branches of forces were carried out in all the theaters of war by the fleet staffs. At the beginning of 1942, the Baltic Fleet Staff generalized the experience of the combat employment of submarines. Clearing routes were worked out as well as variations for crossing the actual barrier in the Gulf of Finland, systems of communications between the subs and the aviation and surface vessels, the methods of ensuring traffic in a sharply restricted operational area of the Baltic Fleet, the setting to sea and rendezvousing of the subs, and many other questions. The Baltic Fleet forces (minesweepers, escort vessels, submarines and aviation) supported the movement of the subs from Leningrad to Kronshtadt, and then to Lavensari Island. In 1942, 50 convoys and 41 escorts with 5 subs made the crossing on the Kronshtadt--Lavensari leg predominantly during the period of the summer Arctic nights, and not one of the subs, regardless of the enemy attacks, was lost. However, due to the complexity of the situation at Leningrad and in the naval theater of war it was impossible to organize systematic and effective operations in the interests of the subs for the purpose of destroying or at least of assisting the enemy antisub forces from the Gulf of Finland, and establish cooperation between the subs and the aviation and surface vessels in operation on the Baltic Sea.

In the Black Sea theater of war, in the second half of 1941, aviation had begun to transmit reconnaissance data directly to the BPL staff, and this increased the freshness of information for the subs at sea. The subsequent exchange of representatives on the BPL staffs and the Black Sea Fleet Air Force helped to establish operational cooperation between the subs and aviation. In the Northern Fleet, in July 1941, the "Provisional Regulation for the Air Cover of Northern Fleet Submarines to Enemy Ships" was issued, and this provided for the organization of cooperation between these branches of forces. However, only in 1942, with the use of the method of guiding the subs to the convoys from air reconnaissance data via the fleet staff radio center did they gain an opportunity to interact efficiently with the other forces operating on the enemy lines of communications, that is, with aviation, the torpedo boats, the destroyers and mines, effectively.

The subs at the outset of the war in all the fleets had predominantly the position or station method. The stations were areas [illegible] (in the Black Sea, for example, to 15 x 20 miles), within which the submariners waited for the enemy within the visual detection range or listening range. In the Baltic Fleet, in 1941, the subs used this method only in the northern part of the Gulf of Finland or on the Tallin--Helsinki line. In the Baltic Sea, the subs also used the cruising method within a limited area (approximately 30 x 35 miles), and this broadened the possibilities of locating targets.

The even dividing of the stations used initially in the Northern and Black Sea fleets wasted the efforts of the submariners. Moreover, the enemy, gradually learning the station system, could effectively employ its main antisubmarine forces. For this reason, from October 1941, the Northern and Black Sea fleets also converted to the cruising method in a limited area, and this was widely employed also in 1942. However in the first period of the war it still had not gained complete development. The Baltic Fleet subs in 1942 basically operated from stations, but the area of the stations increased. Along with this, they also [illegible] cruising in an extended area (S-13 in the Gulf of Bothnia and D-2 to the west of the island of Bornholm).

The station method provided positive results when the subs were assigned positions on the outlets from narrows, skerries, ports and bases, or on the regular enemy ship routes discovered with definite certainty. The number and dividing of the stations changed depending on the situation in the theater of war and the availability of battleworthy subs.

The submariners disrupted the enemy lines of communications by daily (systematic) combat activities or by conducting operations. Such an operation was carried out in 1942 in the Baltic Fleet. As early as 14 March 1942, the Baltic Fleet Military Council gave the following missions to the BFL: Destroying enemy transports and ships on the Baltic Sea, setting mines on the lines of communications, ascertaining the routes of ships, the channels and the antisubmarine system in the Gulf of Finland.[7] For the purpose of putting continuous pressure on enemy navigation, the subs were sent to sea in three echelons (11--9--16 boats): from 27 May through 12 August, from 9 August through 19 September, and from 15 September through 18 November. They were given complete autonomy, and up to one-third of this was used in crossing the antisubmarine barrier.[8] Each of the subs having independently crossed the Gulf of Finland with minimum possibilities for maneuvering in depth as well as course, as an average per trip was at least four times pursued by antisubmarine forces, to the detonating of 60 depth charges, and 48 times crossed the lines of minefields. In 1942, in the Gulf of Finland there were over 21,000 enemy mines. Certain boats hit them, they fell into antisub nets, or sustained damage from the explosions of depth charges, but in a majority of instances the sailors rescued the subs. The crews of L-3 (commander, Capt 2d Rank P. D. Grishchenkov), Shch-310 (commander, Capt Lt B. K. Yaroshevich), Shch-323 (commander, Capt 2d Rank A. G. Andronov), Shch-407 (commander, Capt 3d Rank V. K. Afanas'yev), and others acted courageously. The subs L-3, Shch-303, Shch-406 and M-96 broke through the enemy antisub defenses twice. The combat actions of the Baltic submariners were a heroic feat unprecedented in history. From June through November 1942, they destroyed around 60 enemy ships with a total tonnage up to 150,000 tons.[9]

In all our western naval theaters of war, the submarines operated alone. Only in the Black Sea Fleet, in 1942, were the first attempts made to establish radio communications between subs of the "Shch" class which occupied adjacent stations. Moreover, in May of the same year, for a period of 8 days joint operations were carried out by two "S"-class subs of the Black Sea Fleet which spelled one another. One of these observed the enemy lines of communications while at underwater anchor, while the second during the night recharged the batteries, and then replaced the first boat at the designated station.

The tactics of using torpedoes was also improved. From the aimed firing of a single torpedo, the submariners at the end of 1941 had already begun to change over to the firing of several torpedoes which were launched sequentially after a certain number of seconds and with a constant lead angle. This method was called salvo firing with a time interval. The size of the interval depended upon the course of the target, its size and speed, distance to it, and was chosen from a table worked out under the leadership of the chief of the chair at the Naval Academy, Capt 1st Rank A. V. Tomashevich. The submariners of the Northern Fleet were the first to use the new method. The sub D-3 under the command of Capt 3d Rank M. A. Sibeyev in just one cruise sank three transports with a total tonnage of 25,500 gross tons during the period from 26 November through 6 December 1941. By March 1942, this had become the basic method. For example, in the Baltic Fleet, the number of torpedo firings with

a time interval increased in 1942 from [illegible] in comparison with 1941, while the results of these attacks almost doubled. In the Northern Fleet, more than 80 percent of the total number of attacks [illegible] in the first period of the war using the new method of [illegible] successful. Predominantly two torpedoes were fired. However experience showed that against a moving target it was essential to fire at least three torpedoes, and with an increase in range, four or six torpedoes.

Two tactical methods were used for a torpedo attack: without breaking through the escort screen from a distance of 8-12 cable lengths and with the breaking through of it from a distance of less than 10 cable lengths. The greatest success was achieved in firing from a range of 2-5 cable lengths. Firing from a distance of over 10-12 cable lengths in a majority of instances was ineffective. The effectiveness of using torpedoes during darkness was reduced because of the imperfection of the then employed night sight.

The method of salvo firing with a time interval made it possible sometimes to hit several targets in the course of a single torpedo attack. Such an attack was carried out for the first time successfully on 13 January 1942 by the S-102 (commander, Capt-Lt L. I. Gorodnichiy) of the Northern Fleet, having sunk two transports with four sequentially launched torpedoes, which [illegible] had appeared to be a single target. On 14 September of the same year, for the first time on the Baltic Fleet, an analogous attack was carried out by the [illegible] (commander, Capt-Lt A. M. Matiyasevich). As a total in 1941, five torpedo attacks with the simultaneous hitting of two targets were carried out successfully (three in the Northern Fleet and two in the Baltic Fleet).

Along with torpedoes, in the first period of the war the subs employed artillery, and not only against transports but also fighting units. The Baltic sailors successfully used artillery in six attacks, the Black Sea sailors in seven, and the Northern Fleet sailors in fifteen. However as [illegible] defenses were strengthened, the use of artillery by the subs became [illegible].

In operating on the enemy lines of communications, the subs also employed mines. The mines were set in a line (up to 20) and in [illegible] (from 4 to 16). The Baltic Fleet submarines in 1941-1942 required just [illegible] mines for destroying a single Nazi vessel (the highest indicator over the entire Great War). The submarines of the Northern Fleet used 48.8 mines for [illegible] and in the Black Sea Fleet 229 mines.

Regardless of the numerous difficulties, the submarines in the first period of the war achieved high results, taking first place among [illegible] branches of forces in terms of tonnage and the number of sunk vessels. [illegible], the submarines of the Baltic Fleet destroyed 57 percent of the total tonnage of enemy vessels lost from the action of the various branches of the naval forces, 44 percent in the Black Sea Fleet, and 65 percent in the Northern Fleet [illegible], respectively, 65, 77 and over 50 percent. For operations on the enemy lines of communications, the Baltic Fleet submarines in 1941 made 67 sorties, [illegible] 30; for the Black Sea Fleet, respectively, 101 and 153; and for the Northern Fleet, 74 and 117. During the first period of the war the greatest results were achieved by the Northern Fleet sailors who sank 77 vessels and 19 fighting ships. The Baltic submarines destroyed 75 transports and ships, and the Black Sea Fleet [illegible].

Along with disrupting the enemy lines of communications, the submarines also had to carry out a number of other missions simultaneously as were dictated by the developing situation. At the end of 1941, in the Baltic Fleet, [illegible] were used for countering the assumed breakthrough of large enemy surface vessels into the Gulf of Finland. The submarines of the Northern Fleet were entrusted with coastal defense, and the protection of the internal and external lines of communications. They patrolled the approaches to the Rybachiy Peninsula, they covered the entrance into the mouth of the White Sea, and during the period of the passage of Allied convoys, deployed in a screen on the exits from the Norwegian shortcuts where ships of the Nazi navy were based. In April 1942, individual submarines participated as covering forces in landing operations in the Murmanskiy Baltic. However, it must be pointed out that under the conditions of a limited number of subs in the Northern Fleet, their use in landing troops could scarcely be effective.

More than one-half of the Black Sea Fleet submarines had to be used in 1941 for transport shipments to Sevastopol' which was besieged on the enemy from the land and sealed off from the sea. Here on the large and medium sized subs, just two torpedoes, 24 percent of the artillery ammunition and a minimum supply of food products, fresh water, and air regenerating equipment were left, while subs of the M class entered Sevastopol' without torpedoes and a limited amount of ammunition. All in all, submarines made 91 trips to Sevastopol'. Individual subs in the Baltic Fleet were also involved in transport shipments. The P-1, for example, in September 1941 was sent to the Hanko naval base without torpedoes carrying a load weighing nearly 50 tons. In December of the same year, the P-1 delivered to Leningrad from Kronshtadt [illegible] tons of motor oil in its ballast tanks.

In all the theaters of war, the submarines participated in standing patrol and conducting reconnaissance, as well as in landing sabotage and reconnaissance groups on the enemy-occupied coast. Individual subs of the Baltic Fleet and Black Sea Fleet were also used for artillery firing against Nazi troops on the maritime flanks. Firing was conducted at an area without correction and was ineffective. In the Baltic Fleet, submarines covered the evacuation of the Hanko naval base, and in the Northern Fleet were engaged in transferring fuel at sea, and in the Black Sea Fleet were used as navigation support for the combat operations of surface ships (i.e. convoys). For example, during the Kerch'-Feodosiya landing operation, the Shch-201 and M-33 provided navigation support for the approach of the detachment of Black Sea Fleet ships to Feodosiya on 29 December 1941. As a rule, the Black Sea Fleet subs made 10 percent of their sorties for carrying out missions not directly related to operations on the enemy lines of communications. Such use of the subs involuntarily reduced the effectiveness with which they carried out their main mission and reduced offensive operations.

Party political work conducted by the commanders, political organs, and by the party and komsomol organizations helped to successfully carry out the missions confronting the submariners. The comprehensive use of all its forms instilled in the personnel high moral combat qualities, an offensive spirit, and a high readiness of the weapons for immediate action and precision at the torpedo salvo, the fight to save fuel, electric power, fresh water, and food, and concern for the normal rest, nutrition and cultural recreation of the submariners. Experience showed the inadvisability of conducting mass measures with the simultaneous assembly of a significant portion of the personnel. For this reason work was carried out in each of the compartments and battle stations. An important role was played by the timely leveling of undue

leaflets and express leaflets. In party political work, a special place was given to strengthening the authority of the commanders. Party political work helped to unite the submarine personnel into a close combat collective.

Thus, the combat operations of the Soviet submariners in the first period of the war were closely tied to carrying out the overall strategic mission confronting all the USSR Armed Forces, namely, to thwart the aggressive plans of the Nazi command, to wear down and destroy the enemy forces, and create conditions for a fundamental turnabout in the war.

Two methods were employed for controlling the subs: centralized (by the fleet command) and decentralized (by the BPL command). However, in any instance questions of an operational nature (conducting of reconnaissance, organizing the deployment of the subs, the assigning of them to stations or areas, cooperation with other forces, and so forth) remained the prerogative of the fleet staffs. The improvement in control made it possible to improve the methods of the combat employment of the subs. In addition to the station method, in 1941 they had already begun to use cruising by individual subs in a designated area.

Combat training was conducted on a limited basis, but due to the absence of the necessary support personnel and equipment (and in the Soviet Fleet, ranges as well), as well as due to the lack of time. The stay of a submarine in base between cruises was used predominantly for planned preventive overhauls.

It must be said that during the first period of the war, the cooperation of submarines with the other branches of naval forces, as had required by the prewar operational-tactical documents, was not organized as it should have been. The submarines operated independently and instances of operational cooperation with the aviation were of a limited nature.

The subs achieved their basic successes as a result of the combat employment of torpedoes. From the aimed firing of individual torpedoes, they began to change over to the firing of several torpedoes with a time interval, and this significantly increased the effectiveness of the attacks. In using arms weapons, the best results were achieved by the Baltic submariners. The first period of the war substantiated the high reliability of the submarine weapons and their conformity to the demands of conducting combat operations.

FOOTNOTES

[1]"Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 3, Voyenizdat, 1974, p 247; Vol 4, 1975, p 24.

[2]Submarines of the "K" class had six bow and four stern torpedo tubes, 24 torpedoes, 20 mines, and two 100-mm guns (400 rounds) and two 45-mm guns (1,100 rounds), and two antiaircraft machine guns; the "D" class had six bow and two stern torpedo tubes, 14 torpedoes, one 100-mm gun (144 rounds), one 45-mm gun (500 rounds); the "L" class had six bow and two stern torpedo tubes, 12-18 torpedoes, 20 mines, one 100-mm gun (122-150 rounds), one 45-mm gun (250-500 rounds), one-two machine guns; the "Shch" class had four bow and two stern torpedo tubes, 10 torpedoes, two 45-mm guns (1,000 rounds), two machine guns; the "S" class had

four bow and two stern torpedo tubes, 12 torpedoes, one 100-mm gun (200 rounds), one 45-mm gun (500 rounds), two machine guns; the "M" class had two bow torpedo tubes, 2 torpedoes, one 45-mm gun (195 rounds), and a machine gun (TsVMA [Central Naval Archives], folio 2, inv. 7, file 432, sheets 383 verso-386; folio 13, inv. 30458, file 64, sheets 3-6, 42).

[3]TsVMA, folio 78, file 34934, sheet 248.

[4]V. I. Achkasov and N. B. Pavlovich, "Sovetskoye Voyenno-Morskoye Iskusstvo v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne" [Soviet Naval Art in the Great Patriotic War], Voyenizdat, 1973, p 253; TsVMA, folio 372, file 34160, sheet 21.

[5]The range of submarines of the "S" class, for example, was 30 days. The S-12 (commander, Capt 3d Rank V. A. Turayev) was on a cruise 58 days, from 19 September through 15 November.

[6]"Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy...," Vol 5, Voyenizdat, 1975, p 266.

[7]"Istoriya Voyenno-Morskogo Iskusstva" [History of Naval Art], pp 245, 246, 249; "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy...," Vol 4, Voyenizdat, 1975, pp 123, 336; Vol 5, p 267.

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GROUND FORCES: POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSIVE TACTICS

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[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period" by Candidate of Military Sciences, Maj Gen L. Kortun: "The Development of Defensive Combat Tactics of Motorized Rifle and Tank Subunits in the Postwar Period"; passages in italics printed in boldface]

[Text] The Great Patriotic War with all convincingness reaffirmed the well-known Leninist thesis that "in world history there have never been wars which began or ended with a complete victorious offensive, or they were an exception."[1] Although Soviet military art has always considered the offensive to be the basic type of combat operations at the same time it has recognized the validity and importance of the defense, particularly on the tactical scale. The 1942 Red Army Infantry Field Manual, in defining offensive combat as the basic type of combat operations, recognize defenses as normal type of combat in modern warfare.

In the Great Patriotic War, the defensive occupied a very significant place in the overall system of combat operations for the subunits of the ground forces. There were many vivid examples of its able organization and conduct. The acquired experience has not lost its significance either in the postwar period. Since the end of the 1940's, the means of conducting combat and an operation have remained the same as in the previous war, the development of tactics, including defensive combat, has basically had an evolutionary nature. First of all the most characteristic trends were disclosed in developing the methods for organizing and the procedures for conducting defensive combat. This was the first stage in the postwar development of defensive combat tactics (1945-1953).

However, the equipping of the Ground Forces with modern military equipment and weapons, primarily nuclear missile, has brought about fundamental qualitative changes in military art, including in the defensive tactics of motorized rifle and tank subunits. Since the middle of the 1950's, a new stage has commenced in the development of tactics. The first experience in working out in the course of combat training the questions of organizing and conducting combat operations by Ground Forces subunits under the conditions of the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy, as well as the results of numerous military scientific studies have been generalized in the 1959 Infantry Field Manual and later in the 1964 Field Manual of the Ground Forces (Battalion--Company).

The new questions of tactics, including the tactics of defensive combat, have been actively discussed since the end of the 1950's on the pages of the military press, and in particular in the journal VOYENNYY VESTNIK and the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

The aim of the present article is, on the basis of analyzing the provisions in the appropriate manual documents and materials of the military press, to define certain phenomena and trends in the development of defensive combat tactics for the motorized rifle and tank subunits in the postwar years.

On the basis of the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the purpose of the defense was considered to be the creation of favorable conditions for the subsequent going over to a decisive offense. The war showed that very often the rifle (motorized rifle) and tank subunits had to go over to the defensive in the course of an offensive for the purpose of reinforcing the captured lines (bridgeheads), in repelling enemy counterattacks, for supporting the flanks of the basic advancing groupings, in the event of great losses, or the impossibility because of this of continuing the offensive, for gaining time, and so forth.

Characteristically, although the possibility was envisaged of going over to the defensive both under the conditions of direct contact with the enemy as well as in the absence of such (hurriedly or ahead of time), in the theoretical works and articles the basic emphasis was still put on the speed of its organization under the actions of the enemy. This was also the most widely represented version of organizing the defensive from the experience of the previous war as well as the most complicated one.

On the pages of the military press, more and more attention in the postwar years began to be given to the questions of organizing and conducting an independent defensive by the subunits, and primarily by such as the company and battalion. This was brought about by the constant rise in the role of independent operations by the subunits, particularly under the conditions of the use of nuclear weapons. There was a great increase in the volume and greater complexity in the nature of the *demands made upon the defenses of the subunits*. The 1942 Infantry Field Manual emphasized that *defenses should be deep, antitank, antiartillery and antiaircraft*, in order to successfully repel a massed attack by tanks and infantry supported by artillery and combat aviation, *stubborn and active*, capable of not only repelling the enemy offensive but also causing it significant harm.

All subsequent war experiences showed the complete validity of these demands. In principle they were also made on defenses in the first postwar years, although the nature and content of each of them and the way of realizing them have been altered and adjusted. This has been caused primarily by the quantitative and qualitative development of the so-called conventional types of weapons and military equipment, namely, tanks and aircraft. It has also been caused by the ever-wider introduction into the troops of helicopters, including gunships, equipped with antitank guided missiles, and by the full mechanization of the army. From the experience of the war, the antitank strength of the defenses has assumed special significance. The postwar infantry field manuals have emphasized that antitank defenses comprise the basis of defenses, and for this reason their organization are one of the most important duties of all commanders. In the 1959 Infantry Field Manual, this duty was defined even more categorically as *the most important for all commanders*. Here it was demanded that in each company defensive zone, antitank strongpoints be built,

and for this they could use the implements, tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts assigned to the company, as well as the antitank weapons of the rifle subunits. Thus, not only did the demands made upon increasing the antitank strength of the defenses rise, but also the opportunities for realizing them were broadened. In the 1960's, it was already envisaged that the antitank strongpoints would include antitank guided missiles and grenade launchers.

A characteristic feature was also the strengthening of air defense. The antiaircraft subunits should be positioned in the battle formations of the battalions and from prepared firing positions destroy aircraft, winged missiles, helicopters and enemy airborne troops from various directions using massed intense fire.

Ever more serious demands were made upon the organization of chemical warfare defense, and with the appearance of atomic weapons, antinuclear defense. A new type of combat support arose, defense against atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The military literature and regulations provided a full description of it as well as specific recommendations. They reflected the experience of combat training which had been acquired up to that time. Thus fundamental changes were made in the nature and the content of the demands made on defenses, and brought about by the appearance and development of new types of weapons.

Of exceptionally important significance was the transformation of the rifle troops into motorized rifle ones from the middle of the 1950's. Along with artillery and mortars on mechanical traction with significantly greater firing capability, they received tanks, armored personnel carriers, missile weapons, antitank guided missiles (ATGM), and so forth. The degree of mechanization in the motorized rifle troops can be seen from the fact that the power-to-labor ratio (the power of the motors) rose from 3 hp per man in 1939 to 30 hp at the end of the 1960's.[2] This made it possible on an ever-increasing scale to use mounted engineer equipment on the tanks and armored personnel carriers, and this was particularly important in readying the defenses in a short period of time. The mounting of tanks on larger caliber weapons and weapons with a higher muzzle velocity, the greater effectiveness of the missiles, the stabilization of the weapons in one or two planes, and the improving of the sights, aiming and loading mechanisms sharply increased their fire power and maneuverability.

The ATGM became particularly promising and effective antitank weapons, and certain foreign models of these even at the beginning of the 1960's made it possible to hit tanks at high accuracy from a distance of up to 3 km and more, piercing armor up to 600 mm.[3]

But the defensive layout, the equipping of the defenses and the organization of the fire plan were particularly influenced by the introduction of nuclear weapons into the troops.

A characteristic trend was the consistent dispersion of the battle formations, in keeping with the development of weapons and the increase in the firing range, initially down to the company, then down to the platoon, and subsequently to the squad.

In the defensive layout, there was first of all a substantial increase in the dimensions of its company and battalion areas. Thus, while in the Great Patriotic War a rifle battalion was assigned a defensive area up to 2 km along the front and

1.5-2 km in depth, in the 1960's, its dimensions approached 3 km along the front with the same depth. Companies began to be assigned to defend strongpoints up to 1,000 m along the front and up to 500 m in depth. Here it was assumed that there would be intervals of 1-1.5 km between the company strongpoints, and up to 500 m between the platoons.

On terrain which was not everywhere accessible for the operations of advancing troops, as well as on the defensive in a forward security area or a forward position, defense was also envisaged on a broader front. The exercises conducted at the beginning of the 1960's, provided many examples of the able use of terrain features for the purposes of organizing a stable defense on a broader front than was immediately envisaged after the Great Patriotic War. Thus, during one of the exercises in June 1962, the motorized rifle company under the command of Capt I. Medvedev was defending a strongpoint 1,500 m along the front and up to 800 m in depth. Its two platoons were defending ahead, in positions which occupied 450-500 m along the front, having a space of around 500 m between them. The depth of the platoon positions reached 500 m and was created by the positioning of their regular armored personnel carriers as well as attached weapons. The spaces between the squads were 50-100 m and were securely covered by fire and artificial obstacles.

Such a broadening of the defensive front of the motorized rifle and tank subunits, on the one hand, has been necessitated by the maximum possible dispersion of the troops in the event the enemy uses nuclear weapons, and on the other, by the significantly increased fire and maneuvering capabilities of the defending subunits. In particular, this made it possible to maneuver the men and equipment not only from the depth, but also along the front.

In the military literature of those times, most often it was recommended that battalion defenses be organized on a position which could run both along the forward as well as the back slopes of elevation. Here it was assumed that the position should be based upon the company strongpoints consisting in the motorized rifle companies of platoon strongpoints, the firing positions of attached antitank weapons and tanks, and in a tank company, of the strongpoints of the tank platoons. The motorized rifle subunits attached to a tank company were to be positioned ahead of the tanks, in the spaces between the tank platoons and on the flanks of the company.

The battle formation of a battalion was to be formed up in a single echelon, assigning, as a rule, a reserve consisting of a reinforced platoon. It was recommended that the companies in the battalion and the platoons be positioned one-up, two-up, or echeloned depending upon the content of the missions, the nature of the terrain, and the opportunities for creating the most efficient fire plan. Very great importance was given to the forward position in order to confuse the enemy on the configuration of the forward edge and the defensive layout.

In one of the exercises in September 1962, in the battalion of Maj I. Shenderovskiy, a forward position was created which was defended by small forces. Skillful maneuvering of them along the front and the able organization of the fire plan confused the attacking side. The "enemy" took it as the actual forward edge, it carried out artillery softening up actually against an empty area, and committed its reserves to battle prematurely. And it was unable to achieve success.

When the defenses were occupied out of contact with the enemy and there was no forward position, for preventing an enemy surprise attack and the conducting of reconnaissance, it was proposed that battle outposts be sent out from a battalion, as a rule, consisting of a reinforced platoon, over a distance of up to 1 km.

One of the main problems of the defense in postwar years, particularly after the introduction of nuclear weapons in the troops, became the organization of an *efficient fire plan*. The significance of all types of fire has always been great on the defensive, but during these years it rose sharply. The field manuals emphasized that fire on the defensive is the basic means of defeating the enemy, and that the strength of the defenses is determined by a skillfully organized fire plan, and above all antitank fire. All the postwar manuals have demanded that a subunit commander, in going over to the defensive, first of all organize observation and the fire plan.

Even in the last war, in the fire plan of the subunits on the defensive, there was a continuous rise in the proportional amount and importance of antitank weapons fire. In the postwar years, this tendency has not only been maintained, but also broadened. With the introduction of nuclear weapons, in organizing the fire plan, including that of subunits, the necessity has arisen of considering planned nuclear strikes.

In the postwar years, there has been a significant rise in the power of small-arms fire due to the wider use of automatic weapons as well as the weapons of armored personnel carriers with which the motorized rifle subunits have been equipped. This has also increased the strength of defenses.

Profound analysis of the experience of the Great Patriotic War and the postwar exercises has made it possible to formulate the demands of the field manuals on the necessity of the concealed, dispersed positioning of the tanks, guns and other weapons in order that the enemy can be hit from the backsides of elevations and from in depth by flanking, cross- and high-density concentrated fire, and creating pockets of fire. The term "pocket of fire" was first officially used in the 1964 Field Manual, but even during the Great Patriotic War such pockets were very widely used. The essence of this strategem was to position a large portion of the weapons in depth and on the flanks in relation to the probable direction of the enemy advance. In firmly retaining the positions on the flanks of the pockets, the defending subunits, like breakwaters, directed the advancing troops into specially selected areas where they were destroyed by all types of fire.

During the Great Patriotic War, an exceptionally effective form of countering the advancing enemy, and above all its tanks particularly when moving in columns, was the tank and special antitank ambushes. In the postwar years, the significantly increased fire power of tank weapons, the artillery, the special ATGM and other weapons has substantially increased the effectiveness of ambushes. It has been considered effective to organize them in the gaps, on the flanks and deep in the defenses of a battalion.

The infantry field manuals have recommended that artillery fire from concealed firing positions be prepared ahead of the forward edge on the probable directions of the enemy advance, on the boundaries, in the gaps and on the flanks. Provision has also been made for firing at areas of the terrain not covered by direct fire from the guns, tanks and small arms.

It has been recommended that the armored personnel carriers be positioned in firing positions deep in the strongpoints of the companies and platoons in terrain declivities and on the backsides of elevations in such a manner that their weapons could fire first of all in the gaps between the subunits and toward the flanks.

The dispersion of the subunit battle formations and the significant gaps between them caused a tendency to strengthen the all-round nature of defense, including the fire plan. For the purposes of ensuring all-round defense for the weapons, the tanks and the armored personnel carriers, it was prescribed that additional firing sectors be designated, trenches and reserve positions prepared for firing toward the rear and flanks. Particular attention was paid to the readiness of all the weapons to fire at night and under other conditions of restricted visibility.

Naturally the strengthening of the antitank nature of defenses brought about a greater role for the fire of antitank weapons. However, since the questions of antitank defenses were very thoroughly examined in the article by Col V. Kiselev "The Development of Antitank Defenses in the Postwar Years,"[5] they will not be taken up in detail in this article. As a whole, in agreeing with the author's assertion that a rise in antitank strength is the main trend in the development of defenses in the postwar years, we feel that this trend should not be separated from the constant rise in the importance of the antinuclear strength of defenses. Starting in the second half of the 1950's, the possibility and nature of the use of nuclear weapons by both sides have had a determining influence on the development of the defensive.

The unity of the antinuclear and antitank essence of the defensive has been clearly expressed in the nature and content of the demands made upon its *field works*, and the sequence in carrying out engineer work. While during the time of the Great Patriotic War and in the first postwar years, field works for the defenses of the rifle and tank subunits basically were done by hand, since the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's, earthmoving equipment, mounted equipment and other mechanical devices as well as prefabricated artificial structures and elements have begun to be used on an ever-increasing scale. The possibility of widely using mechanization for engineer work made it possible to substantially shorten the time required for equipping the defensive areas and strongpoints of the subunits. This was of exceptionally important significance under the conditions of the highly fluid combat operations and with the constant threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

In the postwar years, the tendency has also remained of constantly broadening the use of mixed minefields. Special mine layers and even helicopters have begun to be used for building them.

As was already pointed out, a new important element in the organization of defenses was to ensure the *protection of the subunits against weapons of mass destruction.* For these purposes it was proposed that first of all skillful use be made of the protective properties of the terrain and military equipment, that radiological, chemical and bacteriological reconnaissance be conducted continuously, that the corresponding shelters be built more quickly, and with the occurrence of high radiation levels, that the personnel be promptly evacuated from these areas, rescue work organized and other essential measures undertaken.

Both in theory and in practice in the postwar years, the most serious attention was devoted to *increasing the activeness of defenses*. During the last war, active defenses of the subunits were achieved basically by counterattacks.

In the postwar years, counterattacks have remained one of the most important forms for achieving active defenses of the motorized rifle and tank subunits. But at the same time, the military press has repeatedly emphasized that this does not mean the use of only such forms as counterattacks. The work "Taktika" [Tactics] worked out by a group of authors of the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze under the leadership of Gen V. G. Reznichenko pointed out: "Active defenses consist in the continuous hitting of the enemy by all means, in imposing the will of the defending side on the enemy, creating disadvantageous conditions for the enemy to conduct combat, and in carrying out broad maneuvers and counterattacks."[6]

Under the conditions of a nuclear war, active defenses are determined primarily by the use of nuclear weapons and the firing of various other weapons. But along with this it has been pointed out that a fundamental change in the course of combat and ensuring the possibility of going over from the defensive to a decisive offensive can be achieved only as a result of a strong, well-prepared counterattack, particularly after nuclear strikes. At the same time, uncoordinated counterattacks by weak forces lead to the scattering of the efforts of the defending subunits, and this will allow the advancing enemy to repel them with comparative ease and will play only into its hands.[7]

In the works and articles on the questions of defenses, prior to conducting a counterattack it has been recommended that the enemy which has broken into the positions be hit with the fire of all weapons, and that the counterattack be carried out against the enemy rear and flanks under the cover of artillery fire. It has been pointed out that the motorized rifle troops should counterattack the enemy on armored personnel carriers or on foot behind the tanks, while the first-echelon subunits should support the counterattack with fire or upon the order of the senior chief by energetic actions, together with the counterattacking forces, destroy the enemy which has broken into the defenses.

New trends in the development of defensive combat tactics for motorized rifle and tank subunits as set at the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's were subsequently further developed.

The demands made upon defenses continued to grow. Here it has been emphasized that the crucial thing in achieving stable defenses is the ability to withstand enemy nuclear strikes. From a type of combat support, antitank defenses have moved decisively into the position of an inseparable element and one of the major components in combat operations themselves. Ever greater significance has been given to the ability of the defending subunits to conduct a successful struggle against enemy airborne troops and aeromobile forces, and to maintain and restore their battleworthiness.

The organization of the fire plan and the methods of the fire effect on the advancing enemy have continued to be improved. As the Soviet Military Encyclopedia has stated, the modern "fire plan on the defensive is comprised of the following: Areas and lines of massed, concentrated and defensive artillery fire on the approaches to the defenses and in their depth; zones of solid, multilayered fire of all types

ahead of the forward edge, on the flanks and in depth; the maneuvering of fire and strikes for the purposes of massing them in a short period of time on any threatened sector or area. The fire plan is coordinated with nuclear strikes, air strikes and the system of artificial obstacles...."[8]

In accord with this, in the military press it has been recommended that the tanks, infantry combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers), guns, ATGM, and small arms in the defensive areas of the subunits be so positioned that they could be effectively used at night and under the conditions of limited visibility, for firing at maximum range, for reciprocal support of one another, and for creating multilayered fire ahead of the forward edge, on the flanks and deep in the defenses. It has also been recommended that wider use be made of the "pockets of fire," tank ambushes and firing from alternative firing positions by roving guns and tanks.[9]

The system of artificial obstacles is becoming ever-more complicated and diverse. At present it can include various antitank, antipersonnel, mixed, electrified and unmined obstacles, mining lines and destruction. For example, in the "Karpaty" [Carpathians] Troop Exercises in July 1977, the defending subunits very effectively used antitank trenches which were dug by blasting, and used incendiary devices for creating impassable fire belts. Artificial obstacles have also been skillfully used on the defensive in many other exercises.

There has been a constantly developing trend toward raising the activeness of defenses and above all by rapid and strong counterattacks and the maneuvering of fire. At the "Berezina" Troop Exercises in February 1978 and at others, many subunit commanders endeavored to create strong and highly mobile reserves making it possible to carry out the mission of fully defeating the advancing enemy by counterattacks combined with a positional defense. More and more often the motorized rifle subunits counterattacked along with the tanks, without dismounting from their combat vehicles. Because of this a tendency has arisen for defensive and offensive troop operations to come closer together in terms of the level of activeness.

Naturally, within a limited article it has been possible to examine only certain questions in the development of defensive combat tactics for motorized rifle and tank subunits in the postwar years. This development has been brought about by the continuous improvement in the conventional types of weapons and combat equipment and particularly by the introduction of nuclear weapons into the troops. It has had a comprehensive nature. During these years there has been further substantial development of trends which could already be noted during the years of the Great Patriotic War such as the sharp increase in the significance of countering tanks and this has become the basic content of defensive operations; the greater role of all types of fire, the maneuverability and activeness of defenses; a reduction in the time for equipping prepared defenses; a rise in the readiness to quickly resume the offensive, and so forth.

At the same time, the introduction of nuclear weapons and the appearance of other types of weapons have caused a whole range of new problems to appear, and above all the necessity of ensuring the high antinuclear strength of defenses, reliable protection of the personnel against weapons of mass destruction, an optimum combination of dispersion and concentration of forces on the most dangerous sectors, and a significant rise in the moral-combat qualities of the personnel.

Defensive combat tactics is continuing to develop at present. For this reason it is very important that the military personnel correctly see the basic trends of this development, and on the basis of analyzing historical experience, including of the postwar period, be able to promptly determine the new, more effective forms and methods for organizing and conducting defensive combat.

FOOTNOTES

[1]V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 44, p 209.

[2]"Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Voyenizdat, 1978, Vol 5, p 436.

[3]"Taktika" [Tactics], Voyenizdat, 1966, p 56.

[4]V. V. Turchenko and M. V. Fedulov, "Oboronitel'nyye Deystviya v Khode Nastupleniya" [Defensive Operations in the Course of an Offensive], Voyenizdat, 1966, pp 67-68.

[5]See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1978, pp 46-53.

[6]"Taktika," p 324.

[7]See "The Defensive in Modern Combat," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 August 1964.

[8]"Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 5, p 662.

[9]See VOYENNYY VESTNIK, No 3, 1980, pp 39-40.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: GERMAN ATTACK ON HOSPITAL DESCRIBED

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[Article published under the heading "Memoirs," by Col (Ret) N. Afanas'yev: "South of Königsberg." During the described period Maj N. M. Afanas'yev was a propagandist in the 31st Army Political Section.]

[Text] These events occurred in the last days of the Great Patriotic War in East Prussia, in the so-called "Heilsberg Triangle." The "triangle" was formed by three cities: Heilsberg, Landsberg and Bartenstein which were located to the south of Königsberg, approximately 20 km apart. Long before World War II, the Nazi Wehrmacht had turned this "triangle" into the strongest fortified area covering the path to the capital of East Prussia. In a comparatively small area, the Nazis erected over 900 reinforced concrete pillboxes, many earth and timber pillboxes, and antitank and antipersonnel obstacles. At the end of January and beginning of February 1945, this "triangle" was to be stormed by the troops of the 31st Army of the Third Belorussian Front.

Even before the army had entered the territory of East Prussia, the commanders and political workers realized that on their home land the Nazi troops would fight with unprecedented fierceness. Proceeding from this, they patiently explained to the men the particular features and difficulties of the forthcoming battles in East Prussia, the bastion of German militarism and fascism. Over many centuries, this territory had been the springboard for armed attacks against neighboring countries. Here a hate for the eastern neighbors was instilled, and disdain for other peoples and racial intolerance were cultivated. A spirit of strong militarism permeated all the life of the German population in the province.

The Nazi command had turned all East Prussia into an enormous defensive bastion. Here seven fortified areas and five strong defensive zones had been erected. They covered Pomerania and the routes to Berlin from the northeast. In front of the troops of the Third Belorussian Front were the defending 4th Field and 3d Tank armies. The operational density of the defending enemy troops was high. It was about 15 km per division. The Nazis had received the categorical order: At no price permit the Soviet Army into the province.

During this time the author of this article was a representative of the 31st Army Political Section in the 331st Rifle Division. The political section (chief, Col P. M. Shilovich) had worked out a detailed plan for conducting organizational and

explanatory work in the subunits. The divisional commander, Maj Gen P. F. Berestov, approved it. Virtually all the commanders and political workers were involved in carrying out the plan, including the regimental commanders and the leading staff officers. In particular, speaking to the men of subordinate subunits were the regimental commanders Majs P. V. Kashkovskiy, V. N. Smolyar, and S. N. Shcherbakov. They convincingly explained the particular features and difficulties of the forthcoming battles and the necessity of valuing the honor and dignity of Soviet soldiers under any, even the most complicated combat situation. Each soldier was again reminded that our motherland was not fighting against the German people, but rather against German fascism which had commenced World War II, and for this reason for the peaceful population of even such a bastion of German fascism as East Prussia we should not show malice or hate in order by our conduct to repudiate the falseness of fascist propaganda about those fabricated threats to the peaceful population which supposedly the Soviet troops would bring.

The commanders and political workers, together with the leaders of the party and Komsomol organizations, carefully checked the placement of the communists and Komsomol members in the subunits. Full party and Komsomol organizations were set up in all the rifle, machine gun, mortar and combat engineer companies.

The basic part of the fortifications of the "Heilsberg Triangle" was to be stormed by the formations of the 31st Army of Lt Gen P. G. Shafranov. Advancing directly against the city of Heilsberg were the 62d, 174th and 331st rifle divisions of the XLIV Rifle Corps of Maj Gen M. N. Kleshnin. In the zone of their advance were 99 reinforced concrete pillboxes, shelters for large garrisons and other works erected in the valley of the Allei River. These were covered by four rows of antitank obstacles [dragon's teeth] and five rows of wire obstacles on metal stakes. In such fortifications the Nazis could defend themselves for a long time even with comparatively small forces.

On 31 January 1945, the formations of the XLIV Rifle Corps by a rapid thrust captured Heilsberg. The situation of the large enemy grouping was extremely complex. After the fall of the city, a significant portion of the strong fortifications of the "triangle" was in the rear of our troops. The feat of the men in the corps of Gen M. N. Kleshnin and the LXXI Rifle Corps (the 54th, 88th and 220th rifle divisions) of Maj Gen S. A. Knyaz'kov which assisted in advancing from the north was commended in an order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

The army commander P. G. Shafranov foresaw that the enemy command would make desperate efforts to force the Soviet troops out of Heilsberg and reopen the route of retreat for its forces to Königsberg. And this happened. The Nazis commenced fierce attacks against Heilsberg and to the south of Bartenstein, but they were driven off with high losses for the enemy.

The task was to surround and destroy the enemy troop grouping fighting to the south of Heilsberg. The pushing of the formations of the Second Belorussian Front to the Baltic Sea at Elbing created such a possibility. Nevertheless this could not be done immediately. The Nazis were making a strong counterthrust to the south of Königsberg. The commander of the Third Belorussian Front, Gen Arm I. D. Chernyakhovskiy, was forced temporarily to halt the offensive of the front assault grouping. The battles did not abate for a single day. Soon thereafter favorable conditions arose for pushing out from Heilsberg to the city of Landsberg with the

31st Army in order to capture this last major road and rail junction connecting the entire southern enemy grouping with Königsberg and closing off the fortified area. However there were clearly not enough forces for this. The army chief of staff Maj Gen M. I. Shchedrin, upon instructions of the commander, reported his views to the front chief of staff, Col Gen A. P. Pokrovskiy, and then to the front commander I. D. Chernyakhovskiy who approved the plan and ordered:

"Take Landsberg. Tomorrow or the day after the 5th Tank Army of the Second Belorussian Front will strike the city of Melzak and it will be easier for you."

On 1 February, the army commander Gen P. G. Shafranov took the decision for the offensive. Gen M. I. Shchedrin drove to Heilsberg to the staff of the XLIV Rifle Corps in order on the spot to clarify the combat mission of his troops. A large portion of the forces in the corps was to hold the city until the arrival of units from the 50th Army of the Second Belorussian Front. For capturing Landsberg, a troop grouping was created under the command of the commander of the 331st Rifle Division, Maj Gen P. F. Berestov. In addition to this division, it included the 88th Rifle Division (commander, Col A. A. Kuzennyy) of the LXXI Rifle Corps, the 337th Heavy, the 926th and the 959th Self-Propelled Artillery regiments and the 140th Army Cannon Artillery Brigade (commander, Col S. F. Fedotov).

On the night of 2 February, the group of Gen Berestov captured Landsberg by a rapid thrust from the southeast and the south. By the end of the day, the 88th Division occupied a line 5-6 km to the east and north of the city, while the 331st Division was approximately the same distance to the west and southwest of the city. And this victory of the troops of the 31st Army was also commended in an order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

The 5th Tank Army of the Second Belorussian Front had not succeeded in rapidly taking the city of Melzak as Gen Arm I. D. Chernyakhovskiy had planned. The group of Gen Berestov was in a difficult situation. The right-flank formations of the army were 10-12 km to the southeast of Landsberg, and the lefthand adjacent unit, the 50th Army, was 8-10 km behind. The Nazi troops could attack the city from the north, east, southeast and the west, and this they did.[1]

The Nazis endeavored to drive the Soviet troops out of Landsberg at any price. Their counterattacks followed one after the other. The situation was aggrevated by the fact that our units had been unable to organize a solid defensive line, as there was neither the time nor the forces. And it was impossible to hold onto all the lines taken in the preceding battles. In particular, on 5 February, units of the 174th Rifle Division of Col N. I. Demin had been forced to retreat under strong enemy pressure near the village of Petershagen. By the end of the day, a battalion of enemy infantry with 37 tanks and assault guns had broken into the village of Grunwald (around 6 km to the southeast of Landsberg). And here were the rear services of the 331st and 88th Rifle divisions, including the medical battalion of the 88th Division.

The village of Grunwald (now Zielenice, Poland) is to the north of that famous Grunwald where the German Teutonic Knights had been defeated on 15 July 1410.

As a consequence of the heavy battles in the area of Landsberg, for three days the medical battalion had been receiving a large number of wounded. In saving their lives, the medics worked night and day. By the evening of 5 February, in the medical battalion there were around 200 severely wounded alone.

A white flag with a red cross which could be seen from far off flew over the house where the operating and bandaging facilities were located. Nearby stood the ambulances also with large red crosses. The Nazis, of course, saw all of this. Disregarding international rules which prohibit an armed attack on medical facilities, the bestial barbarians determined to take out their evil on the wounded Soviet soldiers. Tanks and "Ferdinand" assault guns opened massed fire against the houses where the medical battalion was located. The operating room was destroyed by the first shells. The surgeon, Maj Med Serv A. A. Sytnikov, interrupted the operation. The wounded man was taken off the operating table and carried to the basement. In the bandaging room the nurse N. Solov'yeva and the orderly T. Aleksandrova at that time were engaged in transfusing blood to persons already operated on. Breaking off their work, they also had succeeded in removing all the wounded to the basement. The physician and secretary of the battalion party organization, Sr Lt Med Serv P. P. Kvochkin ordered N. Solov'yeva to remain constantly in the cellar with the severely wounded. A. A. Sytnikov with the nurses and orderlies quickly carried the remaining surviving wounded from the operating room to the cellar of the house. In the adjacent house the same thing had also been done by the orderlies N. Sharova, L. Kondakova and A. Korotkova.

In the third building were the chief of the divisional medical service, Maj Med Serv D. D. Arnol'di, the commander of the medical battalion, Maj Med Serv A. Ya. Kovyrshin, and the physician P. P. Kvochkin who had fled there. They also had succeeded in moving the severely wounded into the basement and there barricaded themselves behind a massive metal door. The severely wounded German soldiers who had been taken prisoner were also carried there. The necessary operations had already been performed on them, but they had not yet been sent to the rear.

Having completed a massed shelling of the houses of the medical battalion, the Nazis rushed to attack the defenseless persons. The enemy submachine gunners broke into the half-destroyed houses, and with bayonets and gun butts attacked those severely wounded who had not been able to take shelter. The Nazis also broke into the house where N. Sharova, L. Kondakova and A. Korotkova had hidden the wounded in the basement. They opened the basement door and ordered everyone to come up. No one emerged. Then the Nazis opened fire with their automatics. Having thrown grenades into the basement, they listened if anyone was still groaning. But dead silence reigned there. The Nazis left. Of all the inhabitants in the cellar, only N. Sharova and the soldier Sadovskiy survived literally by a miracle.

The Nazis were unable to quickly break down or pull off its hinges the massive door to the basement of the house where D. D. Arnol'di and A. Ya. Kobryshin had taken shelter along with the wounded. Not wanting to waste time on this, they brought a "Ferdinand" up to the house, they broke the ventilating window which was slightly above the ground, they lowered in a hose and fastened it to the exhaust pipe of the gun. The driver turned on the engine so that the exhaust fumes would fill the shelter in as short a time as possible. Soon everyone in the cellar had suffocated. Only the ambulance driver Jr Sgt I. S. Gerasimov remained alive.[2] In falling on the cement floor, his hand touched a puddle of stagnant water. Seizing the skirt of his coat, he was able to wet it in the puddle and held it close to his nose. Having lost consciousness, he came to sometime later. Everyone was already dead, and the carbon monoxide was almost completely aired out. I. S. Gerasimov remained in the basement until our troops had driven the Nazis out of the village, and thus became a witness of all the atrocities of the Nazi barbarians.

Next to the medical battalion was a laundry detachment. The fascist monsters threw themselves on the defenseless girls, subjected them to wild violations and then executed all of them. One of them, Mariya Rogova, was tied up and thrown alive on an enormous bonfire. Watching the girl die, the monsters began to dance around the fire like cannibals rendered senseless from the smell of blood of their victim.

But this atrocity was not enough for the Nazis. They began to drag out of the houses and basements the still alive and even dead soldiers and officers, and placed them in a row across the highway which ran through the village. Having formed a "paving" of human bodies, the Nazis drove tanks and self-propelled guns over it. The Nazi soldiers and officers standing in groups in front of the houses with wild laughter and shouts observed this barbarian retribution against those who could not defend themselves.

More than 200 persons perished by the hands of the Nazi murderers in the village of Grunwald. Aside from the already mentioned Sr Sgt I. S. Gerasimov, of all the Soviet troops which on that day were in this village, by pure chance three remained alive: N. M. Solov'yeva (married name Brezhneva), A. G. Kuz'mina (Korostayeva) and A. I. Sharova (Belyakova). And they told of the terrible tragedy in Grunwald.

For 3 days the group of Gen Berestov continued the bloody battles against the numerically superior enemy forces which undertook one after another fierce counterattack from all sides. In repelling them, the Soviet troops gradually retreated to Landsberg and finally dug in in the stone structures on the edges of the city. A breakthrough by the Nazi infantry and tanks into Grunwald had meant that the group was surrounded.

The units of the group of Gen Berestov learned of the bestial crime by the Nazis in Grunwald on the same night. The indignation of the soldiers and officers was indescribable, particularly among the men of the 88th Rifle Division as many of them had combat friends wounded in recent battles at the medical battalion. And no matter how great their anger, none of the Soviet soldiers thought of retribution or causing evil to the German population or wounded enemy soldiers and officers. The humanism and high moral qualities of our soldiers, sergeants and officers indoctrinated by the Communist Party here were manifested fully.

Even on the day of the taking of Landsberg, Gen Berestov, with a group of officers, among whom was the author of this article, visited the Nazi officer hospital. Its chief, a Wehrmacht colonel, reported on the number of wounded and that all the medical personnel was accounted for. After a brief conversation, the divisional commander left the building.

Having returned to his staff, Gen Berestov ordered that security be put up around the Nazi hospitals. And this was regardless of the fact that in the intense battles the division was suffering high casualties and each man was needed. It reached such a point that virtually all the commanders and political workers of the units, armed with automatics, along with the men drove off the rabid enemy counterattacks, while the lightly wounded remained in formation and continued fighting. In certain companies of the 331st Rifle Division, there were 10-15 soldiers and sergeants and just one officer. There was a similar situation in the units of the 88th Rifle Division.

The Nazi troops had been able to form both an inside and outside encirclement ring. The command of the 31st Army repeatedly made attempts to break them, but did not have enough resources. Only in the second half of the day of 7 February did the reserves approaching under the order of the front commander break through to the units of the division on the southern outskirts of the city. By evening our troops had reached the city from the southeast as well. Then counterstrikes were also made on the other sectors. The Nazis who had surrounded Landsberg suffered a complete defeat.

The men in the group of Gen Berestov with their own eyes saw the bloody crimes of the Nazis in Grunwald. D. D. Arnol'di, A. Ya. Kobryshin, A. A. Sytnikov, P. P. Kvochkin, A. Korotkov, T. Aleksandrov, L. Kondakov and others who had been killed by Nazi hands were buried in Kaunas with military honors.

The evil crime in Grunwald had been committed not by any band of SS troops, but rather by ordinary field troops of the Nazi Wehrmacht. From the information of prisoners and documents, it was established that the 21st, 56th, 203d, 129th, 541st, 292d, and 258th infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht and the so-called "Combat Group Heinholz" had been fighting in this area. There was not a single SS division or unit. This substantiates that bestial crimes were committed by all the troops of the Nazi Wehrmacht.

This must never be forgotten, particularly at present when on the pages of bourgeois newspapers, particularly in the FRG, there have long been appeals to "clean the halo" of the Nazi Wehrmacht of accusations of atrocities against the peaceful population or the humiliating of wounded and prisoners. The agents of the defeated Nazi military are endeavoring to prove that the troops of Nazi Germany did not commit any crimes or any atrocities, and that all such accusations had been fabricated by Soviet propaganda.

But the lies will never eradicate the crimes of the enemy hordes from the memory of the people!

FOOTNOTES

[1]TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 386, inv. 8599, file 521, sheets 54-63.

[2]Ibid., file 244, sheets 17-20; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 March 1965.

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COMBAT TRADITIONS: COMBAT COMRADESHIP AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

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[Article published under the heading "Combat Traditions," by Maj Gen V. Dolgov, First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "Troop Comradeship"]

> [Text] A new cycle of articles is being devoted to one of the noteworthy traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces, to troop comradeship and mutual assistance in combat. The articles will tell of the development of this tradition in the Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, the National Air Defense Troops and the Strategic Missile Troops.

The entire world knows how rich the Soviet people are spiritually. "An atmosphere of true collectivism and comradeship," said L. I. Brezhnev from the rostrum of the 25th Party Congress, "solidarity, the friendship of all nations and peoples in the country and which are growing stronger day by day, and the moral health which makes us strong and steadfast--these are the vivid facets of our way of life, and these are the great victories of socialism which have become the flesh and blood of our reality."[1] The remarkable words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev equally apply to the climate which prevails in the activities of the army collectives. The noble principle of our communist morality is close and dear to the Soviet military, that is, a man is another man's friend, comrade and brother. And in their daily military service and during hardships they are loyal to the debt of comradeship and true military fraternity.

Troop comradeship is an old tradition. In the chronicle of the military history of our motherland there are many glorious pages telling of the collectivism, mutual help in combat and comradely solidarity. Many military leaders have pointed to the enormous role of these qualities of the Russian people and their military. Thus, A. V. Suvorov in his "Nauka Pobezhdat'" [The Science of Winning] emphasized: "Serving is easy when many help," "a foot reinforces a foot, an arm strengthens an arm." Particularly Suvorov noted the importance of collective and close actions in combat. "In two ranks," he taught, "lies strength, in three are double: the first rushes, the second throngs and the third completes."[2]

Soviet military comradeship, in continuing the finest traditions of its people, has developed on a fundamentally new basis. With the victory of Great October, private

ownership of the means of production was eliminated, and exploiting classes were liquidated. This put an end to all that divided the masses of people, and that gave rise to individualism, indifference and mistrust in one another. The shaping of high moral qualities, the establishing of a spirit of collectivism, fraternity of peoples, and the uniting of the workers into a single family to fight for communism were proclaimed as the most important aim of the new society by the party.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the founders of scientific communism, were for the world the most vivid model of such fraternity. Their relations, in the apt phrase of V. I. Lenin, "surpassed all the most touching stories of the ancients of human friendship."[3] It is noteworthy that the first international union of communists was termed by the great teachers of the proletariat as an "association." In defining its program, Karl Marx emphasized: "One of the great aims of the association is to see to it that the workers of the various countries not only felt but also acted as brothers and comrades fighting for their liberation...."[4]

The establishing of the new morality, of new socialist relations, and the spirit of true collectivism became possible only after the victory of October. "We," said V. I. Lenin with unflinching conviction, "will work to eradicate the infamous rule: 'Each for himself, one god for all....' We will work to instill in the awareness, in the habits, and in the daily routine of the masses the rule: 'All for one and one for all'...."[5]

V. I. Lenin did a great deal to instill this rule firmly in the awareness of the Soviet soldiers. During the years of the Civil War and the Military Intervention, in almost every speech to the soldiers and commanders he urged them to show international comradeship and solidarity.

The ideas of indoctrinating the men in a spirit of collectivism were reflected in the first documents regulating the life of the Red Army. Thus, in the official "Booklet of the Red Armyman" distributed under the instructions of V. I. Lenin, emphasis is put on the importance of comradely relations and the necessity of mutual aid in combat. In the first Internal Service Regulations approved by the RSFSR VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] in November 1918, troop comradeship was viewed as the guarantee for successful service.[6]

The history of the Civil War is full of examples of unbreakable military solidarity and mutual aid. Here are just a few of them. In a battle on 1 August 1920, the Red Armyman Litovchenko was wounded. Bleeding, the soldier fell from his horse. The Red Armyman Gorodintsev dashed to help his comrade. Under fire he carried Litovchenko off the battlefield. In January 1924, the Third Kazan' Composite Regiment was awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner. The order of the RVSR [Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic] pointed out: "The exceptional comradely solidarity and discipline of the regiment have made it into a strong fighting unit which has served as the support of the entire Transcaspian Front"[7]

Even during the time of the Civil War military comradeship developed into one of the remarkable traditions of the Red Army. During peacetime construction, it was further developed. This was also aided by the introduction of new regulations. In particular, in December 1937, the Internal Service Regulations of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] came into effect. One of their articles stated: "The serviceman should...strengthen comradely solidarity and maintain the military traditions of his

unit."[8] Each commander and superior was obliged to always be an example of political awareness, organization and courtesy. "In this manner," the regulations emphasized, "he strengthens the comradely solidarity of the personnel...."[9]

History has convincingly affirmed the enormous strength which is possessed in the personal example of the commanders in the process of developing in the men feelings of collectivism and solidarity, and developing in them a readiness to support each other in combat. Here is a characteristic episode. In the heat of an unequal clash at Lake Khasan in August 1938, the company commander, Sr Lt D. T. Levchenko, was severely wounded. However he did not leave the battlefield and continued to command the subunit. His example was followed by the squad commander Mashukov and the men who had been wounded by the fragments of a Japanese shell. They remained in the battle formations of the company and hit the enemy accurately. As a result the mission was accomplished. Dorofey Timofeyevich Levchenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The military comradeship and friendship of our soldiers were particularly apparent during the years of the Great Patriotic War. "The peoples of the Soviet Union," commented Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, "withstood this trial not only in the close work in the rear, but also in the conduct of their sons on the forward lines of the front. It could not be otherwise. Our army is a fraternal family where help for a comrade is obligatory."[10]

Very correctly said! In the history of each combat unit, one can find many instructive examples of the friendship and comradeship of Soviet soldiers and their mutual assistance. The name of Pvt S. I. Savost'yanov is well known in our Moscow district. He committed his feat on 17 December 1941. On that day a group of men from a motorized rifle battalion in a tank brigade mounted on tanks broke into the village of Denisikha. Savost'yanov and his comrades in a hand-to-hand clash destroyed seven Nazis and occupied a pillbox. But then the situation changed, and the handful of courageous motorized rifle troops had to withstand several enemy attacks. Soon only S. I. Savost'yanov remained fighting. Having hurriedly bandaged the bleeding men, he continued to repel the beseiging Nazis. And when one of the wounded men suggested he retreat, he replied decisively:

"I would never abandon my comrades."

Savost'yanov resisted the enemy attacks for 6 hours. And when our tanks troops broke into the village, they found scores of enemy corpses in front of his position. For this feat Pvt S. I. Savost'yanov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet military often sacrificed themselves for the sake of success in combat or for protecting the lives of comrades. Around 200 feats are known similar to the one committed by Guards Pvt Aleksandr Matrosov. Here is one of them. On a cold and stormy January day of 1943, the machine gunner of the 15th Guards Rifle Division, Sgt N. F. Serdyukov, was providing fire support for the advance of his combat comrades near the village of Rogachik. In the course of battle, two enemy pillboxes which were impeding the advance of the guardsmen were silenced. But when our rifleman rose up, suddenly a third began firing. Wounded in the leg, Serdyukov was the closest to the enemy firing point. He crawled to it. The soldier succeeded in making his way right up to the pillbox and threw in a grenade. The Nazi machine gun

fell silent for only a few seconds and then resumed firing. Then Serdyukov threw himself into the firing slot. At the price of his life, he opened the way forward to his military comrades. At the age of 19, Komsomol member N. F. Serdyukov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

But how many examples one could give of mutual assistance from the history of the Great Patriotic War! Here is an excerpt from the archives of the Red Banner Khar'kov-Bucharest 375th Rifle Division: "The Red Armyman of the 2d Machine Gun Company...Mikhail Ignat'yevich Ul'yanov, under heavy enemy fire, carried the assistant company commander, Comrade Samoylov off the battlefield.... The assistant platoon commander, Comrade Tikhon Grigor'yevich Borisov, carried three soldiers off the battlefield and one platoon commander with all their weapons."[11] Thus was the strength of frontline friendship.

The sources of the strength and indestructability of Soviet military comradeship lie in our social and state system, the developing communist relations between people, filial love for the fatherland, and our entire way of life. But their ideological foundation is Marxist-Leninist teachings. Collectivism, a feeling of personal responsibility for the security of the motherland, and a desire to be disciplined and live according to the regulations are developed in the men on this basis.

Nothing of this sort has been, is or can be in the armies of the capitalist states. The isolation cultivated there, national and social mistrust lead to a situation where the officers and soldiers are interested in nothing but their own skins. It is well known that the Pentagon leaders have repeatedly abandoned their wounded to fate. For example, during the Korean War, in the retreat of the 7th American Infantry Regiment, its soldiers, according to a statement in the magazine, FORTNIGHT MAGAZINE, abandoned 800 wounded and frostbitten soldiers.[12]

Over the past 35 postwar years, our society has moved far ahead in its development. Developed socialism has been built, and a new historical community of people, the Soviet people, has developed. The friendship of the Soviet peoples has become even stronger. And the relationships of Soviet people now firmly include such moral principles in the moral code of a builder of communism as collectivism and comradely mutual aid, that is, each for all, and all for one. And the humanistic relations and mutual respect between people derive from the rule that a man is another's friend, comrade and brother. All these principles are also characteristic for the Soviet Armed Forces. "Our army...," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "is a school of internationalism, a school for indoctrinating feelings of fraternity, solidarity and mutual respect of all the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union. Our Armed Forces are a united friendly family, the living embodiment of socialist internationalism."[13]

Collectivism and the feeling of comradeship and mutual aid are also dictated by the very nature of modern military service. The changes which have occurred in it have led to a situation where success in combat will now more and more depend upon the degree of solidarity in the military collective and the ability to support each other. The USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, has written: "...Joint military service...brings together and unites the men of different nationalities and indoctrinates them in a spirit of military comradeship and mutual aid...."[14]

As is known, the field makes a man a real soldier. Precisely there, in tactical drills and exercises, in field firing and in driving vehicles, a complicated situation is created which is as close as possible to actual combat. Help to comrades can vary. For example, the tankman, Sgt A. K. Pavlov, showed self-sacrifice in the course of field exercises. During an attack, the ice broke under the tank of his comrade. Later it was discovered that the route of the vehicle was across an ice-covered and snow-packed swamp. A cable had to be put on the towing hook to pull the tank back onto solid ground. It was impossible to do this without going into the icy water. Then the sergeant, without reflecting, got undressed in the 30-degree frost, dove into the water and was able to quickly attach the line.

It is said that a great feat and true mastery always go hand in hand. The feat of Sgt A. K. Pavlov affirm this. In the unit he is rightly considered the best specialist and an active propagandist of progressive experience.

A sacred sense of military comradeship and high combat skill helped the paratrooper, Guards Pvt Vladimir Pivovarov, escape from a difficult situation. In making a jump, Guards Pfc Yu. Altypov fell into the rigging lines of his parachute. At that moment Pivovarov was making a jump with a load, and this complicated the situation as it would be dangerous to land double. The paratrooper quickly realized that several of his rigging lines had to be cut, and this would help Altypov. This was difficult, but the life of his comrade would be out of danger. The decision was correct. Both paratroopers landed safely. The officer candidates of the Ryazan' Higher Paratroopers School P. Komissarov and Yu. Vladykin were in a similar situation. And again the high skills and troop comradeship helped them find a successful way out of a critical situation.

The party and Komsomol organizations play an important role in maintaining and adding to the glorious traditions, including such as troop comradeship. They help the commanders and political workers unite the troop collectives and establish a spirit of comradeship and mutual aid, high principles and exactingness for one another in the relations between the men.

The forms of this work are extremely diverse. They can include lectures, reports, talks, special-subject evening meetings, meetings with frontline veterans, debates, and so forth. In organizing them, the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations arm the personnel with a profound understanding of Lenin's standards of relationships in a socialist society, the moral principles and rules of military ethics, and make each soldier aware of the requirement of the current Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces that "a serviceman must... value military comradeship, help comrades in word and in deed, restrain them from unworthy actions, and, without fearing for one's own life, to help them out of danger...."[15]

The socialist competition plays an active role in the shaping of military comradeship. With good organization, in the military collective it creates an atmosphere which inspires the personnel to profoundly study military affairs, to accept the help of comrades and provide it to others.

The competition directly expresses both the link of generations and the loyalty of the men to the traditions of military fraternity and solidarity. For example, in the troops of our district, the movement "Heroes in Our Formation!" has spread

widely. The units have established pennants named after the Heroes of the Soviet Union who have been entered in perpetuity in the personnel rolls. Thus, the Order of Lenin and Red Banner Kantemirov Guards Tank Division has established a pennant named after the crew of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Jr Lt Vasiliy Antonovich Yermolayev. It is presented to the closest-knit crews which have achieved the best successes in the competition. And at present even broader opportunities are opening up for developing a spirit of competitiveness and mutual aid. The results of the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Decree of the Party Central Committee "On the Socialist Competition to Properly Celebrate the 26th CPSU Congress" encourage the men to show high activeness in military service.

Thus, there are many forms and opportunities for indoctrinating the men in a spirit of friendship and military fraternity. An extensive program of this work has been outlined. Its basic areas were set out at the conference for the command and political leadership of the Army and Navy held on 3 June 1980. Proceeding from the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," the conference particularly emphasized the necessity "...of paying significant attention to indoctrinating a feeling of collectivism and mutual assistance in combat, as occurred during the period of the Great Patriotic War, that is, 'you may perish yourself but aid a comrade'."[16]

The implementation of these recommendations will even more effectively help to develop the competition to properly celebrate the 26th CPSU Congress and to further improve the combat readiness of the troops.

FOOTNOTES

[1]"Materialy XXV Z"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 87.

[2]A. V. Suvorov, "Nauka Pobezhdat'" [The Science of Winning], Voyenizdat, 1950, p 36.

[3]V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 2, p 12.

[4]K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol 16, p 195.

[5]V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 41, p 108.

[6]See "Ustav Vnutrenney Sluzhby RKKA" [Internal Service Regulations of the RKKA], Voyennaya tipografiya, 1918, p 8.

[7]"Boyevyye Podvigi Chastey Krasnoy Armii (1918-1922 gg.)" [Military Feats of the Red Army Units (1918-1922)], collection of documents, Voyenizdat, 1957, p 181.

[8]"Ustav Vnutrenney Sluzhby RKKA 1937 g." [Internal Service Regulations of the RKKA of 1937], Moscow, Gosvoyenizdat, 1939, p 11.

[9]Ibid., p 20.

[10]M. I. Kalinin, "O Kommunisticheskom Vospitanii" [On Communist Indoctrination], Moscow, Molodaya Gvardiya, 1947, p 246.

[11]TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 1696, inv. 81372, file 6, sheet 68; file 21, sheet 12.

[12]V. Moskovskiy, "Sovetskoye Voyskovoye Tovarishchestvo" [Soviet Military Comradeship], Voyenizdat, 1953, p 7.

[13]L. I. Brezhnev, "Aktual'nyye Voprosy Ideologicheskoy Raboty KPSS" [Urgent Questions of CPSU Ideological Work], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 556.

[14]D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye Rechi i Stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 316.

[15]"Ustav Vnutrenney Sluzhby Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" [Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces], Voyenizdat, 1973, pp 7-8.

[16]KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 June 1980.

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NATO: SOVIET COMMENTS ON NEW MATERIEL, ITS COMBAT INFLUENCE

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[Article published under the heading "In Foreign Armies" by Col A. Kol'tsov: "New Means of Warfare in the Armies of the NATO Countries and Their Influence on the Development on the Art of War* (Based on the Experience of Military Exercises and Local Wars)"; passages in italics printed in boldface]

[Text] The military-political leadership of the NATO countries, in preparing for a war against the states of the socialist commonwealth, along with improving nuclear missile weapons, has given great attention to the development of conventional weapons, to raising the combat capabilities of the troops, to improving the organizational structure and working out more effective methods for their combat employment. In carrying out these measures, extensive consideration has been given to the experience of the local wars and exercises conducted in different regions of the world, as well as the present level of scientific and technical progress.

Let us examine the basic directions in the development of weapons and military equipment of the NATO ground forces during the postwar period and their influence on military art. The introduction of *nuclear missile weapons*, as the foreign press has commented, has brought about a true revolution in the theory and practice of military art. The use of these weapons makes it possible, it is stressed, to instantaneously knock out large groupings, to alter the balance of forces, and to create favorable conditions for completing the defeat of the enemy. All this has an enormous impact on the nature and methods of troop operations. Thus, in comparison with World War II, the zones of operations of the ground units, formations and field forces have increased by several-fold both in offensive as well as defensive operations. The scattering of the troops on the battlefield and the theater of war as a whole has assumed important significance, and the questions of troop command and their material and technical supply have become more complicated.

In the assessment of foreign military specialists, the development of nuclear missile weapons of the NATO ground forces has been carried out in the direction of increasing the accuracy and range of fire, reducing the number of nuclear warheads in maintaining of even strengthening their power, creating multiple warheads, including

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*From the materials of the foreign military press.

of the canister type, increasing the mobility and survivability of the missile complexes, simplifying the work of readying the missiles, controlling them in flight and raising the probability of crossing the antimissile defenses. All of this, in their opinion, will remain in the future.

The experience of the NATO exercises and maneuvers has shown that in recent years, the army group and field army have made individual and massed nuclear strikes to a depth of up to 600 km using the Pershing missiles and carrier aircraft. The army corps on the offensive has received 50 and more nuclear warheads. Nuclear ammunition has also been allocated to the divisions advancing in the sector of the main thrust. Nuclear weapons most often have been used in periods when the headway of the advancing troops has been halted by stubborn resistance of the defending enemy.

In the postwar period, *armored equipment* has developed rapidly. Development has occurred along the lines of increasing the fire power, the rate of fire and the accuracy by improving the weapon stabilization systems, by using smooth-barrel cannon-launchers (making it possible to fire both conventional shells as well as antitank guided missiles [ATGM]) and the extensive introduction of laser combined rangefinders and sights, ballistic computers, infrared and other observation instruments and sights; by increasing the power of the propulsion units; by improving land- and water-crossing capacity; by improving combat survivability.

The massed equipping of the ground forces with modern equipment, self-propelled artillery, combat and transport helicopters, self-propelled ATGM and SAM units, in the opinion of Western specialists, has given new qualities to the armored (tank) and motorized-infantry (mechanized) formations. The continuous growth of their proportional amount in the troops has sharply altered the methods of combat operations. In comparison with World War II, maneuvering capabilities have increased by 3-4-fold strike power has increased by scores of times, and the protection of the personnel has been improved. The extensive introduction of night-vision equipment has made it possible to conduct nighttime combat with virtually the same intensity as during the day. However, as the experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war showed, the protection of personnel and weapons by armor still lags behind fire power, and this led to mass losses of armored equipment. In the course of the battles over the 18 days, both sides lost up to 50 percent of the tanks and other armored equipment involved in them. According to the conclusion of the NATO military specialists, regardless of such high losses, the quantity of tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles will rise, and they, as before, will remain the main strike force of the ground forces both in a war using conventional weapons as well as in a nuclear one.

According to the experience of the exercises and maneuvers of the joint NATO armed forces, the armored formations in playing through the conduct of offensive operations under the conditions of a nuclear war were used, as a rule, in the first echelon, and under the conditions of employing conventional weapons, in the second, for exploiting the success. In working out the questions of conducting defensive operations, the armored troops were usually in the second echelons for making strong counterattacks and counterthrusts, and on the defensive along a broad front, the possibility was not excluded of using them in the first echelon, on tank approaches.

The local wars disclosed the high vulnerability of tanks operating without dependable fire support and antiaircraft cover. For this reason, the necessity arose of

closer coordination in combat of the efforts of the tanks, infantry combat vehicles [ICV], artillery, organic air defense weapons and aviation. And this, in turn, has led to changes in the battle formation of the troops, and to the introduction of more effective methods of control and cooperation.

According to the data of the foreign press, in recent years, great changes have occurred in the NATO armies *in the development of artillery*. There has been a substantial increase in the range, rate, power and accuracy of firing, as well as in the mobility and protection of artillery systems. Thus, the effectiveness of the artillery fire effect in the American Army has increased by more than 3-fold, range has risen from 10-12 up to 30-35 km. While previously it took minutes to solve fire problems, now just seconds are required.[1] In recent years, artillery has been developed in the directions of further increasing the range and precision of fire, increasing the rate of fire and maneuverability; improving and developing new salvo firing rocket systems; introducing automated control and reconnaissance data processing systems; converting the artillery to self-propelled armored mounts; developing more powerful active jet-assisted as well as guided ammunition; the development of air-transportable artillery systems.

The materials of the foreign press have pointed out that the improvement of the old artillery systems and ammunition for them as well as the development of new ones have significantly increased the effectiveness of the fire of the ground forces and have shortened the time for carrying out combat missions. For these purposes, for example, the United States has developed artillery shells with a laser guidance system making it possible to hit targets from concealed positions on the first round, and new fuel air explosive ammunition has been developed in which hydrocarbon has been used as the explosive, and this possesses several-fold greater destructive force than the conventional ones.[2]

As has been pointed out by the foreign press, in recent years jet-assisted salvo-firing systems have undergone significant development in the NATO armies, and the effectiveness of these systems has been more than doubled in comparison with World War II due to the greater range and accuracy of firing, to the use of canister warheads and to the increase in the number of fins. The modern salvo-firing systems are capable of creating a high firing density, as well as carrying out remote mining of the terrain with antitank and antipersonnel mines.

The introduction of the new jet-assisted artillery systems and ammunition has made a substantial change in military art. The possibility has arisen of making fire strikes to a great depth, at a higher rate and with a greater strike accuracy, and this has helped to increase the spatial scope of combat operations.

In the foreign armies there have also been substantial changes in recent years *in the area of the use of antitank weapons*. These include first of all the antitank guided missiles (ATGM) which were developed in the middle of the 1950's and were significantly improved in recent years. The accuracy of them is almost 3-fold higher, while the range is double the antitank guns.

The NATO armies have received the second-generation ATGM. These include the American "TOW" and "Dragon," the French-West German "Milan" and "Haut." They can destroy armored targets at a distance of up to 4 km. They are carried on armored personnel carriers [APC], ICV and gunships. In the organizational structure of the NATO

ground forces there presently are special subunits and units armed with ATGM. In addition to them, each infantry (motorized infantry) battalion in the American Army is armed with 18 "TOW" ATGM and 30 "Dragon" ATGM.

The experience of employing the second-generation ATGM by the Americans in Vietnam and by the Israelis in the war against the Arabs, according to the assessment of foreign specialists, has shown their high effectiveness. For combating tanks, the Israeli troops used helicopters armed with the "Haut" ATGM and unguided missiles, as well as aircraft armed with the "Maverick" guided missiles and the "Rocquaille" canister bombs.

NATO specialists, on the basis of the battles in Vietnam and particularly in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, have reached the conclusion that it is essential to increase the production of modern tanks and develop more effective ATGM for the armed forces of the NATO bloc, for "if the NATO tank troops suffer the same losses as the Israelis suffered, they would be out of commission in 48 hours."[3] In the course of the battles it was also noted that in blinding the ATGM positions with smoke, the losses in attacking tanks declined by 3-4-fold.

Among the other antitank weapons found in the NATO armies, one must note the antitank grenade launchers, the mines, the recoilless guns and antitank cannons which have also undergone great changes in their development. There has been an increase in the accuracy of firing, in the warhead power, and in the reliability and effectiveness of hitting armored targets.

Recently airborne weapons to be used against armored targets have been intensely developed in the NATO countries. Thus, during the period of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 58 guided "Maverick" missiles fired from phantom aircraft destroyed 52 tanks.[4] Considering this, the United States immediately began to develop a whole series of aviation antitank bombs, shells and mines with autonomous guidance systems, and these are to be parachute-dropped in containers from aircraft which are beyond the reach of enemy air defenses. Then, from commands given by the spotter aircraft, they are to be fired for hitting enemy tanks.

The high degree of saturating the troops with modern antitank weapons has made substantial changes in combat operations. They make it possible on a broader scale to effectively counter armored targets both on the defensive and on the offensive. Here foreign specialists have put great hopes on the helicopter gunships equipped with ATGM, as they possess a number of advantages over tanks and ICV in detecting and neutralizing armored targets. The modern defenses of the NATO armies have a clearly expressed antitank nature both on the tactical and operational level. To a great degree the defenses are saturated with antitank weapons (up to 30 and more units per km of front). The use of gunships on the defense gives it a highly maneuverable and active nature.

In recent years, in the armies of the basic capitalist states, there has been great *development of the organic air defense weapons*, and above all the antiaircraft missile complexes (SAM [surface-to-air missile]). Their mission includes the covering of the ground forces and rear installations against air attack. In practical terms there has been the technical reequipping of air defense with automated barrel and missile complexes, powerful radar detection equipment and automated control systems. At the same time, as was shown by the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the effectiveness

of an air defense system can be significantly reduced or even neutralized completely as a result of using electronic countermeasures by the opposite side. For this reason, in a number of NATO armies, great attention has been given to developing effective electronic countermeasures systems. According to information in the foreign press, these armies are armed with second-generation SAM which are capable of hitting airborne targets at a distance from 15 to 30-50 km with a single-missile kill probability of at least 0.5-0.7. The SAM are being further improved by increasing the accuracy, resistance to jamming and reliability, and by reducing the weight of the missiles by using fuel with high energy characteristics, by raising the data processing rate and developing a laser rangefinder; by raising the range and raising the accuracy of determining the coordinates of the SAM radar equipment.

It has also been announced that in the aim of increasing mobility, maneuverability and survivability, the organic air defense weapons have been converted to a mobile armored base. For example, the Chaparral SAM (United States), the Roland-2 (FRG and France) have already been converted, as well as the complexes of conventional antiaircraft artillery such as the "Vulcan" (United States) and "Gepard" (FRG). The best results during testing were shown by the all-weather mobile "Roland-2" complex mounted on the chassis of the AMX-30 tank or the "Marder" IVC. This autonomous SAM is capable of detecting and tracking targets at ranges of 15-18 km and firing at them while in motion.[5]

On the basis of the experience of the Vietnamese and Arab-Israeli wars, the NATO command has drawn definite conclusions which have been considered in the organizing of air defense in the Central European theater of war. In its opinion, for covering the troops it is essential to have four antiaircraft missile weapons systems, including: of the "Redeye" type for countering airborne targets operating at maximum low altitudes directly over the battlefield; of the "Rapir," "Crotal," or "Roland" type for repelling aircraft attacks at low altitudes; of the "Nike" or "Hawk" type for repelling airborne targets at medium altitudes and of the SAM-D type for high altitudes. Here the specialists feel that air supremacy can be won by the massed use of SAM the launching positions of which should be dependably protected against low-flying aircraft armed with air-to-ground missiles.

The effective use of the SAM and the small-caliber antiaircraft artillery in local wars has had a great effect on the tactics of air operations. This has forced aircraft to increase the altitude from 1,000 to 3,000 m or reduce it to several-score meters.

In the postwar period, the NATO countries have devoted much attention to the further *development of tactical aviation* as one of the basic means for delivering weapons of mass destruction to the targets in a nuclear war and as a main strike force in conventional wars. The commissioning for tactical aviation of the new generation of fighters and ground attack planes which possess increased fire power and range as well as accuracy in hitting targets using guided missiles and bombs has had, as has been announced in the foreign press, a substantial influence on the military art of ground forces. As before, the basic missions carried out by tactical aviation are considered to be the winning of air supremacy, direct support of the troops, the isolating of the area of combat operations and the conducting of aerial reconnaissance. However, the methods of carrying out these missions, due to the increased technical capabilities of the aviation and guidance equipment, have substantially altered. The equipping of the aircraft with in-flight computers, long-range target

detection and tracking gear, as well as various guided missiles has made it possible to make mass strikes against the enemy, to destroy armored equipment, disrupt command, destroy bridges and crossings, and dependably hit other important objectives.

As the experience of local wars and exercises has shown, under the conditions of the fluid operations of the ground forces, the necessity has arisen of the more rapid detection and accurate setting of target coordinates, and the directing of aviation to the targets using forward spotters and special aircraft. In the course of local wars and the NATO troop exercises, the so-called direct interaction method has gradually been introduced, where the attacking aircraft receive the mission through the spotter directly from the combined-arms commander.

The high losses of American aircraft in Vietnam forced the NATO military command to show special concern in selecting the methods of the combat employment of new aircraft. Now the emphasis is on carrying out the attacks beyond the limits of the kill zone of the air defense weapons of an installation using guided missiles or bombs. To avoid hitting friendly advancing troops, it is recommended that the strikes be made predominantly against reserves and second echelons, and on the defensive against the units and subunits of the second and third echelons prior to committing them to battle.

The experience of local wars and exercises has shown the *increased role of army aviation* in the combat operations of the ground forces. Regardless of the enormous losses of American helicopters (around 5,000 aircraft) during the war in Southeast Asia, the NATO military command continues to consider them one of the effective means to carry out missions related to combating tanks, strengthening the fire support for ground forces, in transporting and landing them, in conducting reconnaissance, control and communications, supply, and so forth.

Since tanks are to remain the basic strike force on an offensive, the destruction of them is considered to be the major task. From the experience of the last Arab-Israeli war, for example, it is known that a helicopter is capable of destroying two-three tanks in one sortie. For this reason, in the NATO armies primary attention is paid to equipping the ground forces with antitank helicopters, and creating special helicopter antitank units and subunits which are to be included in the TOE structure of the combined-arms formations.

The basic advantage of antitank helicopters is their possibility of attacking the tanks with ATGM from a distance of up to 3,000 m from a hovering ambush, and rapidly escaping to a safe zone or to the alternative holding position. The most effective are considered to be the operations of the assault antitank helicopters in cooperation with light reconnaissance helicopters. Within such a group, in the opinion of foreign specialists, it is best to have up to four reconnaissance helicopters and seven assault antitank helicopters.

Particularly effective have been the conventional helicopter strikes against the enemy on the march, in moving up to the deployment line, and during the period of reforming into approach march and battle formations. Maximum success has been achieved by the integrated use of all fire weapons, by firing ATGM against individual armored targets, and by massed firing of unguided missiles at group targets. Helicopters can also be used for mining terrain, particularly on the flanks and tank approaches.

Gunships have served also as the basis for creating aeromobile troops in the U.S. and NATO armed forces. The American Field Manual FM 100-5 has pointed out that infantry subunits, in using helicopters, are capable of moving on the battlefield 20 times faster than dismounted, and 8 times faster than on APC and ICV.

Aeromobile operations, from the experience of local wars and exercises, have been carried out, as a rule, on the battalion or brigade scale, and more rarely by a division for the purpose of capturing major objectives in the enemy rear on the offensive, localizing an enemy breakthrough on the defensive, securing the flanks, capturing bridgeheads in the crossing of water obstacles, and relieving an encircled grouping of friendly troops.

There has also been further development in small arms, engineering equipment, military transport, communications and control devices. On a mass basis the troops are being equipped with electronic computers, new detection, guidance, target designation and night vision instruments, sights and other equipment helping to increase the effective use of the weapons and military equipment. All of this, undoubtedly, will tell on the nature and methods of conducting combat operations.

Bourgeois military theoreticians, in predicting the possible nature of a future war, feel that it will be highly fluid and dynamic. Combat operations will be conducted continuously, during the day and at night, at a high pace, to a great depth, by joint efforts and with close cooperation of all the services of the armed forces and branches of troops.

In conclusion it must be pointed out that the development of weapons and military equipment in the ground forces of the NATO countries has been carried out in the aim of using them for aggressive purposes, as is convincingly shown by the local wars started by the United States and other NATO countries.

"The intrigues of imperialism and the other enemies of peace require constant vigilance and the greatest possible strengthening of the defense capability of our state in order to thwart the plans of imperialism of achieving military superiority and dictating to the world," is how it is put in the Decree of the Plenum (of June 1980) of the CPSU Central Committee "On the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union."[6] The demands of the party under the conditions of the existing international situation oblige the Soviet military to constantly increase the combat readiness of the Army and Navy.

In speaking at a ceremony in Alma Ata devoted to the 60th anniversary of Kazakhstan and the Kazakh Communist Party on 29 August 1980, L. I. Brezhnev said: "Recently the U.S. government proclaimed a so-called 'new nuclear strategy.' Its main essence in fact comes down to making the very idea of nuclear war more acceptable for public opinion. This also is the purpose of arguments about a supposed 'limited' or 'partial' use of nuclear weapons and which have nothing in common with reality and merely confuse people. An extremely dangerous policy for the peoples of the entire world! It is even difficult to imagine that it derives from the government of a nation which signed an agreement with the Soviet Union to prevent nuclear war. It is no accident that this step by Washington has been greeted with angry condemnation by broad sociopolitical circles in the world."[7]

FOOTNOTES

[1]"Field Manual FM 100-5," 1976.

[2]INTERNATIONALE WEHRREVUE, No 6, 1976, pp 992-996.

[3]WEHRKUNDE, No 5, 1977.

[4]AIR FORCE, December 1978, p 52.

[5]ARMY, No 3, 1974, pp 25-29.

[6]PRAVDA, 24 June 1980.

[7]Ibid., 30 August 1980.

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ART OF WARFARE: SUVOROV'S CONTRIBUTIONS DISCUSSED

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[Article published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information" by RSFSR Honored Scientist, Prof and Doctor of Historical Sciences, Maj Gen Tank Trps I. Krupchenko: "A. V. Suvorov and Military Art"]

[Text] The great Russian military leader, Generalissimo Aleksandr Vasil'yevich Suvorov rightly holds a prominent place in the military history of all times and peoples. The life and activities of this remarkable man are bathed in the bright light of unprecedented military feats committed by him for the glory of his beloved fatherland. A. V. Suvorov did not know a single defeat and in virtually all battles was victorious with a smaller number of troops. His views on war and the methods of waging it were a whole age ahead of time. Individual ideas from Suvorov's "Nauka Pobezhdat'" [The Science of Winning] in 1918 were incorporated in the first Red Army booklet published under the instructions of V. I. Lenin.

In studying the life and activities of A. V. Suvorov, his art of generalship, his military theoretical views and particularly his methods of training and indoctrinating the troops, one cannot help but note his ardent love of Russia. "Nature has made only one Russia," Suvorov often said, repeating the words of Peter the Great. "It has no rival."[1] Aleksandr Vasil'yevich Suvorov was proud of the fact that he was Russian.

However, the great military leader was not a national chauvinist. He was proud of the name of a Russian because he was a son of his homeland, and believed in its might and invincibility. "All Europe is advancing against Russia in vain," said A. V. Suvorov. "There it will find its Thermopylae, its Leonidas and its grave."[2]

In speaking of the patriotism of Suvorov, we are not attempting to idealize his political and social views. He was a convinced and aware defender of the autocratic-serfdom system. For this reason his military talents were repeatedly used by Catherine the Great in the interests of an antipopular domestic and foreign policy of the autocracy (the suppression of the Pugachev revolt and the Polish rebellion). But in the designated instances, A. V. Suvorov, from the evidence of contemporaries, was decisively against cruel measures. He considered the best means for reconciling the parties both in the course of combat operations and after their completion to be humane treatment of prisoners as well as a "charitable and considerate attitude toward the population."

Love for his people and Russia, its history and culture, a profound interest in the customs and mores of simple people determined A. V. Suvorov's attitude toward the training and indoctrination of the troops. In continuing the finest traditions of Peter the Great and Rumyantsev, he was decisively against the blind imitating of the Western European and particularly the Prussian system of training the army. "The Russians have always beaten the Prussians, and so what is there to borrow?"[3] said the general with indignation to the supporters of the Prussian system. Here he emphasized that the Russian army was not a mercenary one and was uniform in terms of its national composition, and for this reason should be organized, trained and indoctrinated considering the national features of the Russian people as well as the moral and physical strength of its men.

On a number of questions Suvorov went significantly farther in comparison with Peter the Great and Rumyantsev. As is known, in the course of the Russo-Turkish wars (1768-1774 and 1787-1791), he decisively abandoned the line battle formation and line tactics and converted to carre tactics, but during the Italian and Swiss campaigns, to column and extended order tactics. However, the changeover to the new method of conducting combat was impossible without a fundamental reorganization in the entire system of training and indoctrinating the personnel. In operations in columns and an extended order, it was essential to teach the troops not only aimed firing and the art of the bayonet thrust, but also the conducting of extensive maneuvers on the battlefield. This would have been inconceivable without bold, resourceful and enterprising soldiers and officers. The new tactics demanded that each soldier understand his maneuver. Consequently, the successful actions of the troops on the battlefield were possible only under the condition that the entire personnel understood the aims and goals of the maneuver and showed resourcefulness and initiativeness, endurance, courage and bravery. The entire Suvorov system of troop training and indoctrination was aimed at elaborating these qualities. Its basic requirements were: "Each man should understand his maneuver," "Teach the troops what is needed in war," "Difficult in training, easy in combat," and "The enemy must be conquered not by numbers but by ability." Among the most important precepts of Suvorov were the following: "Training is light, a lack of training is darkness. The work of a master is feared.... It takes three untrained to equal a trained man...."[4]

An outstanding military leader, a major military theoretician and pedagogue, Suvorov knew his soldiers excellently, and from the memoirs of contemporaries, possessed a magical influence over them. Thus, the famous hero of the Patriotic War of 1812 Denis Davydov in his "Military Notes" rightly commented that Suvorov "put his hand on the heart of the Russian soldier and studied its beat." For this reason in all the engagements, the Suvorov soldier was terrifying for the enemy and fully justified the title given him by the commander of "miracle knights." In response to the paternal concern of the leader, the men were completely loyal to him and showed miracles of heroism.

Suvorov was greatly and fruitfully concerned with organizing troop combat training, including the compiling of the programs and procedures for training and indoctrinating the personnel. While a regimental commander, in 1965, he wrote for the officers of the unit a special regulation known under the title of "Regimental Directive." This document spelled out in detail how the subunits of the regiment should be taught and what they should be taught "for conquering the enemy."

In the training and indoctrination of the troops, and particularly of officers, A. V. Suvorov assigned the place of honor to military history. His famous statement of "without the lamp of history tactics is in the dark"[5] has long become an instructive aphorism. And today it could be proposed as the epigraph for any work on military theory. Suvorov considered a study of military history to be one of the most effective methods for broadening the military viewpoint of the officers. Contemporaries noticed how the young Suvorov studied very assiduously the books on the campaigns and engagements of great military leaders.

The military views of Aleksandr Vasil'yevich were a generalization and critical reworking of the combat experience of the Russian army, and corresponded to its state and inner development. His creative thoughts and practical actions were aimed primarily at improving the battle formations of the troops, combining fire with the bayonet thrust, developing the cooperation in battle between the chausseurs and the grenadiers and teaching the infantrymen and artillery troops accurate firing.

The military leadership art of A. V. Suvorov was most fully apparent in the course of the Russo-Turkish wars in the second half of the 18th century as well as in the Italian and Swiss campaigns of 1799. In the engagements against the Turkish troops, Suvorov abandoned the cumbersome and unturnable division squares, and began to more widely use regimental and battalion ones which in terms of their mobility and striking force were close to a column. One of the most vivid examples of the success of the new tactics was the engagement on the Rymnik River on 22 September 1789, where a detachment of 25,000 Russo-Austrian troops under the command of A. V. Suvorov defeated the Turkish army 100,000-strong. The actions of the great leader in it enriched military art with new examples of the use of surprise, the precise organization of cooperation among the branches of troops, and above all the infantry and cavalry, and the skillful combining of fire and movement. In this engagement Suvorov's infantry units were formed up in two lines of battalion squares behind which were placed the cavalry positioned in the same formation. In storming the Turkish fortifications, the cavalry occupied the spaces between the infantry squares. The particular advantage of such a formation was that the necessary depth of the battle formations was achieved and the possibility was provided of widely maneuvering the men and equipment in the course of the engagment. And the availability of reserve squares made it possible to increase the force of the thrust. The use of new forms of battle formations for the troops was a characteristic trait in the tactical art of the leader. His tactics was permeated by a spirit of a bold and decisive offensive. Although Suvorov, under certain circumstances, did not deny going over to the defensive and even a temporary retreat.

Suvorov's tactics were based upon three famous principles: a good eye (careful reconnaissance and a quick assessment of the situation), speed and attack (he was convinced that these were the soul of true warfare). The military leader considered surprise to be the guarantee for success in combat. "See and conquer...," said Suvorov. "The enemy thinks you are 100 or 200 versts away, but you have doubled your pace, and have come up quickly and by surprise. The enemy is singing, dawdling, and waiting for you on a clear field, but from behind the steep mountains, out of the forests, you fall on the dreamers, like snow on the head, cutting, forcing, pushing, beating, driving, not allowing them to catch their breath; the person who is frightened is half conquered; fear makes the eye see larger, and one seems like ten."[6] A. V. Suvorov had unusually high regard for the time factor. "One minute," he said, "determines the outcome of a battle, one hour the outcome of a campaign, and one day the fate of an empire.... I act not in hours but in minutes."[7]

Suvorov's greatness, his leadership talent was apparent in strategy to no less degree than in his tactics. He had the profoundest understanding of the link between strategy and politics. He endeavored to subordinate the conduct of the war to a strictly thought out and all-encompassing system of theoretical rules. In this regard particular attention should be paid to the plan for preparing the armed forces in the south of Russia in the event of an attack by Turkey as worked out by Suvorov in the autumn of 1793.

The designated document appeared as a result of a careful analysis of the military-political and strategic situation, as well as considering the political aims and balance of forces. In it A. V. Suvorov clearly formulated the strategic goals of the entire war and its individual campaigns, he determined the needs for resources, and designated the place and the time for concentrating them. In Europe, as is known, at that time there predominated the principles of a cordon strategy which required first of all the capturing of enemy territory and its fortresses. Contrary to these demands, Suvorov set as the main goal for the combat operations of the Russian Army, the destruction of enemy manpower. "Such a method of actions," he felt, "should always be observed by our troops, and as much as possible, they should follow the rule of routing the enemy in the field before undertaking a seige."[8]

The Russian Army under the command of Suvorov showed brilliant examples of a strategy of decisive actions and the strike tactics of columns and extended lines during the Italian and Swiss campaigns. Suvorov gave his basic principles in his military leadership art in his plan for the Italian Campaign: "1. Nothing but the offensive. 2. Speed in the campaigns, decisiveness. 3. Excessive methods are not required, a good eye is. 4. Full power to the commander. 5. Attack and beat the enemy in the field. 6. Do not waste time on seiges...take the fortresses mainly by storm or by outright force. Here losses are fewer. 7. Never split forces for guarding different points. The enemy will skirt them and all to the better as it will move up to be crushed.... Never burden oneself with a useless maneuver."[9]

During the entire campaign Suvorov adhered to this plan. While the French military leaders often split up their forces, Suvorov concentrated them in the crucial sectors. This was the case in the engagement on the Adda River (in the main sector, 65 percent of the forces). He acted the same way on the Trebbia River, where he had to give battle to numerically superior forces, and in a situation of an incomplete concentration of troops.

The new strategic and tactical strategems of A. V. Suvorov were one of the reasons for the rapid and decisive victories of the allied troops over the French.

The last and probably the most brilliant feat of Suvorov and his miracle knights was the Swiss Campaign of 1799. In it the Russian Army showed unprecedented examples of bravery and tenacity in the struggle for victory, while its leader demonstrated strategic and tactical mastery, as well as unbending will and courage. This campaign of the Russian Army was a classic example of conducting military operations under the conditions of a mountainous theater of war. It became the wreath of the military glory of the leader and an apotheosis of the victories of Russian arms. Engles termed the Swiss Campaign "the most outstanding of all the alpine crossings carriedout up to that time."[10]

The military theoretical work and the practical military leadership of Suvorov were not combined with the then prevailing feudal and serf orders in the army and greatly anticipated the appearance of bourgeois military art related to the birth of mass armies.

An analysis of the generalship activities of A. V. Suvorov shows that long before Napoleon he employed in practice the principle of the massing of forces on the main sector for a decisive defeat of enemy troops. In assessing this aspect of his strategy, F. Engels has written: "...The Russians, by the very nature of their army, were forced to adhere to a military system very close to the modern one.... In decisive engagements and in major battles the Russians never operated other than in large masses. Suvorov understood the necessity of this even in the storming of Ismail and Ochakov."[11]

A. V. Suvorov was a military leader on the world scale. He not only was the first in practice to employ the new tactics and new strategy, but also provided a theoretical basis for them. Suvorov was studied. They learned from Suvorov. Many of the military leaders, including Napoleon, endeavored in practice to employ Suvorov's tactical procedures and strategic principles. Napoleon learned from Suvorov and taught the French generals to borrow Suvorov's strategy and tactics. One of the future Decembrists F. Glinka wrote about this: "At present it is clear and obvious that many rules of Military Art have been borrowed by Napoleon from our great Suvorov. And the French themselves do not dispute this; Napoleon has himself recognized this. In letters from Egypt intercepted by the English, he clearly told the Directory that Suvorov will not be stopped on his way to victory until the particular art of conquering him is attained and he is opposed with his own rules."[12] The glorious Suvorov traditions were preserved by the leading officers of the Russian Army. However the hostile attitude in officer circles to Suvorov and his military views in which the reaction saw a "dangerous free-thinking" impeded the study of the military heritage of the generalissimo. In essence, only Soviet historians have most fully disclosed his historical role, and have created a valid image of the glorious military leader embodying the best traits of the Russian people: love for the motherland, a clear mind and firm character, and an indomitable desire for activity in the sake of the fatherland.

Our people have high regard for the military accomplishments and feats of A. V. Suvorov, for his great patriotism and military theoretical heritage which today is a treasure of Soviet military art. A particular recognition of his genius as a military leader is the fact that during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet establish the Order of Suvorov of three degrees, one of the highest military decorations for officers, generals and troops units of the Soviet Armed Forces which distinguish themselves in battle. Specially created military schools have been named after the military leader and they are rearing a new generation of future officers.

FOOTNOTES

[1]K. Osipov, "Velikiy Russkiy Polkovodets" [A Great Russian Military Leader], Moscow, Goskul'tprosvetizdat, 1950, p 30.

[2]"Istoriya Voyennogo Iskusstva" [The History of Military Art], Vol 1, Voyenizdat, 1963, p 159.

[3]V. Ye. Yakushkin, "Geniy Russkogo Voyennogo Iskusstva A. V. Suvorov" [A Genius of Russian Military Art, A. V. Suvorov], Moscow, Zadruga, 1915, p 73.

[4]G. S. Nikol'skiy, "Suvorovskaya 'Nauka Pobezhdat'" [Suvorov's 'The Science of Winning'], Voyenizdat, 1949, p 44.

[5]"Istoriya Voyennogo Iskusstva," Vol 1, p 159.

[6]Ibid., pp 144-145.

[7]Ibid., p 145.

[8]A. V. Suvorov, "Dokumenty" [Documents], Vol 3, Voyenizdat, 1952, p 259.

[9]"Voyennaya Istoriya. Uchebnik" [Military History. A Textbook], Voyenizdat, 1971, p 49.

[10]K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 13, p 243.

[11]Ibid., Vol 7, p 504.

[12]"Kratkoye Nachertaniye Voyennogo Zhurnala, Izdannoye Deystvitel'nym Chlenom Obshchestva, Uchrezhdennogo pri Glavnom Gvardeyskom Shtabe, Fedorom Glinkoy" [Brief Outline of the Military Journal Published by the Active Member of the Society Under the Chief Guards Staff, Fedor Glinka], St. Petersburg, 1817, p 10.

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NAVAL FORCES: ACTIVITIES OF WAR VETERANS COUNCIL

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 80 signed to press 23 Sep 80 pp 75-77

[Article published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information" by the Chairman of the War Veterans Council of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Adm (Ret) V. Sychev: "The War Veterans Council of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet (DKBF) at Work"]

[Text] The war veterans council of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet (DKBF) in Moscow has as members war veterans of the Baltic Fleet who live in the capital and Moscow Oblast, and it directs their work. It was formed in February 1966. Prior to 1977 it was headed by the former commander of the Baltic Fleet, Adm V. F. Tributs. In organizational terms the council is part of the Moscow Section of the Soviet War Veterans Committee. According to the charter of this organization, the veterans council of the DKBF is a council of fellow servicemen. Its activities are regulated by the Regulation Governing a War Veterans Council for Fellow Servicemen of a Unit, Formation or Field Force as approved by the Presidium of the Soviet War Veterans Committee of 3 February 1977.

While in 1966, our council had around 100 veterans, at present its membership is up to 3,000 persons. Basically these are retired and reserve officers, generals, admirals, petty officers and sailors. For directing its daily activities, a bureau has been elected consisting of a chairman, deputy chairman, secretary and six members. The report and election veterans meetings are held, as a rule, once every 3 years.

Under the council commissions and working groups have been set up and these are directed by members of the council bureau. They organize the activities in the corresponding areas. For example, the propaganda commission is headed by Capt 1st Rank F. F. Presnakov, the school commission by Col K. N. Kozlov, the historical group by Capt 1st Rank V. A. Poleshchuk, and the group for organizing veteran meetings by Col A. A. Lebedev.

It must be pointed out that in its practical activities the council is always guided by the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, by the decrees of the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, by the Charter for the Organization of Soviet War Veterans and by the Regulation on the Council of Fellow Servicemen. The necessary guidelines and help are received by us from the Navy Political Directorate, as well as from the Presidium of the Moscow Section of the SKVV [Soviet War Veterans

Committee] and the Joint Navy Veterans Council. The council works in close contact with the party and Komsomol organizations, the principals of schools, and organizations. The main thing in its work is military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth in the revolutionary, military and labor traditions of the Soviet people and the Armed Forces. Here its forms are diverse and include: meetings between veterans and school students and the personnel of ships and units of the DKBF; conducting courage lessons in the schools; giving reports and recollections to the workers and youth at enterprises, in parks and cultural-educational institutions of Moscow. Great attention is paid to organizing school museums and military glory rooms, as well as to research work.

Let us take up certain forms of work during the period of the preparations for and celebrating of the 110th birthday of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

In the course of this work, ceremonial parades and assemblies of the circles in the sponsored schools were held in honor of the 110th birthday of the leader. More than 300 veterans participated in them. Here we should point out that by a decision of the Presidium of the Moscow SKVV Section and the city Komsomol committee, certain schools have been assigned to the DKBF war veterans council in the city of Kaliningrad of Moscow Oblast and in Moscow itself. During the days leading up to the holidays, the veterans and the military instructors conducted courage lessons as well as inspections of the museums and rooms of military glory. A courage lesson was conducted well in the eighth grades of the 16th School of Kaliningrad. On the eve of Victory Day, Col K. N. Kozlov, an active participant in the defense of Leningrad, told about the feats of the Soviet soldiers who defended the city of Lenin in the fierce engagements.

An informative courage lesson was given on the last day of school of 24 May in the 11th School of Kaliningrad. It was conducted by the former artilleryman of the Naval Railroad Artillery Brigade, PO 2d Class (Res) I. S. Kalugin, who is now a well-known lathe operator in the Moscow Area and a winner of the Order of Lenin. As a total during the preparations for and holding of the holidays, as well as on the days before the end of the academic year, more than 1,000 courage lessons and meetings between war veterans and school children were held. The effectiveness of these and other measures in the area of military-patriotic indoctrination can be seen from the increase in the number of applicants from the graduates of the sponsored schools for admission to higher naval and military schools. We should point out that from the results of the inspection of the school museums and rooms of military glory, two of our sponsored Kaliningrad schools (No 16 and No 11) were put up for the Moscow city inspection. A ceremony on this occasion with the participation of a large group of students, teachers and veterans was held on 10 May in the city Palace of Pioneers.

An interesting meeting was held with the students of school No 16 on 4 May. The former sailors were acquainted with the exhibit in the military glory museum, after which a parade of Young Armymen was held as well as a joint ceremony of students, teachers and war veterans devoted to the 35th anniversary of the victory. Speaking at the ceremony were veterans, the school principal K. M. Tsybakova, the former school student and officer candidate at a naval school A. Kozlov, and others. They spoke of the price paid to achieve the victory, of the heroism of the Soviet people on the front and the rear, on the peace-loving foreign policy of the CPSU and the

Soviet government, as well as on school affairs. After the ceremony, a literary montage was shown on "Heroes of the Baltic--Heroes of the Great Victory." Participating in the meeting were around 70 veterans and 300 students and teachers. The Kaliningrad city CPSU and Komsomol committees praised it highly. On 8-9 May, ceremonial parades were held in the schools devoted to the 35th anniversary of the victory, as well as a city parade of Young Armymen. Flowers were placed on the graves of soldiers.

Taking an active part in the military patriotic work with the students of the sponsored schools are the war veterans K. N. Kozlov, V. G. Skopintsev, A. N. Tyulin, N. S. Frumkin, V. S. Cherokov, L. I. Shulaykina and many others. At the beginning of April, a group of veterans from the DKBF (8 persons) was invited by the Komsomol Central Committee to the nation-wide meeting of navy veterans in Sevastopol'. They spoke before the Black Sea sailors, the workers of sovkhozes and students in the Crimean schools.

der agreement with the DKBF Political Directorate, during the days of celebrating 35th anniversary of the victory, 16 of our veterans from the naval infantrymen d the naval infantry subunits, the ships and air units of the DKBF. There many stirring meetings also with students from school No 1 in the town of altiysk. Veterans spoke 45 times during this trip, and 12,000 persons were in the audience.

The DKBF war veterans council gives great attention to military history work. For this purpose in 1976 together with the command of the DKBF aviation it conducted a military history conference on the combat activities of the Baltic Fleet aviation during the Great Patriotic War. From the materials of this conference, a collection of articles and memoirs was published entitled "Kryl'ya Baltiki" [The Wings of the Baltic]. At present, the council is planning to prepare and hold a scientific-practical conference on the subject "Medics of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet During the Years of the Great Patriotic War" together with the Navy and DKBF medical services.

One cannot help but welcome the desire of many of our veterans who generalize military operations on the Baltic, and share their memories in print. Widely known are the books of V. F. Tributs "Podvodniki Baltiki Atakuyut" [Submariners of the Baltic Attack], "Baltiytsy Vstupayut v Boy" [The Baltic Sailors Enter Battle], "Baltiytsy Srazhayutsya" [The Baltic Sailors Fight], and "Baltiytsy Nastupayut" [The Baltic Sailors Advance], by V. S. Cherokov "Dlya Tebya, Leningrad" [For You, Leningrad], by V. F. Golubev "Kryl'ya Krepnut v Boyu" [Wings Grow Strong in Combat], and others.

The glorious military traditions are actively propagandized by the Baltic Fleet veterans V. G. Afanas'yev, M. A. Vorontsov, V. F. Golubev, N. N. Golenbakov, V. S. Yelagin, G. G. Kudryavtsev, A. A. Lebedev, P. Ye. Mel'nikov, N. R. Otrokhov, V. N. Perlin, V. A. Poleshchuk, F. F. Presnakov, K. G. Ryanin, M. I. Samokhin, P. A. Skutskiy, N. M. Kharlamov, P. I. Khokhlov and many others.

In moving toward the 26th CPSU Congress, the war veterans are ever more broadly extending their work, achieving more effective forms of propagandizing the skill and heroism of the Soviet military and their wholehearted dedication to the CPSU and our great socialist motherland.

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SOVIET-GERMAN FRIENDSHIP: HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENT

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[Article published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information," by Col V. Mikora: "Banners of Soviet-German Friendship (1918-1929)"]

[Text] In October 1977, the GDR Military Museum opened an exhibit entitled "The Victorious Path of the Red Banner" which had been set up with assistance from the Central Museum of the USSR Armed Forces. It was a selection of banners, flags, pennants and other exhibits telling about the history of the development of friendly relations between the Soviet workers, the men of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] and the revolutionary military organization of the German proletariat, the Union of Red Frontliners (URF). Each exhibit has a rich history full of vivid events from the life of the Soviet and German proletariat.

The exhibit convincingly describes the development of the tradition of exchanging banners of Soviet-German friendship, and this became one of the forms of international contacts of the German URF (during the period of its legal existence from 1924 through 1929) with the collectives of Soviet enterprises, institutions, schools and units of the Red Army.

The birth of the tradition goes back to the lively development of bilateral class relations between the workers of the two countries after the victory of Great October. The inscription on one of the banners states: "The Day of the Victory of the World Proletariat Will Be the Day of the Elimination of State Frontiers!" and was presented in 1918 by a RKKA subunit to the soldier's council of the German 106th Landsturm Regiment. Its fate is interesting. The German workers carefully protected this precious symbol of friendship and fraternity. One of the members of the soldier's council, Friedrich Klippgen, in risking his life, was able to protect it even during the years of fascism. In 1958, he turned over the banner to the Leipzig SEPD organization.[1] The exchange of friendship banners also occurred in peacetime. Two of them were presented in 1923: on 23 January to the Eighth Congress of the German Communist Party in the form of a banner from the Petrograd workers, and on 24 March to the Seventh Congress of the German Communist Youth in the form of a banner from the Soviet Youth.[2]

In response, in July 1923, the German workers presented their own banner to one of the Red Army units. On this occasion, in a letter from the KPD [German Communist Party] Central Committee to the RKKA 10th Rifle Regiment to whom the banner was

presented, it was stated: "Brothers, we hold profound confidence in you and offer an eternal alliance. As a guarantee of this alliance, upon the decision of the congress and on behalf of the fighting German proletariat, we present this red banner to you. It expresses our pride and our hopes: you are our sword and the hope of the entire world.... We are hopeful that this Red Army regiment will always be aware of its honor of belonging to the Red Army which is...the shield and sword of the people who have broken their chains and love freedom more than life."[3]

Subsequently the exchange of banners which became a symbol of the unity and eternal solidarity of the working people in the two countries became a good tradition. Participating in it, on the one hand, were the RKKA formations and units, as well as the organizations and institutions of the Soviet workers and peasants, and, on the other, the workers of German enterprises, and the representatives of the athletic, cultural and military-patriotic organizations of the German working class. Created in 1924, the URF took a particularly active part in continuing the tradition.

The leadership of the KPD gave great importance to this work. The leader of the German proletariat, Ernst Thalman, repeatedly emphasized that the exchange of banners should be "not only the symbol of solidarity with our Russian brothers, but also proof...of our close solidarity and courage in the struggle."[4]

Everything related to the exchange of banners was subordinate to the international indoctrination of the workers in the two countries and to developing fraternal relations and cooperation in their joint struggle against the anti-Soviet actions of the militaristic and fascist unions, as well as the reactionary circles of German monopolistic capital.

Thus, in June 1925, at the First All-German Rally of the URF in Berlin, which was attended by around 20,000 persons, at a meeting which brought together several-score thousand Berliners, the URF was presented the banner of the Moscow workers before which the red frontliners vowed to be loyal to the cause of proletarian internationalism. The profound sympathies of the Soviet people for the URF and their solidarity with the struggle of the German working class and peasantry were expressed at a mass meeting of Muscovites in the presentation of the friendship banner of the Berlin URF Organization to the representatives of the RKKA 4th Rifle Division in the capital of the USSR at ceremonies on the occasion of the 8th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution (1925).[5]

Subsequently, the presentation of banners was timed, as a rule, to the anniversaries of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the German November Revolution, the Day of International Worker Solidarity of 1 May and the RKKA Day.

After the exchange of banners, close friendly ties began to be established between the individual collectives of Soviet and German workers. Characteristic are the relations which developed between the collective of the Krasnyy Proletariy Plant and the URF Organization of Thuringia. The friendship which began in 1924, when on the occasion of the anniversary of the two revolutions a delegation from the Moscow plant presented a banner to the participants of the bezirk URF meeting, grew year by year. The exchange of delegations and banners continued. At a bezirk rally in Jena in February 1928, where around 2,000 URF members assembled in honor of the 10th anniversary of the RKKA, the Red Frontliners of Thuringia were presented a banner of

the Moscow workers from the period of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In the autumn of 1928, a delegation of Thuringian workers visited Moscow upon the invitation of the Krasnyy Proletariy Plant. One of the photographs showing the German guests and a group of activists from the Soviet enterprise even now is carefully kept and exhibited at the plant's museum.[6]

The traditions of Soviet-German friendship born at this enterprise more than a half century ago are not only being maintained but also developed. Here meetings are organized regularly on various levels, and there is the reciprocal exchange of delegations and experience.

In October 1975, a party-state delegation from the GDR visited Moscow headed by the General Secretary of the SEPD Central Committee, E. Honecker, on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid Between the USSR and GDR. The delegates visited the Krasnyy Proletariy Plant. The cordial meeting of the workers with the German guests was vivid proof that the friendship born several decades ago has grown significantly stronger. A meeting was held at the plant. Those speaking at it emphasized that the meeting with the GDR delegation was still another proof of the fraternal friendship between the two states.[6]

Subsequently, the exchanging of banners of Soviet-German friendship assumed a broad scale. In 1924-1929 alone, around 50 such banners were presented. Among them was the banner of the RKKA 10th Rifle Division presented in 1924 to the workers of the city of Hamburg and accepted by Ernst Thalman;[7] the banner of Leningrad workers presented in 1925 to the Bielefeld URF; the banner of the crew of the Soviet steamer "Karl Libknekht" presented in May 1926 to the URF of Kiel; the banner of the bezirk West Saxony presented in August 1926 to the Smolensk Infantry School; the banners of the Presidium of the URF presented in October 1927 to the Trade Union Council of the Northern Caucasus and that of the Berlin URF Organization presented to the editors and worker correspondents of the newspaper MOLOT [Hammer]; the banners presented by the URF of Kiel to the ships of the Baltic Fleet "Sovet" and "Krasnyy Profintern"; the banner of the URF from the city of Ottendorf-Okriel presented in April 1929 to the RKKA 12th Artillery Regiment, and others.[8]

In the holdings of the Belorussian State Museum in Minsk, there is a red banner with the inscription "Established by the URF. Local group from Strehla am Elbe. Germany." For a long time nothing was known about it. However, German and Soviet researchers, with aid from the Pioneers and school children of the USSR and GDR, succeeded in reestablishing the vivid episodes related to it from the history of Soviet-German friendship which started in the 1920's and has lasted up to our days.

In 1926, friendly contacts were established between the 5th Field Engineer Battalion of the Red Army (Bobruysk) and the URF Organization in the town of Strehla am Elbe. Initially letters were exchanged. Then it was decided to exchange friendship banners. At the end of the summer of 1928, a delegation of German workers visited Bobruysk. It is indicative that the making of the banner and the trip related to its presentation were financed by funds from the members of the city URF organization. For an organization with a membership of around 40 persons, the expenses were substantial. But this did not stop the workers. Before dispatching the banner to the USSR, the URF members of Strehla were photographed around it.

In 1928, a ceremony was held in Bobruysk at which banners were exchanged and this developed into a vivid demonstration of friendship and solidarity between the workers of the two countries.

The fate of the banners differed. After the Nazi coup in Germany, the banner presented to the German comrades fell into the hands of the Gestapo. There it obviously was destroyed. After the liberation from Nazism, for a long time they searched for the precious relic, but without success. Then it was decided to make a copy which was made from a description of the surviving witnesses of the events. Now it is kept at the GDR Military Museum. The banner presented by the German workers to the Soviet Red Armymen during the years of the Great Patriotic War traveled a difficult and involved path, but then found its place at the museum.[9]

The banners were viewed as an important symbol of the friendship and fraternity of the workers and their military bodies. As a rule, they were attractively made, and had inscriptions, slogans, symbols of the revolutionary workers movement or portraits of the leaders of the proletariat. In the URF organizations they were kept in a place of honor, and during major demonstrations, parades, meetings and propaganda measures were set up in the presidium or carried at the head of the column of workers.

The red banners of Soviet-German friendship also played an important role in the political life of the Soviet workers and men of the Red Army. The trooping of such banners without fail was included in the ritual of all mass political measures. Many worker and military collectives fought for the right to possess them. For example, in the course of the socialist competition, all the enterprises of the Urals won the right to possess the banner of the Berlin URF.

The exchange of friendship banners and other international ties between the German and Soviet workers and the men of the Soviet Armed Forces continued until the Nazis seized power in Germany.

This noteworthy tradition was resumed after the liberation of Germany from Nazism by the Soviet Army. The exchange of banners, pennants and other symbols of friendship at present is one of the many forms of preserving and continuing international ties in the socialist armed forces. This can be seen from the banners kept in the military museums of the fraternal armies and which were exchanged by the formations and units of the Warsaw Pact armies during joint measures. In many rooms and museums of military glory, as well as in the rooms devoted to the traditions of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the GDR People's Army, banners and pennants of Soviet-German friendship are carefully kept, and these were established by various party, state, military and public organizations of the USSR and the GDR.

Today the traditions of Soviet-German friendship are stronger than ever. A clear demonstration of this was the official friendly visit to the GDR (4-8 October 1979) by the USSR party and governmental delegation headed by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. The talks and meetings held during it and the signed joint documents provided a new impetus to the development of friendship and cooperation between the two peoples and states, between the CPSU and the SEPD. "In the communists of the GDR and in the people of the GDR," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev during the visit, "we have seen and do see reliable coworkers in our common cause, who

are loyal to our common ideals, steadfast and skilled in labor, and strong in any hardships."[10]

Mutual trust, ideological unity and political solidarity between the CPSU and the SEPD, intense economic cooperation, the broadest cultural ties, and vital contacts between millions and millions of workers--all of this now comprises a firm foundation for the fraternal relations between the USSR and the GDR. These principles have become an exorable basis for the activities of both parties, for the peoples of the USSR and the GDR, and for the men of their armed forces.

FOOTNOTES

[1]MILITÄRGESCHICHTE, Berlin, 17 (1978), No 1, pp 92-94.

[2]"Fahnen der Freundschaft," Berlin, 1969, pp 14, 48.

[3]MILITÄRGESCHICHTE, Berlin, 17 (1978), No 1, p 94.

[4]Quoted in: "Ernst Thälman im Bezirk Halle," Halle, 1974, p 31.

[5]KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11, 20 November 1925.

[6]Museum of the Moscow Machine Tool Building Plant "Krasnyy Proletariy" imeni A. I. Yefremov, Doc. No 842; DVIGATEL' (newspaper of the workers and employees of the Krasnyy Proletariy Plant), No 2, November 1978.

[7]The banner was presented by the representatives of the RKKA 10th Rifle Division to E. Thalman at the Fifth World Comintern Congress.

[8]MILITÄRGESCHICHTE, Berlin, 17 (1978), No 1, pp 97-100; MOLOT, organ of the Northern Caucasus Kray Committee and the Don Committee of the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)], the kray trade union committee and the Don Executive Committee, 16, 29 October and 1 November 1927.

[9]MILITÄRGESCHICHTE, Berlin, 17 (1978), No 1, pp 96-103; KRASNOARMEYSKAYA PRAVDA (newspaper of the Belorussian Military District), 5, 7 September 1928.

[10]"Vizit v GDR Sovetskoy Partiyno-Pravitel'stvennoy Delegatsii vo Glave s Tovarishchem L. I. Brezhnevm po Sluchayu 30-Letiya Obrazovaniya GDR. Rechi, Dokumenty i Materialy" [Visit to the GDR of the Soviet Party-Governmental Delegation Headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the Formation of the GDR. Speeches, Documents and Materials], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 42.

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GROUND FORCES: HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SOVIET TANK TROOPS

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[Article published under the heading "Historiography and Source Study," by Maj A. Davidenko: "Historiography of the Soviet Tank Troops"]

[Text] The Soviet Tank Troops have a glorious campaign record. It is closely linked to the history of the Soviet Armed Forces which were created upon the initiative and under the leadership of V. I. Lenin during the years of the Civil War for defending the victories of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The young Soviet republic inherited from Tsarist Russia a backward, poorly developed military-industrial base, obsolete and few weapons, including armored forces in the embryonic stage: 7 armored trains and around 300 armored vehicles.[1]

During the interwar years, the problems were successfully solved in the technical reequipping of the armored troops of the Red Army, their organizational development, the training of personnel and the development of the theory of combat employment.

Of particular interest for specialists are the works written during the period of 1919-1921 and analyzing the Soviet and foreign views of the development and use of tanks. These include the articles of G. K. Sorokin-Razhev, S. P. Mikheyev, A. V. Lyubimov, S. P. Tsabel', and others.[3] They analyze the experience of the use of tanks and armored vehicles on the fronts of the Civil War, and the future of the tank troops is forecasted.[4] Precisely at this time there was a revival of military theoretical thought. In 1921, a military scientific society and several special journals were created.[5]

The propagandizing of armor questions assumed great importance in the army. They were very successfully dealt with by K. B. Kalinovskiy,[7] A. I. Lizyukov,[8] and V. N. Kashuba.[9] They urged the men to master the equipment and gain maximum use of its combat capabilities. In the second half of the 1920's, the first military theoretical works appeared on the use of armored forces by K. Kalinovskiy,[10] P. Gladkov,[11] and others. They examined the questions of the combat employment of the armored forces of the Red Army.

At the beginning of the 1930's, the possibility arose of creating large tank formations[12] and the necessity of predicting their combat employment[13] together with the infantry, artillery and aviation,[14] while the idea of an operation in depth was

shaped into an ordered theory. In this a leading role was assigned to the tanks, as one of the "powerful means for a future war."[15] S. M. Ammosov,[16] A. Ye. Gromychenko,[17] V. P. Krzhizhanovskiy,[18] A. A. Ignat'yev,[19] N. A. Ernest,[20] and A. I. Shtromberg [21] were working successfully on solving various questions related to the combat employment of the tank and mechanized troops. They created the bases for the theory of developing a tactical breakthrough into an operational one by committing to battle large mechanized formations, and they established the dependence of the success of an operation in depth upon the actions of the tank troop formations. The results of the organizational development and combat training of the Red Army armored troops were summed up at the 18th VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress. "...All the tank troops," the congress materials pointed out, "are smoothly organized and well trained both in gunnery and tactical terms."[22]

The Great Patriotic War was an important stage in the history of the Soviet Tank Troops. The study and generalization of the experience of combat operations became one of the most important tasks of the command, the political bodies and the staffs of all levels. At that time the basic documents relating to the combat employment of the tank troops were: the order of Headquarters, Supreme High Command of 22 January 1942, the order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense of 16 October 1942, the Regulation on the Combat Employment of the Tank Troops, the Draft of the 1943 Red Army Field Manual, and the 1944 Field Manual of the Armored and Mechanized Troops.

Important work was carried out by the ZHURNAL AVTOBRONETANKOVYKH VOYSK [Journal of the Motor, Armored and Tank Troops], founded in 1942. It contained articles by prominent military leaders such as M. Ye. Katukov,[23] P. S. Tsybalko,[24] and others. For the first time since the start of the war general works appeared which analyzed a number of Red Army operations with the use of armored and mechanized troops.[25]

In the postwar period, the study and generalization of the experience of the Great Patriotic War assumed a broader and more planned nature. The Military History Directorate of the General Staff and the historical sections of the services of the Armed Forces became the center of the research work. The activities of these bodies during the postwar years have been taken up in the articles of Maj Gen A. Grylev.[26] And an assessment of the basic literature on the Great Patriotic War published prior to 1965 can be found in the 6th volume of "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg." [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945].[27]

A great contribution to taking up the events of the past war and showing the importance of our tank troops has been made by the Soviet military leaders who in the postwar years have written their memoirs.[28] In 1954-1977, Voyenizdat has also published a number of collective works[29] taking up the history of the development and combat employment of the Soviet Tank Troops.

The collective of the Academy of the Armored Troops imeni Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy has made a major contribution to elaborating the problems of the history of the armored and mechanized troops of the Soviet Army. On an extensive documentary basis, it has conducted important research on studying and generalizing the experience of the organizational development of the Soviet Tank Troops.[30]

Many articles have been published in the journal TANKIST [Tankman] and on the pages of other printed organs.[31] They have shown the activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet government in strengthening the armed forces during the years of the Great Patriotic War and the postwar period, as well as the measures related to the further organizational development and technical equipping of the Soviet Tank Troops.

In the past decade Soviet military historians have achieved significant results in military-scientific work. Widely popular among the Soviet readers have been the volumes of the fundamental work "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], and "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily. Istoriya Stroitel'stva" [The Soviet Armed Forces. The History of Organizational Development] published by Voyenizdat. Of the numerous problems solved by the authors in these publications, one must mention the creation of the historiography of World War II, including also the historiography of the Soviet Tank Troops.

The diverse combat experience of our Tank Troops during the years of the Great Patriotic War have long been the focus of attention for bourgeois historians and specialists. In assessing this tendentiously, they have endeavored in every possible way to play down the role and significance of the tank troops in the Soviet Army during the war. This bias marks the works of J. Fuller "World War II of 1939-1945," J. Boucher "Armored Weapons in the War," K. Tippelskirch "History of World War II," H. Guderian "Memoirs of a Soldier," F. Mellenthin "Tank Engagements of 1939-1945," and many others. But the irrefutability of the facts sometimes forces them to admit the truth: "At the beginning of the 1930's, the Soviet armored forces were ahead of the entire world in terms of models, the number and tactics of the tanks."[32]

The task of combating bourgeois ideology and all its manifestations necessitates, considering the existing historiography, a constant demonstration in the published works of our superiority on the questions of the development of tank equipment and the theory of the combat employment of the tank troops, and the decisive unmasking of the bourgeois falsifiers of history.

FOOTNOTES

[1]"Istoriya Tankovykh Voysk Sovetskoy Armii" [History of the Soviet Army Tank Troops], Moscow, Izd. VA BTV, 1975, p 33.

[2][Not in text.]

[3]A. Lyubimov, "Tanki, ikh Boyevyye Svoystva i Bor'ba s Nimi" [Tanks, Their Combat Properties and the Combating of Them], Moscow, Gosizdat, 1919; S. Mikheyev, "Tanki i ikh Boyevoye Primeneniye" [Tanks and Their Combat Employment], Moscow, Litizdat, 1920; G. Sorokin-Razhev, "Tanks," REVOLYUTSIYA I VOYNA, 1920, Vol 1; S. Tsabel', "Bor'ba s Tankami" [The Combating of Tanks], Moscow, Litizdat, 1921; "The Tiflis Armored Operation," BRONEVOYE DELO, No 2, 5, 1921.

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[24]P. Rybalko, "From the Experience of Tank Operations in the Orel Bridgehead," ZHURNAL AVTOBRONETANKOVYKH VOYSK, No 10, 1943; "Tank Operations on the Right-Bank Ukraine," ZHURNAL AVTOBRONETANKOVYKH VOYSK, No 2, 3, 1944.

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[26]VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nos 1, 3, 1968.

[27]"Brief Historiography of the Great Patriotic War and World War II," "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg." [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945], Vol 6, Voyenizdat, 1965, pp 401-556.

[28]P. I. Batov, "V Pokhodakh i Boyakh" [In Campaigns and Battles], Voyenizdat, 1962; G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i Razmyshleniya" [Recollections and Reflections], Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1969; D. A. Dragunskiy, "Gody v Brone" [Years in Armor], Voyenizdat, 1973; S. M. Shtemenko, "General'nyy Shtab v Gody Voyny" [The General Staff During the War Years], Voyenizdat, 1973; A. M. Vasilevskiy, "Delo Vsey Zhizni" [A Cause of an Entire Life], Moscow, Politizdat, 1974; M. Ye. Katukov, "Na Ostriye Glavnogo Udara" [At the Peak of the Main Thrust], Voyenizdat, 1974.

[29]P. Kornyushin, N. Korol'kov, "Sovetskiye Tankisty" [Soviet Tank Troops], Voyenizdat, 1954; "Bronetankovyye i Mekhanizirovannyye Voyska Sovetskoy Armii (Kratkiy Ocherk Razvitiya i Boyvogo Puti)" [Armored and Mechanized Troops of the Soviet Army (Brief Sketch of the Development and Campaign Record)], Voyenizdat, 1958; "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne (1941-1945 gg.). Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Ocherk" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). Military History Essay], Voyenizdat, 1958-1959; "Boyevyye Deystviya v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne. Kratkiy Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Ocherk" [Combat Operations in the Great Patriotic War. Brief Military History Essay], Vols 1-2, Voyenizdat, 1958; "Tanki i Tankovyye Voyska" [Tanks and Tank Troops], edited by A. Kh. Babadzhanyan, Voyenizdat, 1970; P. A. Rotmistrov, "Vremya i Tanki" [Time and Tanks], Voyenizdat, 1972; "Sovetskiye

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32ARMY QUARTERLY AND DEFENSE JOURNAL (England), Vol 2, 1966, p 153.

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BOOK REVIEW: PHILOSOPHY AND MILITARY HISTORY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 80 signed to press 12 Sep 80 pp 84-85

[Review by Doctor of Historical Sciences O. Rzheshevskiy of the book "Filosofiya i Voyennaya Istoriya" (Philosophy and Military History), by a group of authors, Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 327 pages]

[Text] The reviewed book is devoted to research on the methodological problem of the relationship between philosophy and military history. An analysis of the relationship between philosophy and military history since ancient times up to the present provides an opportunity to disclose the process of the formation and development of military history as a scientific discipline. The authors clearly trace the principle of party loyalty, in analyzing the problem in light of the struggle of materialism against idealism, and showing the life-affirming scientific force of the dialectical materialistic method of assimilating military history materials.

The fundamental nature and ideological focus of the work are its indisputable merits. First of all it is essential to point out the chapters and sections devoted to disclosing the role of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in the shaping of military history as a science. The book thoroughly investigates the theoretical and methodological principles used by K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin in solving military-philosophical problems, and the process is shown of the analysis made by the founders of Marxism-Leninism of military historical events from the viewpoint of dialectical and historical materialism. These materials theoretically and logically lead the reader to examining one of the basic military-philosophical problems, the problem of the role and place of war in history. The book formulates criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the ways used to solve this problem, and thoroughly takes up the forms and directions of the influence of war on society. It also shows the link of the methodological and theoretical problems with practice which is the basic criterion of truth.

One should also note the analysis of the Marxist-Leninist views on the problem of war and peace. Using many examples from historical practice, the authors disclose the concept of "peace," its forms and types, and oppose the Marxist philosophy of historical optimism to the bourgeois pessimism, emphasizing that the optimism of Marxist-Leninist philosophy "is based not on blind faith, not on carefree flippancy, but rather on the basis of studying the profound patterns and trends of social development...." (p 322).

The work examines in sequence the philosophical problems of military history as an independent scientific discipline. Very important in this regard is the analysis made of the relation of the dialectical concept of development with military history, the essence of the army as a sociohistorical phenomenon, the relationship of man and technology in a war, and the typology of wars themselves. In examining the question of the functions of military history as a science, the authors point out that precisely philosophical criteria helped overcome the previous utilitarian approach to military history as an applied science. The monograph is the first comprehensive study of the relationship of philosophy and military history.

We must separately take up the question of military historical reality and military historical time. These concepts are brought out in an organic relationship to the overall notion of Marxist-Leninist dialectics which shows the relationship of practice and military historical experience as components of military historical reality. The necessity of a detailed examination of the essence of the concept of "military historical reality" has been necessitated by the idealistic confusion of bourgeois theoreticians. Typical in this regard are the views of the modern French sociologist R. Aron who considers historical facts to be a subjective construction of the researcher. "A battle seen by an historian...," he asserts, "is a reality only in his conscience" (p 183).

Such theoretical ploys, the authors of the reviewed book point out, serve as the starting point for the falsification of history, for its voluntaristic interpretation, and are a manifestation of agnosticism in historical science. In studying the problem of historical reality, they have succeeded in thoroughly answering the question of why the same events are perceived far from uniformly by persons with different class and national interests, as well as showing that only the dialectical materialistic ideology is a reliable basis for a scientific understanding of military history.

However, not all the aspects of the problem have been examined with the required completeness in the work. Thus, individual "cruxes" of the ideological and scientific clash have been left outside the view of the authors. In such a book there must be an analysis of the bourgeois and reformist interpretation of the very concepts of "philosophy" and "military history," as well as of the overall views of their relationship.

As a whole the book is a definite contribution to a philosophical systematization of military history knowledge. The extensive theoretical and factual material contained in it, undoubtedly, will attract the attention of a broad range of specialists and readers interested in the problem, and will help to further broaden the theoretical viewpoint of the Soviet military personnel.

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BOOK REVIEW: POPULAR SCIENTIFIC MILITARY HISTORY SERIES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 80 signed to press 23 Sep 80 pp 85-86

[Review by O. Kuznetsova of the military history series of popular scientific pamphlets published by Voyenizdat]

[Text] Since 1958, Voyenizdat has been publishing a series of illustrated pamphlets under the title of "The Heroic Past of Our Motherland" (3-4 issues a year with a run of 60,000-80,000 copies in each). Over this time, already 74 of them have been published.

The pamphlets correctly tell the readers about major events in the struggle of our people for the honor and independence of the motherland against numerous invaders, starting with the Ice Slaughter up to the victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War.

In the publications of this series, a great deal of space has been given to showing the steadfastness, heroism and skill of our military who often fought against numerically superior and technically more advanced enemies, but always conquered them.

The feelings of a love of freedom, ardent patriotism, international duty and fraternal solidarity of all the Soviet people with the peoples of the countries suppressed by fascism were manifested with particular strength during the years of the Great Patriotic War during which our people carried the basic burden on their shoulders. The Soviet soldiers and partisans showed mass heroism on the front of the struggle against the Nazi invaders, while the workers of the rear forged a victory at the plants and in the fields, supplying the army and navy with ever-increasing amounts of military equipment, weapons, ammunition and food.

The publishing of this series of pamphlets which stirs the memory of the major events of the military history of the motherland, and above all the Great Patriotic War, must be counted as an achievement of Voyenizdat. It has made available to the broad masses of young readers many vivid historical facts on the heroic feats of our patriots and examples of the steadfastness and courage of the soldiers and partisans, the high military art of the military leaders and the strength of the effect of the heroism of the communists on the battlefield. The value of the series lies in the popularizing of military historical knowledge. It has been worked out by a large group of scientists, writers, journalists, researchers and direct participants in the events.

Unfortunately, up to now this series has not been a question of scientific analysis. Only 3 pamphlets out of the 74 have been reviewed.[1] A detailed study of them makes it possible to conclude that they have been written on a high scientific level. Some of them are small research studies and make a definite contribution to historical science. For example, here one might mention the pamphlet of M. A. Stolyarenko on the revolt of the Battleship "Potemkin" and written using solid archival and documentary materials.

In terms of literary genre, the best of the pamphlets gravitate toward an essay, and this is obviously no accident. Material presented in an essay style helps to achieve a stronger impression on the mass reader and attract the attention of the youth.

However, not all the authors have been successful. The excessive breadth of the selected subject often is an impediment. Then there is not enough room for delineating characters or providing poignant details. Thus, in the pamphlet of I. G. Inozemtsev entitled "Krylatyye Zashchitniki Severa" [Winged Defenders of the North], the material has been given dryly and without expression. Many numbers of the units and formations are listed, but there are no memorable facts and events.

More successful have been the authors who have selected as the subject one outstanding episode and treat it thoroughly. Here an example would be the pamphlets of G. A. Butakov "Boy u Kosy Obitochnoy" [The Battle at Point Obitochnaya], A. A. Makovskiy "Skvoz' Morskuyu Blokadu" [Through the Naval Blockade], and F. V. Konstantinov "Pod Kholodnymi Volnami" [Under the Cold Waves].

Many authors abuse special terminology. Particularly guilty of this are those writing about sailors and artillery troops. An ordinary reader could scarcely understand without looking in a dictionary what a "double wing column" or "sheering a vessel" is. And the assertion of S. Ye. Popov that the artillery troops using just a stopwatch can register an enemy firing position evokes surprise. And it is scarcely advisable to overload the text with slang expressions.

The quality of the publishing of certain pamphlets in this series leaves much to be desired. Poorly executed drawings and illegible photographs do not improve a publication.

In conclusion it must be said that Voyenizdat has done good work in propagandizing the military feats of the Soviet people. But each publication, as the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" requires, "should have its own 'personality,' its own range of basic subjects and be presented in a style and format particular to their area."[2]

By studying the reviewed series, the younger generation will become participants in the military feats of their fathers and grandfathers. And this is the great indoctrinational significance of the series.

FOOTNOTES

[1]KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 October 1961; 6 May 1976; VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY, No 12, 1975.

[2]KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 May 1979.

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CIVIL DEFENSE: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Moscow Industrial Plant

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 80 signed to press 8 Sep 80 pp 2-3

[Interview with A. A. Gromov, general director of State Ball Bearing Plant No. 1: "Dedication"]

[Excerpt] Moscow State Ball Bearing Plant No. 1 (GPZ-1) is a child of the First Five-Year Plan. March 29, 1982 will mark exactly 50 years since our domestic industry received the plant's first products. All these years the enterprise collective upheld the high reputation of the plant trademark, repeatedly emerged victorious in all-union socialist competition, and initiated numerous glorious labor firsts. Its services to the country were marked by high awards--the orders of Lenin and of the October Revolution.

The plant's almost half-century history is in essence the entire labor biography of Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Gromov, general director of the GPZ-1 production association. He arrived at the plant while it still was under construction. First he worked as a lathe operator and studied evenings at the Moscow Higher Technical School imeni Bauman. He worked his way up from worker to well-known production manager and his name is linked irrevocably with the successes of one of the largest enterprises. He has twice been awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution once, the Order of Labor's Red Banner twice, and the Badge of Honor once for his services to domestic industry. The motherland also recognized him with a higher award--the title Hero of Socialist Labor. He has been awarded the title Laureate of the Lenin and of the National Prize for great personal contributions to improved production of ball bearings and introduction of new progressive methods.

A. A. Gromov does a great deal of public service work. He is a member of the city and rayon party committees, was twice elected deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet, has been a deputy to the Moscow city Council of Peoples' Deputies since 1971, and was a member of the Mossovet ispolkom for four convocations. Communist Gromov was a delegate to the last six party congresses.

We publish an interview our correspondent had with A. A. Gromov, general director of the GPZ-1 production association.

[Question] The GPZ-1 collective is known not only for its production successes but also for its glorious traditions in the military-patriotic indoctrination of youths and in civil defense [CD] work. How are these traditions being maintained at present?

[Answer] A monument stands in the square opposite the plant entrance: the figure of a woman paying a tribute of respect to the memory of those who perished during the Great Patriotic War. Nearby are carved the names to whom all of us who survived give thanks, the names of those whom our children and our children's children will remember. Among them are Hero of the Soviet Union Petr Romanov, a fitter at our plant, Nikolay Ukhlovskiy, a blacksmith with us, and many, many others to whom we bade farewell at the plant entrance, and forever as it turned out. But they will be remembered forever and this sad list of names is a constant reminder of the necessity to be vigilant, to remember that there are no bounds to imperialism's deceit, that any provocations and adventurism from that quarter are possible.

We place great emphasis on military-patriotic indoctrination and training draftees for army service. The plant collective has established close ties with the troops of the Armed Forces. It sponsors the Moscow Higher Command School of Road and Engineer Troops and the Moscow Kremlin komandatura. We often take joint measures.

There are fine CD traditions at GPZ-1. The forerunner to this--local air defense (MPVO)--was set up at the plant during its first years of operation. Our collective often took prizes at annual MPVO control exercises and contests held by Osoaviakhim [Society for Assistance to the Defense, Aviation, and Chemical Construction of the USSR]. In 1940, the collective was awarded a certificate by decision of the USSR Osoaviakhim Central Soviet Presidium for its active MPVO work.

When the Great Patriotic War broke out our installation's MPVO was an organized system and it met the needs of the time. Combat know-how points this up: during enemy air raids MPVO formations protected the plant against fires and disarmed 2,500 incendiary bombs. The list of names etched on the Wall of Eternal Glory at the plant entrance includes those who sacrificed their lives defending their plant against bombing attacks by Hitlerite aviation.

Understanding the importance of CD tasking, our collective steadfastly and consistently carries out all CD measures to protect the workers and to improve production stability. We consider reasoned planning of all CD measures, taking into account modern requirements and actual conditions unfolding at the enterprise, to be an important problem. We devote great attention to effective use of the time allocated for lessons and exercises.

Requisite conditions have been set up at the enterprise for quality CD training of all blue and white collar workers. We have good training facilities--a training section with six classrooms, training positions, and a well-equipped lecture hall.

Successful combination of production activities and CD measures also is a tradition for our collective. I reveal no secrets when I tell you that where you find well established production, things go well in the CD area. But a reverse relationship also exists. The fact that all workers study the CD program and participate in its measures facilitates production. How? For instance, better first aid for minor injuries results from an improvement in fire safety discipline and strict adherence to rules concerning the handling of toxic chemicals. Nor can

one overlook the purely psychological effects of CD measures. Lessons, reviews, and exercises not only provide special knowledge and skills. They also indoctrinate the collective, they improve discipline and good organization, impact positively on labor productivity.

We do not involve ourselves in CD without the party committee's continual organizational and political-indoctrinational work. The opinion has been prevalent at the plant for a long time that CD is an important sector of party work and the most experienced workers are called upon for successful accomplishment of CD tasks.

The example set by leaders is extremely important, as are their personal contribution to CD and their competency in this area. That is why the general director, the chief engineer and his deputies, shop and section chiefs, and the directors of plant and shop public organizations always participate in CD measures--lessons, reviews, practical training, and exercises--give talks and reports, actively influence the collective.

Naturally any enterprise director primarily is responsible for fulfillment of the production plan and for product quality. But this certainly does not mean that CD measures take a back seat for him or for the rest of the collective. After all he concurrently is the installation CD chief and bears full responsibility for protection of the people, for the enterprise's readiness steadfastly to operate under special conditions. The interests of production and of CD to a great extent coincide and there is no need artificially to counterpose them. Our collective demonstrated an example of skillful accomplishment of production and CD tasking simultaneously at the last integrated installation exercise by demonstrating high concentration, responsibility, and discipline.

We are proud that for 10 years running GPZ-1 has been in first place in CD socialist competition among the industrial installations in the Zhdanovskiy Rayon of Moscow. In recent years 145 individuals have been awarded the "Outstanding in USSR Civil Defense" badge and 11 have won the "USSR Civil Defense Badge of Honor."

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In Dushanbe Area

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 80 signed to press 8 Sep 80 p 12

[Article by A. Demochkin: "With Combat Spirit"]

[Text] You especially sense the Soviet peoples' spirit of creativity and initiative at the time of great events in the country's life. Now the news about convening the 26th CPSU Congress elicits a desire on the part of labor collectives in Tajikistan's national economic installations to do better, more productive work. Nor are CD workers remaining on the sidelines.

"We will greet the 26th CPSU Congress with early fulfillment of all CD plans and measures scheduled for the 1980 training year," Dzhurabek Sadyyev, rescue element commander speaking for a composite CD detachment from Dushanbe, announced at a meeting. "This will be our contribution to CD improvement, to strengthening the country's capability to defend itself."

The collective from the Dushanbe Cotton Association previously had been initiator of the republic's socialist competition designed to improve CD mission accomplishment. Here management, party and Komsomol organizations, and the Komsomol committee in a timely way evaluate and support any manifestation of initiative.

Competition was a powerful lever for vitalizing all CD measures. Now all of the association's civilian formations have been fully supplied with individual and collective protective gear. Staffs and services are fully manned. CD classrooms have been equipped so CD lessons can be held regularly. Norms are worked out and exercises are held in the training village built by the enterprise's blue and white collar workers through self help.

Taking up the pre-congress watch, the textile workers' collective made higher socialist pledges. CD items are reflected therein as well. These primarily include a high level of civilian formation readiness for actions under complex conditions, timely and high-quality conduct of command-staff, special tactical, and integrated exercises, all workers passing CD norms, maintenance of shelters in constant readiness, and development and improvement of the training facilities. CD propaganda among blue collar, white collar, and engineering and technical workers also occupied a large place among these socialist pledges.

The enterprise trade union committee authorized three monetary prizes for the winners. And, the Dushanbe textile workers invited a progressive collective from the silk combine in Leninabad to the competition to give it even greater viability and spark.

More and more of the republic's labor collectives are taking up the pre-congress watch during which new initiatives and innovations are born. The CD fighting men and the command-supervisory personnel from the Machine Building Plant imeni Dzerzhinskiy, the Tadzhikgidroagregat plant, and others through good successes and creative labor are writing a report to their party's 26th Congress. The collectives at these installations were the first in the republic to complete all their 1980 CD measures.

National economic installations in the city of hydraulic engineers--Nurek--became the adherents of the Dushanbe textile workers. Here they also made higher CD socialist pledges in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress. All measures planned for this training year were completed by 1 September with a rating of excellent. Training of the population not occupied in production or in the public service area and of blue and white collar workers in the universal mandatory minimum knowledge program was finished on 1 August. The decision also was made to complete construction of a city-wide CD training village ahead of time.

Three prizes were established for the collectives in those organizations, institutions, and educational facilities that achieved high indicators in CD training.

Socialist competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress is expanding and developing throughout the entire republic.

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Results, Tasks Reviewed

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 80 signed to press 8 Sep 80 pp 12-13

[Unattributed: "A New Year, New Tasks"]

[Text] This past training year in the country's CD system progressed under the mark of a worthy greeting for the 35th anniversary of the Soviet peoples' Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the anniversary of V. I. Lenin's 110th birthday. Collectives in industrial enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, institutions, and departments did much to improve the readiness of their collectives to defend against modern weapons, to conduct SNAVR [rescue and emergency reconstruction operations] in centers of destruction, as well to insure steadfast work under special conditions.

It is encouraging that the quality of training CD supervisory and command-staff personnel improved not only at courses, but directly at installations themselves, that the knowledge and practical skills in solving ever more complex CD tasks were refined. The considerably growing level of quality in preparing for and conducting integrated installation exercises, broad introduction of exercises by a group of installations located in the same area or tied in together in production, the know-how acquired in conducting exercises concurrently with all installations located in an area under the cognizance of rural and settlement Soviets all give witness to this.

There is no doubt that there have been successes in training civilian formations, especially regarding their readiness for actions in combined centers of destruction, in providing CD training for students in general education schools, PTU [vocational and technical schools], and higher educational institutions.

One can list many national economic installations where all these problems were solved during the training year in a methodologically skillful way, where the problems were worked out practically, especially in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, Moldavia, Latvia, Moscow, Moskovskaya, Kuybyshevskaya, Kurskaya, and Sakhalinskaya oblasts of the RSFSR, Karagandinskaya and Semipalatinskaya oblasts in Kazakhstan, and in Tashkentskaya and Surkhandar'inskaya oblasts of Uzbekistan.

But we cannot limit ourselves to our achievements. The entire CD system, and especially national economic installations, unswervedly increase their readiness to defend against mass destruction weapons and to operate under any, most complex, extraordinary conditions. After all it is no secret that, as a result of insufficient control by local CD staffs at several installations, integrated exercises were replaced by command-staff exercises involving an insignificant number of formations.

In some places practical actions to work out CD notification signals were absent during exercises, formations had no practical training in notifying and assembling personnel, no equipment was issued to them, they did not march out to the suburban [illegible] to areas where SNAVR was underway.

There also were deficiencies in the work at CD courses. Much needs to be done to solve problems concerning course location as well as in setting up and refining training facilities. In some locations construction of training villages and planning of their use have ceased. Meanwhile the villages remain the main facility for

training the population and formations and for holding integrated exercises.

Far from all CD staffs sufficiently are involved in organizing training for the non-working population.

It is quite evident that, preparing a worthy greeting for the 26th CPSU Congress, these shortcomings must be eliminated and urgent problems solved. Competition in honor of the forum for Soviet communists is expanding more and more throughout the country. Progressive installations in the Russian Federation, Estonia, Tajikistan, Moldavia, other republics, krays, and oblasts made higher CD socialist pledges and successfully are accomplishing them.

These pledges stem from the basic tasking levied on CD for the new 1981 training year for further improvement in the preparation of national economic installations for steadfast work under extraordinary conditions. In this light one must look upon integrated installation exercises as the apex of preparing the installation to fulfill this tasking. The attention of CD staff directors at installations, rayons, and cities, and of CD course workers must be focused on insuring that, during the preparations for and conduct of such exercises, problems of protecting people effectively are solved, all measures to improve the stable operation of the installation are worked out, a complex and useful situation in the centers of destruction is set up, and the modes of protecting people (and the modes for maintaining livestock in rural areas) are correctly selected and realistically carried out. Also required are skillfully organized dosimetric and chemical monitoring, the training of all exercise participants in actions in response to CD notification signals, and practice in doing production work while wearing individual protective gear.

It is important during preparation for and conduct of exercises to teach management and command-supervisory personnel under time pressure to generalize situation data and make substantiated decisions and to control civilian formations in a complex and rapidly changing situation. Close attention here should be paid to formation training, to finding new, effective drills and methods of doing SNAVR in centers of combined destruction.

One cannot avoid the question of organization and conduct in the new training year of competition for the best formation at installations, in rayons, and in cities. Now is the time to begin to prepare for this. This is painstaking but very necessary useful work. Locally in the most diligent manner one must study know-how in conducting medical aid team competitions, without repeating past mistakes, to keep personnel aware of the state of the competitions in a timely manner, to create all requisite material conditions.

Much needs to be done to organize training of the non-working population in defense against modern weapons, to determine training groups, to select and train exercise directors, to find the necessary buildings, more widely to use the CD training facilities belonging to nearby national economic installations, to various institutions, educational facilities, and CD courses. Achievement of real shifts in this important regard requires stepped-up monitoring by rayon and city CD staffs and a decisive increase in their responsibility.

Finally, local staffs, especially rayon CD staffs, are faced with the task this training year everywhere to complete CD strongpoints in general education schools and PTU, to generalize initial know-how in their work, and to implement this know-how at other educational institutions.

There is no doubt that the broad CD aktiv, personnel in civilian formations, collectives in national economic installations, departments, institutions, and educational facilities, staffs, and courses, preparing a worthy greeting for the 26th CPSU Congress, completely and properly will accomplish all tasks facing CD in the forthcoming training year.

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In City of Murmansk

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 80 signed to press 8 Sep 80 pp 14-15

[Article by D. Solov'yev, Murmansk: "A Run of the Mill Day"]

[Text] For Vasiliy Yakovlevich Katayev, chief of staff of the Murmansk Seagoing Fishing Port, this day began like any other except for the one difference: it began not with a progress update but with a visit to the CD training group. I went along with him.

A month ago during an in-depth examination, in spite of solid overall training, the design bureau workers demonstrated weak knowledge. The time now had come to check to see if lesson director Ye. Girich had made the requisite conclusions.

Several people with their coats on and with a detached look on their faces were seated at the training position. The director read something from a book and for appearances sake three gas masks were laid out in front of him. As is his habit Katayev restrained himself from making reproaches. He called warehouse manager N. Shul'ga and helped her find and put up visual aids and issue gas masks and respirators to each person.

"I think you are familiar with the layout and function of these items. Please prepare the gas masks for extended use," Katayev uttered. Then he gave the command "Gas!"

Quite a bit of time passed but many still were unable to put on the gas masks properly.

"We need to overcome this," Katayev said. "Watch me and do what I do."

He demonstrated all the routines, then proposed to Girich:

"Please continue the practical training. I have to hurry over to the progress update."

Katayev knew that the lesson would benefit both Girich and his pupils.

An announcement was made at the progress update about one of the civilian formations going on duty the next day. This procedure had been introduced in the city in accordance with an ispolkom decision since forest fires had been prevalent during the summer in the district. People continue to work but they know the location of firefighting equipment, vehicles, and other gear and they know what to do in the event of an alert. The chief of staff's presence at progress updates is not mandatory but Vasiliy Yakovlevich never misses one. As deputy chief of the port he supervises five installations.

The progress updates help him monitor the pulse of life in order for him in time to solve problems involving both production and mass defense work.

Following the progress update Vasiliy Yakovlevich went to the training position in the port's southern area. There his assistant R. Fedorov, along with an artist, had again prepared an exhibition of visual aids, in particular a display captioned "TO&E Equipment and Capabilities to Replace It."

He went to see P. Tikhmanovich, chief of power facilities, after leaving the training position. When he opened the office door, he met the man in charge with an open file in his hand.

"Thank you for coming over, Vasiliy Yakovlevich," he said. "Look at this new approach to the notification roster. These are estimates for the equipment required by the formations taking possible replacements into consideration. We have made the instructions on actions to take when the 'Air Alert' signal is sounded specific. The population sheltering plan has been corrected again."

Showing the documents, Tikhmanovich intently looks at his conversation partner and finally asks:

"Well, then, will I get out of this disgraceful position?"

The discussion centers around the position in the competition. An integrated examination of socialist pledge fulfillment is held quarterly at installations, shops, and sections. Last time power facilities scored 55 points, slightly more than half, the lowest indicator in the whole port. Hero of Socialist Labor I. Shan'kov, port chief, mentioned the power facilities chief's name at the progress update. After that Tikhmanovich visited a majority of the installations, found out how and what was being done, and now tried to correct blunders. True, they reduced the bonus all the same this quarter for the collective and for the chief himself.

At first glance it is possible to demonstrate that chores drew the chief of the CD staff into his own natural flow and now won't let him loose. Wherever he went, no matter where he appeared, people bombarded him with questions: they asked, agreed, gave advice, reported. But in actuality everything went according to plan.

Katayev spent the last half-hour prior to dinner visiting the kray ethnological museum. This also was denoted in the plan. Museum workers had made dozens of reproductions using photographs of prewar Murmansk. They aid in comparing what the railroad station, the port, and the city's houses and streets were and now are. In one photo two women and a teenage girl are standing in a deep trench and are looking with alarm to the heavens. This is an episode from the war period.

"Look, things were tight, they dug into the rocks then too," Katayev said as he came back to reality.

You sensed that the chief of staff is debunking the opinion held by some that it is impossible to build shelters in rocky areas.

"You cannot even compare this with what the city now has become. Who is there that cannot but rejoice over our successes achieved during the 35 postwar years!"

Katayev thinks out loud. "The thing to do now is find the place to put the photo display so that as many people as possible can view it."

Carefully putting the photographs back in the folder, Katayev sits down at his desk and, flipping several calendar pages, makes a note: "Discuss at the party committee where to locate the photo display of prewar and wartime Murmansk." Then he leafs through a thick volume entitled "Plan for Preparations for an Integrated Port Installations Exercise."

"Preparation for an exercise is the linchpin of all defense training measures." Katayev wanted to say something more but a visitor appeared at the door. It is N. Chistyakov, chief of the warning and communications service. Seeing that he was the first to arrive, he began his report. The crux was that he had succeeded in eliminating "choke points" in the warning system.

Nonetheless Katayev for some reason frowned. Chistyakov notes this.

"What is it then, Vasiliy Yakovlevich? The count is in minutes."

"But it needs to be in seconds," Katayev responds, quietly but firmly.

Chistyakov raises his arms in amazement but then seemingly weakly lets them drop, having understood apparently that the chief of staff is correct--and he must be correct.

When Chistyakov disappeared out the door, Katayev noted:

"Exercises are a search, a search for reserves with which to save time. He will find them," he nodded towards the door.

You sense that he trusts the communicator and is proud of him.

Z. Kask, director of the packaging combine, phoned.

"Come over, Zoya Sergeyevna, only right away. There is a 'window' in my schedule."

"Listen from start to finish to see if I understand everything, so there won't be any 'surprises' during the exercise," Zoya Sergeyevna said as she came through the door.

Katayev listens attentively and patiently, content with the precision with which she had thought through all the problems involved with conducting the exercise.

"The main problem, Zoya Sergeyevna, is whether you will be able to build one shelter using your formation's resources during the exercise."

"What do you mean, Vasiliy Yakovlevich?" Kask says in amazement. "Under our conditions and in such a short time?!"

"What is surprising about that?" Katayev answers the question with one of his own and pulls a wartime photograph from the cherished folder. . . .

"Well, what can I say? The agitation is convincing," Kask says decisively. "We will at least try."

An old and, as it turned out, good acquaintance B. Vilin, oblast TV correspondent, looked in.

"As far as the 'week' is concerned, I heard that you are starting something new," he said on his way in.

"Yes," Katayev confirmed, "and we will need your help, by the way. Our sports committee, DOSAAF members, Komsomol members, culture, 'Znaniye,' and newspaper editorial boards have been alerted. It will be a mass defense work week rather than a CD week."

The oblast radio correspondent got involved. He prepared a short report about the stage of exercise preparations for the "latest news."

But these two meetings already were outside the day's program.

It became necessary to spend a long time with the management of the fishing equipment factory. Director A. Vasil'yev arrived with his chief of staff Ye. Listoforova.

"The documentation has been completed based upon best cases," Vasil'yev bragged.

"I see," Katayev affirmed. "I don't understand one thing. If you assign so many people to the exercise, won't production suffer?"

"It possibly might suffer," Vasil'yev agreed.

"Then what will we cancel, the exercise or production?" Katayev responded with an ironic smile in his eyes and then emphasized: "That is where your plan is weak, my dear Aleksandr Sergeyevich. Defense measures, when conducted during peacetime, must not hinder production. And this is achieved through scientific planning and careful assignment of resources.

"We measure exercise effectiveness not only by how defense measures were accomplished, but also by how much labor productivity increased," Katayev reminded the director and demonstrated how the defense measures were planned at progressive installations.

Katayev tasked his assistant N. Kalinina with talking to the directors of the ZhKO [communal housing department] training position about results in the competition among the nonworking population to sew cotton gauze bandages. An employee of the newspaper RYBNYY MURMAN aided in generalization of this know-how.

Between 5 and 6 p.m. various documents are validated. The chief of the fire fighting service was the only person to bring in a document this particular day. He called it the "Fire Fighting Support Card" required by the oblast fire fighting service.

"That is no 'card,'" Kayatyev joked, raising the heavy packet of paper in the palm of his hand. With regret he added: "And who needs it?!"

The stream of people finally ceased and the phone calls dropped off sharply.

"Here is something interesting," and Katayev invited me into the next room. Here Yu. Kiselev was working with the situation forecasting group. Katayev observed lesson progress with some sort of special interest. Finally he said:

"You know we often conduct demonstration exercises with this group. Moreover installation directors prepare inputs beforehand. This turns out to be very useful. Everyone with his own eyes sees how the situation unfolds under specific conditions: the nature of the damage, size of the fires, possible losses. As a result our supervisory personnel become more convinced of the reliability of our CD system, its capability to protect people and insure that the port operates steadfastly."

As we were saying goodbye, the phone rang.

"What time?" he asked someone. "Six? Well, as always, I am free. I am just bidding the comrade correspondent farewell." And, already turning to the last companions, explained: "My wife has tickets for a play at the Ivanovo Drama Theater."

As I departed, I could not help but think: no, not everyone can be called upon to do so much in a normal work day. This can be done by people able precisely to plan their work, people who know and love their work in all its details, someone able to value his own time and that of strangers.

We add that Vasiliy Yakovlevich has a multitude of social tasks. He is deputy chairman of the party committee ideological commission, chairman of the war veterans' council, commander of the composite voluntary squad for protection of public order in the microrayon, member of the presidium of the city committee of the Red Cross Society, and director of the training position for preparing predraft age youths for service in the army.

That is enough to keep him busy.

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In Kiev Industrial Plant

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 80 signed to press 8 Sep 80 p 16

[Article by V. Stepanyuk, party committee secretary, Kiev Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Plant: "Incident During an Exercise"]

[Text] What happened during the integrated installation exercise was not envisioned in the plan.

The return condensate tank at the steam power plant broke down. The water began to wash out the foundation of the building and to threaten the nearby installation. And it was cold as sin outside. This threatened to freeze up the plant's main heating system piping and put it out of order.

An element from the technical emergency group immediately came to the scene. The element commander was alarmed at the scope of the accident. Then group commander N. Sotnikov arrived. As is proper for an experienced communist commander and former frontline soldier, he took over. First he put portable pumps in operation in order rapidly to pump water from a trench.

The question of how most rapidly to clean up after the accident arose. Having evaluated the situation, Sotnikov ordered N. Raykovskiy, first element commander, to make a new tank and M. Baranovskiy, second element commander, to disassemble the broken tank and reinforcement.

The elements immediately went to work. Raykovskiy had to get welding equipment, cut the metal, and weld a new tank in a short time. Along with labor veteran V. Fedchik, M. Prikhod'ko, and other element members, he worked without ceasing, even when fatigue simply knocked him off his feet. Here the troops also demonstrated labor tempering.

Baronovskiy's element found itself in a tough situation. There was hot water in the tank to be disassembled and steam issued from it. There was not time to wait for the water to cool down. Dressed in work jackets and their faces masked, the commander and his troops immediately set about hooking up a large sewer hose in order to drain the hot water from the tank. Steam burned their hands. Breathing was difficult. However even under these inestimably difficult conditions the hose was connected and the boiling water transferred to a drain.

Clearing up after such an accident according to usual technical norms would require at least 16 hours. Sotnikov and his troops did it in 8 hours. Each displayed wisdom as well as moral and psychological steadfastness. Eight hours of heavy labor in clothing covered with a layer of ice, without a break or food!

"How can we leave the plant without heat at such a time?" the troops responded when the suggestion was made that they take a short rest. "Each minute is valuable."

The example of the Sotnikovites (that is what these troops are called, referring to their commander) also inspired other civilian formations carrying out missions in a "center of destruction" in accordance with the exercise plan. Let's take the one V. Khmel' commands. Initially the rescuers operated somewhat sluggishly, sometimes allowed conventionality, which did not escape the attention of umpire V. Mokovoz.

"You call this work. . .," he reproached the commander? "Did you hear how Sotnikov organized things as they cleaned up after the accident?"

"I heard," Khmel' answered. "But that was a real accident. . . ."

"Oh, Khmel', Khmel'," the umprie said with irritation and pointed towards one of the installations in the training village where they had simulated a center of destruction. "Do you see how the firemen are fighting that fire?"

"I see. . . ."

"Why aren't you hurrying? There is a blast shelter beneath that burning building. The people 'are suffocating'. . . ."

One must give those who did the simulations credit. They created an actual fire and rubble all around. Looking at the smoky tongues of flame, Khmel' commanded:

"Follow me, forward!"

At the commander's order, one element ran to the emergency manhole hatch and the other to the shelter's air lock. They had to find the hermetically-sealed door and get the people out. If this was not possible, then they had to punch a hole in the wall and provide air.

Recalling these two examples, I would like to express my opinion about the physical, moral, and psychological loads on the exercise participants. Often where conventionality and simplification are permitted, civilian formation troops and commanders do not feel such loads. The quality of their training suffers therefore and the effect that the organizers of integrated installation exercises envision is not achieved.

"With us everything is pre-arranged...." That is the mood the rescue personnel and their commander V. Khmel' took into the training center of destruction. But it took complicating the situation, making it much like the real thing, and involving the umpire directly in the rescue group's affairs to cause a radical change.

Of course the accident became a sort of incentive and all participants accepted the unfolding situation as an actual one. This applies not only to the formations but also to the labor collective overall. However similar incidents during exercises are a rare exception. And various means of simulation should skillfully be used in order to make the situation complex and to increase the physical, moral, and psychological loads.

As our know-how demonstrates, it is possible to simulate not only fires, rubble, and other elements of the situation but accidents as well. Let's say that it is necessary in the interests of production to overhaul a section of the sewer system or lay a cable communications line. These actions are included in the exercise concept and the simulation plan as emergency situations caused by an "enemy" attack. They will become a part of the urgent emergency restoration work in a center of destruction.

It is important that trainees have physical, moral, and psychological loads at all stages of the KOU [integrated installation exercise]. In particular at the same exercise when actions under the threat of "enemy" attack were being worked out, our civilian formations near a POL storage area used engineer equipment to dig a pit to bury fuel tanks and bunkered part of the area where POL was stored.

These and other engineering and technical measures taken during the exercise were directed towards increasing the steadfastness of the installation's work under special conditions and were of substantial assistance to production. At the same time everyone who participated in the exercise gained specific skills in how to act in a complex situation.

Thus, in my view the following are required in order to place physical, moral, and psychological loads on people: creation of extreme conditions close to the real thing and insuring a work volume which the trainees must accomplish with full physical and moral intensity; organization of purposeful political and indoctrinational work with personnel in the civilian formations, with all enterprise blue and white collar workers; mobilizing people to surmount difficulties and manifest steadfastness and ingenuity when accomplishing assigned missions.

Standing in the forefront is a person capable of defending himself and that which has been created by his labor. That is why when preparing for and conducting exercises

using all types and forms of ideological and training-methodological work it is important to prepare each individual for skillful actions in an extraordinary situation. Let's take for example working in gas masks at a machine. This is no simple matter, as it would first appear. In the shops we must train a lot, work out all norms in detail, and do extensive explanatory work so that people are able practically speaking to carry out complicated operations while wearing gas masks. And during the exercise we are describing many shifts worked in gas masks for a prolonged period.

Well and methodologically correctly organized practical training involving working out actions to take when the "Air Alert" signal sounds, especially when it is sounded unexpectedly, has psychological effect. It is very important to create extreme conditions which increase physical, moral, and psychological loads when training people to operate in centers of combined destruction. Moreover here several destructive factors immediately impact upon a person. Among them, besides damage and fires, radioactive, chemical, and biological contamination present a special danger. And in order to teach people protective drills, at this exercise we strived through simulations and other ways to point out the danger threatening anyone who violates the rules of conduct in such areas.

Having studied and generalized know-how from the integrated installation exercise, we came to the conclusion that much still remains to be done for effective and quality training of a labor collective under special conditions. Here great attention must be paid to moral-political and psychological training problems.

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In Rostovskaya Oblast

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[Article by A. Kurilov, chief of an installation CD staff, Rostovskaya Oblast: "Side by Side"]

[Text] This training year there was a special tactical exercise at our installation involving the CD rescue team in coordination with the formations from our services and a CD troop subunit [podrazdeleniye]. It went well according to the rating given by the exercise director and the superior CD authority.

I will discuss several details concerning preparation for the exercise. Each civilian formation's high readiness is guaranteed primarily by complete and quality fulfillment of all sections of the training program and by each formation having the TO&E equipment and supplies. Notification and muster of personnel at any time of day and in any weather are of great significance. We pay special attention to this.

Our civilian formations went through all stages of training on general and special preparation without a single deviation from the program. The time now had come to check their readiness at a special tactical exercise. There also was an opportunity to run the exercise jointly with a CD troop subunit, to work out problems of coordination with it, as well as of the rescue team with the reconnaissance, radiation and chemical defense, technical emergency, and other formations.

First of all they coordinated all parts of the exercise plan and conducted joint reconnaissance (twice they traveled to the exercise area). Here exercise director

V. Samarskiy, deputy installation CD chief, assigned specific tasks to the umpires, having refined these tasks with the commander of the CD troop unit. V. Gotsman, umpire for the center of combined destruction, with the resources in his group and those troop specialists allocated to him ahead of time prepared everything necessary so that exercise participants could operate without any sort of leniency. They determined the modes for protecting the people and organized the radiation monitoring.

The exercise was run under sufficiently complex conditions to require strict adherence to safety measures. For this purpose the exercise director conducted a practical lesson, the participants of which learned how to prevent unwanted incidents when moving to and when operating in the center of combined destruction.

When preparations for the exercise were completed, installation CD chief K. Osipov called together the management and supervisory-command staff participating in it and discussed know-how from cleaning up after an accident at petroleum enterprises in the city of Groznyy following fascist bombings during the Great Patriotic War. "And all of us," he concluded, "must learn to operate under similar conditions since we are talking about actions in a combined center of destruction."

The director and the umpires, already being observed by the installation CD chief, again "played out" the entire forthcoming exercise, paying special attention to quality development of each training problem under realistic conditions. Then the umpires themselves, the civilian formation commanders, their political deputies, and communist agitators, as if completing the preparations, disseminated the exercise missions to each troop. CPSU members I. Smirnov, V. Ivanov, G. Serov, and N. Nikulina excelled in this work. It should be stated that women make up one-half of the personnel in our CD formations. Therefore, the party committee concerns itself with training communist women as agitators.

Exercise day arrived. The often checked notification system did not fail. People mustered faster than envisaged by the plan. A little bit of time was needed also for issuance of the TO&E equipment, checking on readiness, and departure to where the CD troop subunit was located. From there they were faced with a difficult 20-kilometer march to the center of combined destruction. The powerful equipment possessed by the CD troop subunit played a large role in the successful accomplishment of this mission. The BAT [artillery tractor dozer] crews that Jr Sgts M. Karetnikov and V. Pichkanov command carefully supported the movement of the column via the prescribed route. Our scouts, who reported the radiation and chemical situation enroute on time, also skillfully fulfilled their obligations, as did the soldiers.

As the column drew closer to the center of destruction, the scouts actively were at work, especially the reconnaissance element A. Potapenko commands. Along the approach to the center they reported the locations of fires and shelters covered by rubble. They reported the radiation and chemical situation. Based on these data the commanders of the rescue team and the CD troop subunit made the decision to conduct SNAVR, having coordinated their actions, as well as those of attached special formations.

Those responsible for simulations attempted to erect many barriers in the path of the rescue, fire fighting, and other formations. Here and there were fires, rubble, and delineated sectors of chemical contamination. Signs erected at various places denoted the radiation levels. Formation personnel and commanders did not get flustered under

these conditions since during the entire previous period of training they often had worked out ways to operate when conducting SNAVR. Following the troops' example, they barely had to take a back seat to them, working, as they say, side by side and understanding one another implicitly.

Take, for example, locating a buried shelter and removing the "injured." Personnel from the rescue groups G. Serov, V. Tsimbalistov, and G. Tyrtyshnikov command and Pvts A. Smirnov, A. Glushchenko, N. Anisimov, and others from among the military personnel especially excelled here. The medical aid teams T. Zalomnovaya directs coordinated closely with them.

Our fire fighting element (commander A. Chernov) and Sgt V. Dikun's fire truck crew skillfully fought the fire. Sgt V. Gotrovich and Pvt A. Chernyshev, saving people from the second floor of a "burning building," really demonstrated a soldier's tempering and agility.

Such coordination was achieved thanks to skillful command and control of subordinates by rescue team commander I. Smirnov and officer S. Vyrostkov. Under their direction formation personnel and the CD troops worked 4-5 hours in the center of destruction reinforcing and improving skills, demonstrating psychological steadfastness.

Analyzing the know-how resulting from the joint actions, I again wish to emphasize that such exercises must be conducted at any time of the year and day and under all meteorological conditions, creating a complex situation for all trainees.

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In Leningrad Institute

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 80 signed to press 8 Sep 80 p 18

[Article by B. Tselikovskiy, candidate of military sciences, docent, senior teacher in the CD series, Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute of Communications: "Saving Time, Gaining Quality"]

[Text] Practical lessons where trainees have a chance to think through earlier obtained information, to reinforce knowledge, and to acquire skills are envisioned in the program of providing CD training on a number of themes to VUZ students. Similar lessons give a fuller representation of the operating conditions for CD forces and show capabilities and ways to accomplish CD missions. It is no accident that every teaching collective strives to improve the forms and methods of conducting practical lessons. The teachers in the CD series [tsikl] at the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute of Communications also are working towards this.

Carefully analyzing the practical lessons on every theme in the program, we established that a considerable amount of time is spent studying the initial situation. Thus many important training problems have to be worked out using the lecture-demonstration rather than the practical method. Thus, students in the main become familiar with prepared documents during lessons on ways and means of increasing the operating reliability of communications installations and on the installation CD plan. Opportunities for students to work independently with the documents are extremely restricted due to lack of time.

And why can't all practical lessons held be applicable to a single installation so there is no need to study the initial situation over again? This would permit training times to be more rationally allocated and to switch from the lecture-demonstration to the group practice session method when necessary.

Based on their own know-how the teachers at our VUZ became convinced that the conduct of practical lessons on several themes against the background of a general initial situation, with its subsequent development over time, is completely realistic. Moreover in this case students get a fuller and more precise representation of the measures envisioned and accomplished in accordance with the installation CD plan and with the plan for increasing the reliability of its work. The students track them by stages and as a complex.

For example, the VUZ program themes on the methodology of evaluating the radiation situation, on SNAVR at an installation, and on organizing communications and warning are incomplete. But in order to work them out it is advisible to combine and to conduct the lessons against the background of a single initial situation, accomplishing a single integrated mission. This can be formulated, as follows: the work of the composite team commander and of the chief of the installation warning and communications service when the threat of enemy attack arises and when conducting SNAVR in a center of nuclear destruction.

We have done just that at the VUZ. We have allotted the exact amount of time the program recommends--12 hours--for practical lessons on the aforementioned themes, but we distributed the time in an unusual manner. We envisioned a total of three 4-hour lessons. At the first lesson we work out the actions of the composite team commander and the responsible individuals in the installation warning and communications service when the threat of enemy attack arises. During the second lesson we cover actions in the dispersal area and on the march to the center of destruction. SNAVR is covered during the third lesson. Here we presuppose that the theoretical material on all the aforementioned themes already has been covered.

The objective of the first lesson is to study with the students the procedure for evaluating the situation for this period, to give them practice in composite team command and control, to familiarize them with the actions of the chief of the installation warning and communications service, and to train them to accomplish missions of evaluating the radiation situation. Evaluation of the situation and decision making are worked out using the group practice session method. The students are supposed to study the following training material independently prior to the lesson: the installation CD plan and measures to increase the installation's operating reliability, and be prepared to play the role of the composite team commander and of the chief of the installation warning and communications service.

The second lesson is also a group practice session. Students playing the role of the composite team commander are taught to compile a plan for the march and conduct of SNAVR in a center of destruction. As the chief of the installation warning and communications service, they are taught to organize communications on the march from a mobile control post. Concurrently they practice accomplishing missions 1, 2, and 3 in evaluation of the radiation situation.

During the third lesson the teacher is called upon to familiarize the students with the work of a composite team commander during SNAVR at the installation, to demonstrate the procedure for insuring communications, reconnoitering damaged

communications networks, and organizing urgent recovery operations, and to provide practice in accomplishing missions 4, 5, and 6 in evaluation of the radiation situation.

Since all three to a certain degree are concluding lessons technical control means widely are used at this time. This lets the teacher question the entire group and present an evaluation.

A few words on training methods documents. One assignment is worked up for the group practice sessions on themes 8 and 10. Presented therein are the characteristics of the installation, basic CD missions, the CD chief's decisions, the instructions from the chief of staff on organization of warning and communications, and excerpts from the decisions (on communications) of the city rayon staff. The adopted command and control system, installation CD resources, and other reference data are included also. Attached to the basic assignment are the documents of the installation CD plan and the plan for measures to improve the reliability of installation operations, with the exception of the documents the students themselves have to compile during the lessons.

Prior to the start of the first lesson each trainee is issued preprinted individual sheets containing the installation layout on the terrain and the plan of the installation's dispersal area in the suburbs. These blanks in the future will serve as the primary working document on which the students reflect changes in the situation and accomplish the various diagrams and tables required for accomplishment of the integrated mission.

Primary and two supplementary assignments are worked out for lessons on themes 5, 11, and 17. The primary assignment gives the situation at the installation with the appearance of the threat of enemy attack and some refined data on the condition of the installation's CD resources and of the dispersal area at a specific time. The supplementary assignments for the second and third lessons give the situation corresponding to a designated operational time. Both assignments present the data required for accomplishment of the missions to evaluate the radiation situation.

Using the group practice session method during the lessons, the teacher poses questions for the trainees and listens to their responses in the form of decisions. The entire group discusses the correctness of the responses, resulting in the determination of the most advisible, which is accepted as the foundation. If the decision takes the form of a diagram or table, then the students enter them in their working document or working notebook.

The teacher during the lessons can use a movie or slide projector to show individual film segments or slides characterizing the situation. Use of a mock-up of the installation also is effective. Having seen and evaluated the situation, trainees operate more correctly and confidently and the lesson is more productive.

"Ogonek," "Sputnik," and especially "Ritm 2M" technical means of control help in increasing each trainee's activeness and responsibility. Moreover, they insure feedback to the teacher from the audience and let him in time adjust the progress of the lessons.

The proposed variant for conducting practical lessons is one possible approach. Almost every teacher has his own methodological drills, his own pedagogical discoveries. And therefore the exchange of know-how in this magazine is important and useful for us.

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In Tbilisi School

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 80 signed to press 8 Sep 80 p 19

[Article by K. Oganezov, chief of the CD courses' motor vehicle club: "Show Confidence in a Teenager"]

[Text] Secondary School No. 136 in Tbilisi is a CD supporter. A passing acquaintance with the CD corner is enough for one to say that everything that is here was made with love and care. Beautifully formed displays, skillfully selected photographs, drawings, diagrams, and other visual training aids in laconic and clear form give a representation of the subject being studied.

Available to the school children in the classroom where CD lessons are given are an "Ukraina" movie projector, an LETI [Leningrad Order of Lenin Electrotechnical Institute imeni V. I. Ul'yanov (Lenin)] device, a film strip projector also intended for showing films made by the kids themselves. The teaching machine is also convenient: its speed of movement allows you without special effort not only to read the text but take notes as well.

The CD training village, which the teaching staff and the kids worked hard to build, is an item of pride. Here everything is present for the conduct of practical lessons and training: a fallout shelter, slit trench, as well as walls, mounds, and pits, which in certain instances also can serve as a shelter. A crater of imposing dimensions caused by an "exploding shell" is very realistic. A place has been set aside here for deployment of a radiation and chemical monitoring post.

It should be stated that the school children did a lot of this. Here is one of the displays--it has been dedicated to an integrated installation exercise. The most interesting moments were captured on film: the kids are entering a blast shelter, medical aid teams provide aid to the "injured," the upperclassmen are clearing rubble away from a blast shelter entrance, the underclassmen are making cotton gauze bandages.

"You should have seen the zeal with which the youngest exercise participants worked," says A. Ashugov, the school's military instructor. "And there is no necessity to even mention their older comrades."

It is no accident that the republic's minister of education and the chief of the Georgian SSR CD staff gave a high rating to the actions of the school's collective during the exercise. Appreciation was expressed to K. Khechoyev, school director, by order of the minister.

Enormous merit of course goes to the director for the school's successes, for the seriousness with which its entire collective approaches solution of CD problem. It has been known for a long time that nothing is more inspirational than the personal example of the director.

"The Komsomol committee, particularly its secretary P. Lashkevich and committee members S. Gudushauri, I. Borodina, and M. Giguashvili provide great help to the school leadership and to me as the military instructor," A. Ashugov continues. "We solve all the problems jointly. The Komsomol committee is our reliable supporter."

"We greatly value the confidence shown in us," P. Lashkevich says in turn. "Komsomol members are able to do a lot themselves. The school's management and party organization understand this and provide us the opportunity to work independently, to show initiative. The teachers do not reproach us excessively and do not put us down. They trust us, they guide and monitor our work. And confidence brings many obligations and it must always and in every way be justified."

"Pavel is correct," school director K. Khechoyev enters the conversation. "The main thing is for each student, each teenager, to understand the importance of the matter entrusted to him, his obligations, in this case CD. And here everything has significance: selection of training equipment, teaching methodology, and approach to children. It is important to show confidence in a teenager, to give him an opportunity independently to solve a particular problem. Moreoever today's students, especially upperclassmen, are able not only to understand and assimilate CD measures (naturally within the frameworks of the program established for them), to learn to operate correctly in complex situations but also to be propagandists, to pass CD knowledge on to others. It is in just this way that we are indoctrinating them, we are focusing our pupils on this."

And everything begins with the young. Upperclassmen help teachers conduct lessons with the students in the lower grades. They participate just as actively in organization of practical training, displays, military sports games where CD is included, and in passing norms.

School No. 136 in its role of supporter does much methodological work. Seminars with 2d and 5th grade teachers, individual and group consultations, and open and demonstration CD lessons regularly are organized here.

Considering the school's special role in propaganda of progressive CD teaching know-how, the rayon CD staff provides it comprehensive assistance. Its workers give advice and aid in building and improving the training facilities.

PHOTO CAPTION

p 19 Students at Moscow School No. 846 with interest also seriously study radiation and chemical reconnaissance instruments. [Note: Photo unrelated to this article or any other article in this issue]

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Medical Aid Team Competition

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 80 signed to press 8 Sep 80 pp 20-21

[Article by Inspector-Doctor N. Shapovalov, Medical Defense and Medical Health Improvement Administration, SOKK i KP SSSR [Union of the Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent of the USSR] Ispolkom: "On Competitions and Officiating"]

[Text] N. Shapovalov, inspector-doctor in the SOKKI i KP SSR Gospolkom Medical Defense and Medical Health Improvement Administration, comments on the editorial board's mail.

M. Gvaladze and Ye. Gaprindashvili (Chiatura, Georgian SSR). "Our medical aid team went to the city competitions. We were equipped in accordance with an inventory sent by the CD staff at the Kutaisi Production Association imeni S. M. Kirov (our sewing factory is part of that association). Only six medical bags were stipulated in the inventory. Absolutely nothing was said about equipment in the instructions from the Kutaisi CD staff. At the competitions a representative of the city CD staff (he apparently was a member of the officiating commission) requested that we show him all 23 medical bags. Since we did not have that number on hand, penalty points were assessed. Please tell us whether the judges were correct and what is a full complement of medical aid team equipment?"

[Answer] In accordance with the TO&E, a medical aid team's equipment includes filter gas masks and R-2 respirators (1 per team member), 1 set of individual dosimeters, 6 pocket flashlights (for the team and element commanders), stretchers complete with straps (1 stretcher per element), and 23 medical bags with special packing. The team also has a set of carriers and flasks (containers) for water (with cover). The medical aid team's work clothes consist of cotton coveralls (blouses and pants) and a beret with emblem. Warm foot clothes, socks, and gloves, which team members also receive from their enterprise (organization), are envisioned for winter.

It follows from the letter that the CD staff at the Kutaisi Production Association proposed that the medical aid team go to the competitions with six medical bags; thereby the staff violated established requirements. The city CD staff also erred by not pointing out that the equipment must correspond to the TO&E. The actions of the officials that penalized the team for incomplete equipment also were unfair. In this case the commission was obliged to send an individual ruling to the installation directors who failed to provide the proper equipment to the team.

N. Blinov (Mineralnyye Vody, Stavropol'skiy Kray). "The Statute on Medical Aid Team Competitions requires teams to be fully manned at competitions. This means that a team cannot win a prize if one person is absent. Do I understand this correctly?"

[Answer] A fully-manned medical aid team (23 people) is allowed to compete. Undermanned teams participate in competitions without being awarded places. This requirement is contained in the new Statute on Medical Aid Team and Medical Post Competitions, which goes into effect on 1 January 1981.

V. Chekulayev (Kiev). "Can a medical aid team consisting of students from a vocational-technical school attached to a factory participate in installation (factory) and rayon competitions?"

[Answer] Students in vocational-technical schools (on the same level as secondary special educational institutions and general education schools) cannot participate in either installation or rayon medical aid team competitions. Envisioned for them is the "Orlenok" military sports game, where medical defense problems have been included in the program.

Comrade Smirnov (Ventspils, Latvian SSR). "We use the 1972 edition of the textbook for training medical aid teams. In the textbook it states that the team's work in a center of biological destruction is done under the direction of medical workers whom medical aid team members are assisting in the inspection of the contaminated sector and in taking samples. But judging by the new Statute on Medical Aid Team Competitions, medical aid team members independently must take samples of the water, soil, and foodstuffs and send them for testing. Is there not a contradiction between what is taught and that which is required at competitions? And a second question. Nowhere is mention made about a special protective suit nor is there such a thing in the TO&E. However they require that at competitions medical aid team members work in special suits. Is that fair?"

[Answer] It in fact is stated in the textbook for training medical aid teams and posts, including later editions as well, that in a center of communicable disease medical aid teams are included in the formations and institutions of the CD medical service. And even though they fulfill their responsibilities there under the direct guidance of medical workers, this certainly does not mean that they must not be able independently to take environmental samples. There can be a situation where a medical aid team is called upon to operate independently in a center of communicable disease and it must be trained to do so. Thus there is no contradiction between what is taught and that which is required at competitions.

In a center of communicable disease medical aid team members work in gas masks and rubber gloves and they take measures to protect exposed skin. When working with especially dangerous germs a reliable means of protection is a special suit consisting of cotton coveralls, a regular or an anti-plague smock (the latter longer with ties on the cuffs), a hood or kerchief, a cotton gauze headband, protective goggles (the chauffeur type), rubber gloves and boots (rubber or regular), and a towel. Those items of protective equipment not in the TO&E will be supplied by the treatment and preventive health care institutions in which the medical aid teams are assigned.

N. Ivanov (Stavropol'skiy Kray). "Besides the diary reflecting medical health treatment and immunizational work, judges at installation competitions require you to show also the medical aid team pass, the order showing team activation, the exercise account log, the wrap-up protocol from the lesson exam, and the medical bulletin. Is this legal? Can penalty points be assessed if the documents listed above are missing?"

[Answer] The Statute on Medical Aid Team Competitions permits, based upon local conditions, supplementing the basic plan with the corresponding sections to achieve a higher quality competition. Consequently, judges have the right to demand supplemental documents (if this has been agreed upon beforehand). However penalty points affecting the standings cannot be assessed if these documents are missing.

I. Shichanin (Moscow). "Competitions are the best examination of medical aid team readiness but only in the event that they are well organized. The officiating commission must work harmoniously, without preconceived notions.

"However, that was not the case at competitions held in Gagarinskiy Rayon. All participants (18 or 19 teams) went through in a single stream, which led to the accumulation of team members at stages, their becoming nervous while waiting their turn, and haste in the officiating. They concentrated all the "injured" on a "dime"

about 5 by 10 meters in size. There were none in the center of chemical destruction and everyone was limited to a check on their ability to put the gas mask on. Only a theoretical quiz was given in the center of communicable disease and the conditions set up for the medical aid teams were unequal. In our view, even worse things were allowed where the officiating was concerned. Thus, by order of the chairman of the Red Crescent Society raykom, penalty points were assessed for nonfulfillment of the blood donor plan and other shortcomings of the Society's primary organizations. Could it be that medical aid team members bear responsibility for that?"

[Answer] First of all we note that the actions of the chairman of the Red Crescent Society raykom are improper and violate the Statute. It is forbidden for anyone to interfere in the work of the officiating commission during competitions. The same Statute stipulates that competitions of any scale other than at the republic and all-union level are to be run in two streams. The recommendation is to work out for them an example schedule and to be guided by it so that the medical aid teams don't bunch up. There cannot be any simplifications during the competition stages. Replacing the practical actions of medical aid team members with a theoretical quiz is forbidden categorically. The dimensions of centers of destruction, their equipment, and so on are stipulated and the actions of the judges strictly are regulated in the Statute.

A. Naumova (Krasnodar). "Our medical aid team is a regular winner in rayon competitions. We won the intramural [kustovyye] competitions easily this year. But the victory was not fully satisfying and here is why. When checking drill training, the judge requested that we execute commands not contained in the Statute: right and left turns while moving. In the center of chemical destruction we discovered with amazement the absence of a diagnosis on the cards. When I as commander tried to determine what mistakes we had made, the judge agitatedly responded that he was under no obligation to provide an explanation. No preliminary seminar was conducted with commanders prior to the competitions, nor was there a critique of errors made.

"There were even more unanswered questions after the kray competitions, where our medical aid team finished last. We were assessed 150 penalty points, with 115 of them for incorrect, in the judge's opinion, uniforms in the center of communicable disease. This is what happened. When there was just one element left in the center, the judge ordered the entire medical aid team to form up. Then he called the orderly to the front of the formation, ordered her to pull her pants outside her boots, and said that this was how one had to enter a center of communicable disease, adding only that you should wrap bandages beneath the trousers. He assessed 5 penalty points per team member for the uniform violation. The officiating commission rejected our protest against this action. We request that the editorial board help us sort this problem out since in the past we had worked always in this uniform, even at kray competitions, and had never been written up."

[Answer] The medical aid team operated correctly and in the proper uniform in the center of communicable disease. But even if it had violated the uniform code, too many penalty points were assessed. Judging by the letter, only a portion of which is presented here, both the judges and the medical aid team members made mistakes during the stages of the competitions. The officiating commission was negligent in its attitude towards the protest and did not provide a substantiated answer. Assessing penalty points, the judges were obliged to provide an explanation to the commanders on the errors made. After the critique, the chief judge in front of the

formation of medical aid team members must delineate the main mistakes made during the competitions and should recommend they more carefully be analyzed at a rally or conference of medical aid team members attended by medical workers, directors of enterprises, facilities, and educational institutions, and the public.

In conclusion, I would like to underscore that many (if not all) the questions raised here would not have arisen if the organizers of the competitions and the judges unfailingly had carried out the requirements of the Statute on Medical Aid Team Competitions and had placed greater attention on study of the training methods literature on that subject.

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Chemical Agent Detector Described

Moscow VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 80 signed to press 8 Sep 80
Inside Rear Cover

[Inside rear cover illustrations: "Military Chemical Reconnaissance Instrument (VPKhR)"]

[Text] Military Chemical Reconnaissance Instrument (VPKhr)



KEY:

1--hand pump; 2--shoulder strap with braid; 3--pump fitting; 4--protective caps for the fitting; 5--smoke filters; 6--heater cartridges; 7--flashlight; 8--heater; 9--pin; 10--trowel; 11--indicator tubes in cassettes; 12--instruction book for operating the instrument. Mass--2.3 kg.



KEY:

(a) Repeat work with tubes; (b) Work with tube; (c) Sarin, Soman, V-gases; (d) Hydrocyanic acid; (e) Break the ampul and pump 10 to 15 times; (f) lower layer; (g) slightly dangerous; (h) very dangerous; (i) fatal; (j) Yperite; (k) dangerous; (1) Pump 60 times, watch the color after 1 minute, use the tube at temperatures above 15° C.

Determination of Toxic Materials in the Air

1. Take two tubes, cut and break the ends, break the upper ampules of both tubes, take each tube by the marked end and shake two or three times. Place the tube in the rack. 2. Insert the experimental tube unmarked end down into the pump and pump five or six times. 3. Break the lower ampules in the tubes, shake the tubes, and watch for a change in the color of the packing.

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